

# The Twofold Character of Truth: Heidegger, Davidson, Tugendhat

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In what circle are we moving here? It is the *eukukleos alētheiē*, the well-rounded non-concealment itself, thought as the clearing – Josph Kockelmans, *On the Truth of Being*, p.281.

I. The concept of truth as *aletheia*, translated by Kockelmans as *non-concealment*, or as I shall call it *unconcealment*, is one of the founding concepts in Heidegger's thinking. It is a concept present in his early thought as well as in his later. Kockelmans himself refers to Walter Biemel's claim that taken as a whole Heidegger's thinking has a double focus: being and *aletheia*,<sup>1</sup> and the claim is clearly one with which Kockelmans himself is largely in agreement. It is, however, the same idea of truth that appears here that was famously criticised by Ernst Tugendhat<sup>2</sup> in a way that seems eventually to have led Heidegger to abandon the use of 'truth' to refer to *aletheia*.<sup>3</sup> The idea of truth as unconcealment is thus central, but also apparently, problematic. Indeed, in Tugendhat's analysis, it is not merely that Heidegger's characterization of *aletheia* as a mode of truth is without foundation, but that Heidegger's very

deployment of the concept is indicative of the limitation that Heidegger's thinking places on the possibility for genuinely critical engagement.

Beginning with Kockelman's own account of the idea of truth as unconcealment, I want to re-examine the questions at issue here, looking particularly to the way Tugendhat's criticisms have played been taken up in contemporary discussion, but also drawing, as I have elsewhere,<sup>4</sup> on the account of truth to be found in the work of Donald Davidson. My intention will be to show why it remains the case that *aletheia* has to be understood as indeed a mode of truth; that understanding this involves understanding a certain transcendental-topological structure as pertaining to *aletheia*, thereby understanding truth as standing in an essential relation to place or *topos*;<sup>5</sup> and that the fundamental role played by truth as *aletheia* does not curtail, but itself constitutes the ground for, genuine questioning or critique.

II. In his 'Introduction' to *On the Truth of Being*, Kockelmans sets out an account of Heidegger's thinking of truth as this is developed in both *Being and Time*, from 1927, and in the essay 'On the Essence of Truth', from 1930. While these two works both belong to the period of Heidegger's early thinking ('On the Essence of Truth' usually being taken to mark the beginning of the turn to the later work), Kockelmans' presentation indicates how they nevertheless provide the basis for the understanding of truth even as it continues into the later thinking. Heidegger's thinking of truth in these earlier works provides,

in fact, the essential preliminary to Kockelmans' reflections on the later thinking.

The view of truth that appears in Heidegger, and which Kockelmans delineates with some care, is a view of truth as essentially *twofold*: truth names both truth *as correctness* – the 'adequation' of sentence to thing or of sentence to world – and it names truth *as unconcealment*. The underlying argument here can be put quite simply, and in a way that need not depend exclusively on the language of either *Being and Time* or 'On the Essence of Truth'. Truth is conventionally understood as correctness. Yet in order for a sentence to stand in the right relation to that which it is about such that the sentence can be said to be 'correct', not only must the sentence already have picked out something as that about which it speaks, letting it appear as something in relation to which the sentence can be true or false, but both sentence and thing must already stand in a relation of accessibility to one another. Inasmuch as the sentence allows the thing to appear, so a certain capacity for unconcealment is already given in the nature of the sentence – language, one might say, is already disclosive – but the capacity of the sentence to uncover in this way also depends on that mode of unconcealment that allows the uncovering of both sentence and thing. Truth thus names the correctness of the sentence, and it names the original unconcealment that makes such correctness a possibility.

Although much of Tugendhat's presentation of the Heideggerian account mirrors the position just set out, Tugendhat's critique tends to overlook Heidegger's insistence on truth as indeed encompassing both correctness *and* unconcealment. Consequently, one of the responses that can be and has been made to Tugendhat consists in drawing attention to the twofold character of truth that is at issue here.<sup>6</sup> Yet Cristina Lafont and William H. Smith have argued that not only does Heidegger himself not offer any adequate refutation of Tugendhat's critique, but neither has anyone else, and the reason for this, so they claim, lies in a failure to appreciate the nature of Tugendhat's argument – an argument that is not rebutted merely by an assertion of the twofold character of truth. Thus Smith writes that: “no one has yet formulated a successful reply to Tugendhat because the force of his critique is continually misplaced, and therefore the full-force of his objections remains unaddressed”.<sup>7</sup> As Lafont and Smith view matters, the real question at issue, a question that remains even if we accept the distinction between correctness and unconcealment, is why unconcealment should itself be understood as a form of truth? Why, for instance, should we not rather treat the concept of truth as just a matter of correctness, and if we are to take unconcealment as the ground for the possibility of truth, treat unconcealment as something other than truth? Thus with regard to unconcealment as it stands in contrast to correctness, Cristina Lafont asks “what justification and what significance does it have that Heidegger chooses ‘truth’ of all words, to

designate this other phenomenon?"<sup>8</sup> The questions put by Lafont and by Smith may be thought to take on a special significance in the light of Heidegger's own apparent change of position on this matter: to what extent, one might ask, does this change of position arise from an inability to provide the justification after which Lafont asks?<sup>9</sup>

The objection that Lafont and Smith restate in Tugendhat's name depends on the idea that unconcealment lacks a feature that is characteristically associated with truth in its normal usage: its normativity. In its ordinary usage, truth is contrasted with falsity, and any claim to truth is always open to critical assessment, and so to being judged as true or false. Even if we use truth to refer to the way in the appearance of something correlates with the nature of the thing (as when one speaks of a 'true' friend as someone who not only presents themselves as a friend, but who actually is one – truth as genuine-ness), still even this usage seems to operate within a framework in which something can fail to be truthful only in virtue of appearing in a way other than it is, and so in a way that depends upon some notion of 'authentic' and inauthentic' appearance that can be normatively construed.<sup>10</sup> Yet no possible failure of truthfulness, and so no possibility of critical assessment, seems to operate with regard to the truth of unconcealment. In fact, this is already indicated by the simple fact that unconcealment is not a form of 'claiming' or asserting (not even in the derivative sense in which an appearance might be seen to carry some sort of

assertoric content), but rather provides the ground on which claims or assertions can be made and be assessed.<sup>11</sup>

Given that unconcealment is not normatively or critically constrained in this way, the question then arises, not merely *how* it can be understood as a form of truth, but *why* it should be so considered in the first place. Moreover, at this point, the argument can be seen to have an added bite. Unconcealment seems to function in a way that limits critical engagement – the particular mode of unconcealment that is the ground for any specific practice of assertion cannot itself be subjected to critical questioning. As Tugendhat comments: “If truth means unconcealment...then this means that an understanding of world in general is opened up but not that it is put to the test”.<sup>12</sup> In this light, Heidegger’s position seems to depend, not on a taking of questioning to the most fundamental level, but rather on a radical limiting of questioning: unconcealment appears as a mode of *not questioning* – a dimension into which questioning does not even enter.

III. The problem presented by Tugendhat appears, according to Lafont and Smith, to be clear and straightforward, and yet, in the literature, so they claim, it remains almost entirely unaddressed or even acknowledged. That such an obvious problem could be so completely overlooked or misunderstood ought to prompt some further query, however, and there is, indeed, more to the situation than is apparent in LaFont’s, and especially Smith’s, presentation.

While both are right to point to Tugendhat as asking after that on which Heidegger's identification of unconcealment with truth is based, and right also to point to the way in which what concerns Tugendhat is the lack of any normative dimension in the idea of unconcealment, they go too far in claiming that this has gone entirely unappreciated in earlier discussions or that attempts have not been made to respond to the justificatory demand at issue here. In the case of Kockelmans, in particular, it seems that there is an awareness of the nature of Tugendhat's basic point, as well as an attempt to respond to it.

Kockelmans does not refer to Tugendhat directly, yet not only does he reiterate the twofold character of truth in Heidegger, thereby reiterating the commitment to a notion of truth as correctness (and so to truth as having a normative dimension), but he also argues explicitly that Heidegger's claim that unconcealment is a mode of truth is not an *arbitrary* claim.<sup>13</sup> Kockelmans thus attempts to provide considerations as to *why* unconcealment should indeed be understood as a mode of truth. Consequently, if one is to reject Kockelmans' account, it cannot be on the grounds that Kockelmans ignores the sorts of objections found in Tugendhat, but must instead depend on viewing Kockelmans' responses to those objections as inadequate or unconvincing. How one assesses Kockelmans' position will obviously depend on how one thinks about the concept of truth that is at issue here. It is all too easy, in fact, for the discussion of this matter to slip into a simple

confrontation between opposing accounts of truth, rather than taking the form of a genuine engagement regarding the questions at issue. The underlying question here is thus not simply whether unconcealment is a mode of truth, but given a *prima facie* understanding of truth as correctness, whether this is sufficient as a complete account of truth, and whether what Donald Davidson calls 'the structure and content of truth' is exhausted by an approach that focuses on the normativity of truth as this operates in conjunction with the notion of correctness.

On Kockelmans account, there is no question that truth carries an important normative component that operates at the level of particular sentences and is captured in the notion of truth as correctness. Yet the fact that truth carries such normativity with it opens up the further issue as to the ground on which the normative assessment of particular sentences is itself possible. Moreover, if there are reasons for taking the ground for normativity as itself a mode of truth, then that will mean that there is a mode of truth that is not open to normative assessment in the same way as is the mode of truth associated with truth as correctness. Kockelamans claims that there are such reasons, and thus takes truth to refer both to correctness and to that which is the ground for the possibility of correctness, namely, unconcealment.

Kockelmans rehearses the Heideggerian argument for *aletheia* as that which underlies truth as correctness: the correctness of statements is only possible on the basis of a prior comportment towards beings that allows



beings to come forth into the open such that things can be stated of them, which statements may then be true or false (the beings themselves providing the measure of such truth or falsity), and this prior comportment is itself based in truth as *aletheia* – as unconcealment. In addition, however, Kockelmans also makes explicit one further claim, concluding that: “if the correctness (truth) of the statement becomes possible only through the openness of the comportment, then that which makes the correctness first possible must also, and with more original right, be taken as the essence of truth”.<sup>14</sup> It is this claim that requires further elucidation.

A key element in the argument for the identification of truth with unconcealment, as Kockelmans understands it, is undoubtedly the idea that the inquiry into essence is identical with the inquiry into that which makes possible. Independently of how we view this idea, it certainly has a lengthy and respectable philosophical provenance. Aristotle’s inquiries, paradigmatically set out in the *Metaphysics*, into the first principles that underpin the being of things – the inquiry into what is first substance (*proteousia*) – clearly depend on the idea that what determines the being of a thing (which might be interpreted, in the language Kockelmans employs, as that which makes it possible) is its essence, and there is a sense (although there remains an ambiguity here also) in which the essence of the thing can bear the same name as the thing whose essence it is. Moreover, that the essence of a thing should indeed be called by the same name that belongs to the thing is

certainly not an arbitrary suggestion, but one that derives from the idea that the essence of a thing is what that thing most properly *is* – so the name may be said to designate, first, the essence, and, secondarily, the thing to which the essence belongs. Truth may thus name correctness, but in its primary sense it names that which is the ground for correctness, and it is this that is unconcealment or *aletheia*.

The mere fact that this argument can be reconstructed, and is indeed a type of argument that seems to be assumed, and briefly alluded to, in Kockelmans account shows, at the very least, that it cannot be correct to claim that there is *no* basis, in the existing literature, for the claim that unconcealment is to be identified with truth. Perhaps the argument at issue is too readily assumed, or presented in too schematic a form, but what is surely at issue is not so much whether there is *some* basis for the claim at issue, so much as whether it is an *adequate* basis. What more can be said, then, to defend the adequacy of the position that Kockelmans advances? In the end, what must be done is to show more clearly the way in which the twofold character of truth does indeed follow even from the idea of truth as correctness. It is here that the account of truth found in Davidson proves particularly useful, providing a perspective that, although very different from that to be found in Heidegger (or in Kockelmans), nevertheless moves towards much the same conclusion. Moreover, although there has been discussion of the apparent convergence between the Davidsonian and

Heideggerian accounts of truth,<sup>15</sup> the possible relevance of the Davidsonian account to Tugendhat's objection has been largely unexplored. Before we come to Davidson, however, there is still more to be done in order properly to bring to light what is at issue in the twofold structure that truth presents in Heidegger – this is especially so in relation to an aspect of that structure that is clearly present in Heidegger's early thinking, and that is also recognised by Tugendhat, namely, its *transcendental* character.

IV. The twofold structure that appears in Heidegger's account of truth is not peculiar only to his treatment of truth alone. It is, in fact, a recurrent structure in his thinking. One can, for instance, discern a very similar structure in Heidegger's discussion of the concept of phenomena in the Introduction to *Being and Time*. There Heidegger distinguishes between two senses of 'phenomenon' writing that:

...what is designated in the first signification of φαίνόμενον ('phenomenon' as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second ('phenomenon' as semblance) are structurally interconnected. Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretension of showing itself – that is, of being a phenomenon – *can* it show itself *as* something which it is *not*, only then *can* it 'merely look like so-and-so'. When φαίνόμενον signifies 'semblance', the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded.<sup>16</sup>

A similar structure is apparent in a much later discussion of the nature of language. In 'The Way to Language', the title of which itself indicates a movement that is at the centre of the essay, Heidegger attempts to find a way to language that nevertheless already finds itself within language. As he writes:

We are here undertaking something very unusual, which we might paraphrase as follows: we try to speak about speech *qua* speech. That sounds like a formula. It is intended to serve us as a guideline on our way to language. The words: "speak, speech" are used three times in the formula, saying something different each time and yet the Same. It is this underlying Same which, in terms of the oneness that is the distinctive property of language, holds together what is kept separate in the formula. To begin with, though, the formula points to a web of relations in which we ourselves are included. The undertaking of a way to speech is woven into a kind of speaking which intends to uncover speech itself in order to present it as speech and to put it into words in the presentation – which is also evidence that language itself has woven us into the speaking.<sup>17</sup>

The way to language at issue here moves between different senses of speech and speaking, and so different senses of language, that are nevertheless essentially bound together. In uncovering a way to language, which occurs only in and through language, language is illuminated in all of these senses, but the uncovering of that way is an uncovering of the originary phenomenon of language to which we already belong – a phenomenon that Heidegger

designates as Saying: "All human language is appropriated in Saying and as such is in the strict sense of the word true language...".<sup>18</sup> In each of these cases – the inquiry into the concept of the phenomenon, the investigation of the way to language, and also the uncovering of the nature of truth – we find a mode of thinking that begins with what is immediately presented ('semblance', 'speech', 'correctness') and that looks to elucidate its nature (the conditions of its possibility) by uncovering its essential relatedness within a larger structure ('that which shows itself', 'Saying', 'unconcealment'). It is a mode of thinking that can be understood as essentially *hermeneutical* in that it does not rest content with the immediate presentation, but instead looks to uncover the framework of significance (essentially a structure of relatedness) within which that presentation is necessarily situated. There is an essential circularity at work here, since it is only through the immediacy of the presentation that the larger framework becomes at all evident (for the most part it remains withdrawn) at the same time as the presentation is itself dependent on that larger framework – a circularity that, in traditional hermeneutics, is understood in terms of the mutual dependence of whole and part.

The hermeneutical character of the thinking that is evident here is not merely something repeated at different points in Heidegger's thought, but is rather an ubiquitous, one might even say a characteristic, feature of Heidegger's thinking as a whole. Thus, even after Heidegger moves away

from any explicit reference to hermeneutics in his work,<sup>19</sup> still the same essentially hermeneutical structure remains.<sup>20</sup> Part of what is so revolutionary about Heidegger's thinking is, indeed, the way in which he brings about a hermeneutic transformation of philosophical inquiry (a transformation that, in its turn, also transforms hermeneutics). Construed as an inquiry into that which is essential – into that which is originary, as well as that which safeguards or preserves – ontological inquiry, in particular, can now be seen to take the form of the uncovering of a twofold structure that encompasses both that which is the initial focus of questioning and that which is brought forth as its proper origin and ground. Moreover, the uncovering of what is essential here is not a matter of the uncovering of some determinate character or entity – not a matter of identifying an *eidōs* or *ousia* – but is indeed the uncovering of a structure of relatedness that unifies otherwise multiple, or at least dual, elements, and does so in a way that also preserves their differentiation.

If the structure at issue here is *hermeneutical*, then it is also *transcendental*. In his discussion of Heidegger's idea of truth, Tugendhat refers to the structure of Heidegger's thinking as it moves from the conventional understanding of truth to the idea of truth as unconcealment as involving a "transformed transcendental 'reference back'".<sup>21</sup> The 'transformation' to which Tugendhat refers here is a shift in the idea of the transcendental from Husserl to Heidegger, and although Tugendhat does not himself make this

explicit, it is a transformation partly brought about by Heidegger's alignment of the transcendental with the hermeneutical.<sup>22</sup> The fact that the transcendental and hermeneutical might indeed stand in an essential relation to one another is suggested by the presence of an analogous circularity within the transcendental to that which is evident in the hermeneutical – Tugendhat's own talk of a transcendental 'reference back' might be seen to hint in just this direction (and is perhaps the same circularity that Kockelmans identifies as belonging to truth as unconcealment).<sup>23</sup> The circularity at issue here is itself indicative, however, of the way in which both the transcendental and the hermeneutical already belong, in spite of the various, and often contending, readings and misreadings attached to these notions, within the domain of philosophical *topology* or *topography*.

The topological character of the hermeneutical is perhaps easier to appreciate than is the topological character of the transcendental. The hermeneutical already brings with it, especially in its Heideggerian employment, but also in the Gadamerian, explicit concepts of situatedness and location – even in its mundane forms, hermeneutic inquiry always proceeds on the basis of the concrete engagement of the interpretation with some subject matter as it stands within a larger frame.<sup>24</sup> In comparison with the hermeneutical, the transcendental may appear a more abstract notion, based, not in factual situatedness, but in the relation of condition and conditioned. Moreover, there is an additional difficulty that arises both in the

assimilation of the transcendental to the topological and in the use of the transcendental as applying to Heidegger's twofold account of truth in its generality: although Heidegger draws explicitly on the notion of the transcendental in his early work, he explicitly abandons the concept in his later thinking, and this shift is itself associated with a shift towards a more explicitly topological orientation (the transcendental, it appears, gives way to the topological, rather than being an instantiation of it). Since Tugendhat focuses on Heidegger's account of truth primarily as developed in *Being and Time*, in which the transcendental is not put in question, this is not an issue that he is forced to address, but it is a *prima facie* problem for any account – like that developed here – that takes up Heidegger's thinking more broadly. There are thus two issues that need to be further explored: first, what is the idea of the transcendental that Heidegger rejects (and to what extent is it the same idea as is at issue in the hermeneutical structure already delineated above); second, to what extent is the transcendental indeed topological in character (and so to what extent does Heidegger's topological thinking constitute a continuation, rather than abandonment, of the transcendental as such)? In fact, both these questions come down to a question concerning how the transcendental is to be understood – and addressing that question will require that we do not assume too determinate a conception of the transcendental in advance.



No matter what else we say about the idea of the transcendental, the very heart of the concept is a certain way of thinking about the problem of *ground* – it is a grounding that is also a unifying<sup>25</sup> – and it is this that is captured in the commonplace talk of the transcendental as concerned with ‘conditions of possibility’. What the transcendental makes possible, on Heidegger’s account, however, is specifically *transcendence* – where transcendence is the capacity of Dasein to open up a world in a way that goes beyond any particular thing that may appear within that world.<sup>26</sup> In this respect, transcendence can be understood as equivalent to Dasein’s own capacity for disclosedness, and the transcendental as that which grounds such disclosedness. Already this indicates just how closely the structure of the transcendental, at least in Heidegger, is tied to the structure of truth as unconcealment. Yet since it is the relation to transcendence that Heidegger takes to be primary in the idea of the transcendental, so, as his thought develops, and he moves away from the focus on transcendence, he also moves away from the language of the transcendental. The movement away from transcendence, and so away from the transcendental, is also a move away from a focus on human Dasein as the primary locus of truth towards a more direct concentration on the happening of truth as that in relation to which even the human is disclosed.<sup>27</sup>

There is reason to think, however, that Heidegger’s particular appropriation of the transcendental as tied to transcendence in this way is

mistaken, or, at least, constitutes too narrow an understanding of what is at issue in the concept.<sup>28</sup> On this basis, one might well argue that the idea of the transcendental continues to operate in Heidegger's thinking even after Heidegger has abandoned that particular version of the transcendental that is tied to transcendence. Taken more broadly, and in a way that is also attentive to Kant's, rather than Heidegger's, use of the notion, the transcendental should be understood in terms that connect it with Kant's own geographical or topographic conception of the critical enterprise. Kant's problem is essentially how one can provide a grounding for knowledge or experience that does not appeal to what goes beyond knowledge or experience. Kant's solution, in general terms, is to look to the ground of knowledge or experience in the unity that is given within it and without which it would not be possible<sup>29</sup> (such a way of putting matters clearly echoes the hermeneutic characterisation I set out above). The term 'transcendental' can be used to refer to the ground that is thereby exhibited, to the grounding structure, and to the mode of inquiry by which such a ground is exhibited. In the terms Kant employs, the way such a transcendental grounding proceeds can be taken to be analogous to certain aspects of geometrical or topographic practice: the geometer, for instance, from the measure of a small part of its surface, is able to determine the full extent of the surface of a sphere; the topographical surveyor, by a process of repeated triangulation and traverse, is able to map the entire territory in which she or he is located.<sup>30</sup> The transcendental is

indeed a term that describes the inquiry into a certain place or *topos*, as well as the place thus exhibited, that is *our own* place, and that proceeds *from within* that very place.

Understood in this way, one can see a twofold structure already built into the very character of the transcendental as set out here. The transcendental begins with our being already given over to things; it asks after the ground for that givenness. Since it may be taken to be asking after its own grounds, the twofold character of what is at issue exhibits something of the circularity that is characteristic of the transcendental as well as the hermeneutical.<sup>31</sup> Yet in asking after the ground of our own being-given-over to things in this way, the transcendental does not abandon the givenness at issue, does not attempt to surpass it, but instead remains with it. Invoking the topological character of Kant's own understanding of the transcendental, we can say that the transcendental begins with our being already 'here/there', and what it seeks to uncover is the very place of that here/there, the very place in which we already find ourselves. The twofold is thus evident in the way being here/there is a mode of being-in-place that goes beyond the here/there of our own location – to be here/there is precisely to be opened to a place, and for that place itself to open up.<sup>32</sup> The twofold at issue can thus be said to be identical with the twofold character of place. That twofold character is one explored early on by Aristotle himself, not in the *Metaphysics*, but in his analysis of *topos* in the *Physics*, and also, although in very different terms, in

Plato's account of *chora* in the *Timaeus*.<sup>33</sup> In each case, what appears is a structure that combines a movement inwards and outwards (an infolding as well as unfolding) , an opening that is also a closing, a relating that is a distinguishing, a limiting that is a freeing up, a withdrawing that is also a coming forth.

In its most basic sense, a sense that underlies any other interpretation of the idea, the transcendental refers us to the inquiry, and the twofold structure, that is named by place or *topos* – an inquiry that, in keeping with the rest of the discussion here, is also hermeneutical (or perhaps one should say that the hermeneutical is essentially topological). Understood in this way, the transcendental can be seen to be closely aligned with that mode of thinking that takes place as the primary focus for philosophy – as closely aligned, that is, with a form of philosophical topography or topology. Such a topology turns out to be present in Heidegger's thought almost from beginning to end (it is what Heidegger calls the 'topology of being'<sup>34</sup>), and is given a particularly clear exemplification in his thinking of truth. Indeed, what Kockelmans refers to as "the *eukukleos alētheiē*, the well-rounded non-concealment itself" is identical with the place, the *topos*, that is the focus of such a topology or topography. Even the language Tugendhat employs in his inquiry into Heidegger's idea of truth carries traces of the topological structure at work here – thus Tugendhat speaks of a "depth dimension" as involved in the Heideggerian account as well as talking of what occurs in

terms of a “pointing beyond” or a “reference back”.<sup>35</sup> The topological character of Heidegger’s of thinking is especially evident in his use of the idea of *Lichtung* or ‘clearing’ to refer to truth as unconcealment. This is no mere ‘metaphor’, but a very specific way of referring to the character of place or *topos* as that opening into appearance, into *presence*, that occurs in the midst of the withdrawal into concealment ( a withdrawal that is, of course, never complete). Indeed, the very idea of unconcealment itself captures the twofold character of the event that is the clearing: unconcealment is no mere standing in the open (it is not pure transparency), but is instead a dynamic interplay of concealing/revealing. This is itself evident in the characterisation of truth as, indeed, *a-letheia*, un-concealment – the twofold is evident in the privative.

Heidegger’s own worries about the idea of the transcendental, and what underlies his eventual rejection of it, are not connected with its topological character, but almost the very opposite – they relate to his particular reading of the transcendental as necessarily implicated with the notion of transcendence. To begin with, transcendence carries with it a problematic tendency towards subjectivism – since transcendence seems to find its ground in human Dasein. In addition, however, transcendence also presupposes a certain separation of Dasein *from* world – a separation itself enshrined in the very idea of Dasein as that in which transcendence finds its ground and world as that towards which transcendence moves. In this latter respect, transcendence can be seen to threaten the very unity that must also be

presupposed here (a unity given particularly salient articulation in the topological unity of place). Yet this problematic reading of the transcendental is by no means forced upon us by anything in the notion of the transcendental itself – and Kant’s own topographic employment of the idea suggests a very different interpretation, one that is the basis for the discussion above.<sup>36</sup> On this reading, the structure of the transcendental is not to be found in the inquiry into that which underlies transcendence (understood as the move of Dasein in the direction of world), but rather in the inquiry into place or *topos*. Moreover, that inquiry is oriented towards the understanding of a twofold structure that, as twofold, is also therefore essentially unitary; it is a structure that rather than overcome a separation, is the unfolding of an essential relatedness, an originary belonging-together. The twofold character of place is thus quite distinct from the potentially dichotomous separation of Dasein and world that is implied in the idea of transcendence, and that requires a surpassing of one in the direction of the other.<sup>37</sup>

It is precisely because of the transcendental-topological (and also hermeneutic) structure that is at work in Heidegger’s twofold account of truth that one cannot prise off truth as correctness from truth as unconcealment. The latter must always be implicated in the former, even though the latter itself tends to withdraw in the face of our concern with truth as correctness. In this respect, Tugendhat’s claim that Heidegger’s turn towards truth as unconcealment results in the loss of truth as correctness, and so also in the

loss of any genuine critical sense,<sup>38</sup> gets things exactly the wrong way round: only by keeping hold of truth as unconcealment, and the twofold structure that it brings with it, can we hold on to truth as correctness. It is for just this reason that Heidegger's later acceptance of Tugendhat's claim that *aletheia* is not the same as truth has to be viewed as problematic, since it threatens to obscure the very twofold unity that is so important here. Although Heidegger clearly did not see this admission as indicating his abandonment of the concept of *aletheia*, but rather as an acceptance of the difficulty that the ordinary understanding of truth as correctness presents for any attempt to think truth differently,<sup>39</sup> still the severing of unconcealment from truth in this way threatens the very structure that is at issue in the idea of *aletheia* itself. *Aletheia*, unconcealment, does not stand apart from truth as correctness, but is, one might say, its 'other side'; there are, in an important sense, not two separated concepts here, but two aspects of a single structure – although a structure that constantly turns a part of itself away from us. This is what it means, in fact, to talk of the *twofold* character of truth: truth as unconcealment is the essence, that is the origin and ground, of truth as correctness.

V. If Lafont and Smith can claim that the nature of Tugendhat's objection to Heidegger's account of truth has been misunderstood and overlooked, then one might equally claim that the real nature of the twofold conception of truth in Heidegger has also been misunderstood and sometimes ignored. Certainly

Tugendhat himself seems to have no real sense of the topological dimension in which Heidegger's twofold understanding of truth moves. Indeed, one might view Tugendhat's objection, and the reiteration of that objection, at least in terms of the insistence on the normativity of truth by writers such as Lafont and Smith, as itself constituting a refusal of the very possibility that the inquiry into truth might move in such a direction – a refusal of any transcendental-topological dimension to truth. Although this could well be taken as the real core of Tugendhat's position, one might also take it as the basis for a restatement of Tugendhat's objection: Why should we look to any 'transcendental-topological' structure as necessary at all here? Why should we look to anything beyond truth as correctness? Why should we look for anything as the ground for correctness? One response to such a restated version of Tugendhat's critique would be to rehearse once again exactly the sorts of arguments just considered. Yet there is another, and perhaps more useful, response, that is also available – one that need not draw, at least not initially, on ideas of the hermeneutical, the transcendental or the topological. The source for this response is the work of Donald Davidson. There one finds, as in Heidegger, a conception of truth as also twofold in character: truth belongs to individual sentences, but, on the Davidsonian account, it also inheres in the larger framework within which those sentences are located. What is important about this account from the perspective of Tugendhat's objection, is that it shows the necessity of understanding truth in a way that is



not restricted to truth in its normative sense alone – a conclusion arrived at by means of some fairly straightforward considerations concerning the way truth itself operates and the other concepts with which it is implicated. In the larger context of Davidson's thinking as a whole, there is a sense of truth at work that turns out to operate within the same transcendental-topological dimension as can also be discerned in Heidegger, but this is a dimension that is arrived at in the course of Davidson's thinking, rather than one that is assumed from the start.

At first sight, however, far from providing a parallel to the Heideggerian account, the Davidsonian position might be thought to exemplify what Heidegger takes to be the conventional understanding of truth as correctness. A key feature in Davidson's account of truth is that truth is indeed a property of individual sentences, and as it belongs to sentences, so it carries the normative dimension emphasised by Tugendhat.<sup>40</sup> Yet although Davidson does indeed take truth to belong, in its standard usage, to individual sentences, truth also figures, as I noted above, as part of the 'background' against which individual sentences can be true or false, and in this respect, truth not only goes beyond what is given in the individual sentence but it also exceeds what is captured by any notion of correctness. The way in which truth functions here is evident both in Davidson's inquiries into the concept of truth, and in his account of the nature of linguistic understanding and communication.<sup>41</sup>

As developed in the idea of radical interpretation, the possibility of understanding speakers – of interpreting their utterances and actions, and identifying their attitudes – depends on the application of the Davidsonian ‘principle of charity’. Charity requires that, in interpreting a speaker, one must take their beliefs and utterances to be, for the most part, true (and so as also in agreement with one’s own beliefs and utterances). The assumption of overall truth is an assumption that is not only prior to any particular interpretive encounter, but it is not defeasible in the face of any such encounter: that utterances and beliefs are generally true is a requirement if utterances and beliefs are to have content, that is, if they are to be meaningful.<sup>42</sup> In the associated idea of triangulation, a notion that appears in Davidson’s more developed thinking, meaning (or, more broadly, content), including the meaning of utterances as well as the content of states of mind, is seen to be dependent on the situation of the speaker within a tripartite structure encompassing self, others, and world.<sup>43</sup> It is not only that we come to understand another speaker’s utterances, attitudes and actions through being able to relate aspects of the other’s behaviour to our own, as well as to features of the larger environmental situation in which we are jointly located, but that it is only through the relatedness between ourselves, others, and features of the world that utterances, attitudes, and actions take on the meaning (or content) that, in large part, identifies and individuates them.<sup>44</sup> In this sense, it is on the basis of their relatedness within the tripartite structure

of self, others, and world, that utterances, attitudes, and actions are constituted *as utterances, attitudes and actions*, and so too, since speakers are in turn constituted *as speakers* by the meanings (the contents) that make up their mental lives, are speakers constituted *as speakers* on the basis of the mutual relatedness that is worked out within the structure of triangulation.<sup>45</sup>

The possibility of truth as a property of sentences, or of individual utterances, arises only on the basis of the conditions that make such sentences and utterances meaningful – that constitute them as sentences or utterances. The conditions that make for the possibility of meaning, and so for the possibility of truth as attaching to individual sentences, and so as being either truth or false, are the conditions that are identical with the obtaining of the mutual relatedness between self, other, and world within the structure of triangulation. The obtaining of that structure is not a matter of the being true of any particular sentence or sentences, but it is a matter of the being true (and not just being *held true*<sup>46</sup>) of the body of sentences, as a whole and for the most part, and this is because it cannot be the case that the relatedness at issue might fail without an accompanying failure of meaning, which also means a failure in the possibility of individual sentences being true or false – without, in other words, a failure in normativity. Indeed, without the relatedness that is articulated in triangulation there can be no speakers, no utterances, no attitudes, no actions. When understood specifically in relation to belief and utterance, the obtaining of the relatedness that is worked out within the

structure of triangulation is the obtaining of the overall truth of belief and utterance in a way exactly analogous to the requirement that is at issue elsewhere in Davidson in the principle of charity. It is thus that Davidson can write that it “cannot be the case that our general picture of the world and our place in it is mistaken, for it is this picture which informs the rest of our beliefs and makes them intelligible, whether they be true or false”.<sup>47</sup>

One way of capturing the point at stake here is by saying that the very possibility of any individual sentence having a truth value (that is being true or false) depends on many other sentences being true (but in a way that does not allow any identification of just which sentences must be true). The symmetry that operates in respect of truth and falsity at the level of individual sentences – a symmetry reflected in the principle of bivalence – does not hold with respect to the larger body of sentences within which individual sentences are always nested. The position described here could be viewed as equivalent to a form of coherentism, since it is similar to the idea according to which any single belief requires connection within a larger system of belief, or as akin to the thesis of linguistic holism, according to which a sentence is only meaningful in the context of a system of sentences, namely, a language.<sup>48</sup> The difference, however, is that neither coherentism nor linguistic holism make explicit the way in which it is indeed *truth* that is implicated here. Meaning does not arise on the basis merely of the interconnection of sentences or beliefs, and so cannot be construed on the

basis of some purely 'internal' system of connections, and in a way that stands apart from speakers' engagement in the world (if such a possibility is even conceivable). For there to be meaning is already for meaning to be implicated with the world, and so for it to be also already tied to truth. In this way the possibility of the meaning of any individual sentence or belief mirrors the conditions on which the possibility of the truth or falsity of any individual sentence also rests. Sentences and beliefs are meaningful (have content), and so can be true or false, only inasmuch as they are nested within a larger body of sentences and beliefs that are, for the most part, true – that are already connected with the world.

One might respond to this position by insisting that the truth that is supposed to belong to the larger body of sentences can only be a truth that attaches to sentences individually. So to say that truth inheres in the body of sentences implies that most of the individual sentences that make up that body of sentences must be true. Yet this would be to deny that truth does indeed attach to the *body* of sentences taken together (the truth of the body of sentences would directly reduce to the truth of a number of individual sentences<sup>49</sup>), and would be to reassert a sense of truth that, because it does indeed attach to each sentence individually, and so also entails that each individual sentence might be true or false, opens up the very possibility that has to be ruled out, namely, that the entire body of sentences could, for the most part, be false (if any individual sentence can be false, and if the truth of

the entire body of sentences is just a matter of the truth of individual sentences, then the entire body of sentences could be, for the most part, false). The possibility of meaning, and the possibility, therefore, of individual truth or falsity, depends on a sense of truth that is not reducible to the truth of individual sentences, and that is also not normatively constrained. Here, by following through a Davidsonian line of argument, we come up against the real limit of Tugendhat's position, but also to the beginning of Heidegger's.<sup>50</sup>

Although it can be seen to emerge from Davidson's account of the conditions that underpins the possibility of meaning and understanding, the idea that truth cannot be understood in terms of correctness or correspondence tends to be implicit in that account rather than a central theme. Elsewhere, however, Davidson takes up the matter quite directly. This is not surprising, since one of Davidson's distinctive contributions to twentieth-century analytic thought has been the idea that one can take truth as the basic concept in the understanding of meaning.<sup>51</sup> Davidson thus appropriates the formal mechanism of Alfred Tarski's theory of truth as the template for a formal theory of meaning. Already this should indicate the potential danger in making too radical a distinction between truth and meaning: the concepts are distinct, but as Davidson shows (and as is evident from the discussion above), they are also closely related. Tarski viewed his own truth definition as entailing a correspondence conception of truth. Davidson argues, however, that the Tarskian approach, while it may appear

to make use of notions that might be viewed as analogous to correspondence (the idea of 'satisfaction', as well as the notion of translational equivalence),<sup>52</sup> does not commit one to an identification of truth with correspondence.<sup>53</sup>

Indeed, Davidson devotes considerable attention to showing that correspondence *cannot* be adequate as an elucidation of truth.<sup>54</sup> One reason Davidson gives for this is that there simply is nothing to which true sentences correspond in any interesting or relevant fashion.<sup>55</sup> But one can also say, more generally, that any notion of correspondence must, in any case, always presuppose truth, and so cannot elucidate it. This is because only the right sort of correspondence makes for truth, but saying what counts as the right sort here requires that we be able to specify what truth is in a way that itself constrains the notion of correspondence (in the right way), and this requires a notion of truth that is other than truth as correspondence.<sup>56</sup> The same point applies to any other concept we may use as a means of explaining truth or as a surrogate for it. The fact is that truth is always presupposed in our attempt to explain or give an account of truth.<sup>57</sup> Even a Tarskian truth definition already presupposes that we have a grasp of the way the concept of truth works independently of the Tarskian definition itself, since the Tarskian account depends on the idea of translation into an already understood language (and so a language in which we already have a grasp of truth).<sup>58</sup>

Here, once again, truth appears as a concept that constrains discourse, in a way that is additional to the constraint associated with the normative

operation of truth in respect of individual sentences, but can never be fully elucidated within such discourse, since it constrains even the normative concept of truth that it operates with respect to individual sentences.

In Davidson, as In Heidegger, truth carries a twofold sense: as 'correctness' and as that on which the possibility of correctness is based. This possibility is understood in Heidegger in terms of the idea of unconcealment, understood, in one form, as the clearing. Correctness thus finds its ground in the prior opening up of the world that first allows for the possibility of action or of assertion. Davidson does not use the same language as Heidegger, and yet the structure that he delineates through the idea of triangulation is also essentially a form of clearing, or opening up. It is fundamentally a structure of *relatedness* that depends on a certain mode of spatiality in which the realisation of meaning, of presence, occurs through the becoming proximate of human beings to themselves, to one another, to other creatures and other things, within the framework of a single world, as that occurs in and through specific places and spaces. While differences in language, sources, and style cannot be ignored, one also cannot afford to allow oneself to be distracted from the points of convergence that may lie beneath. Those points of convergence are especially important in the thinking of truth that is at work in Heidegger and Davidson, since each provides resources to assist in the illumination of the other, and to allow a better understanding of the topology that they both endeavour to explore.



V. The twofold character of truth as it appears in Davidson mirrors the twofold appearance of truth in Heidegger. One might argue that Davidson's account lacks the properly ontological element that is present in Heidegger's, except that the very idea of the twofold that is at work in the concept of truth at issue here brings with it a transformed conception of what ontology might be – a conception that moves the ontological in the direction of the topological, and so in the direction of a structure that does indeed seem to be at work, if through different modes of expression, in both thinkers. A proper understanding of the twofold character of truth as it appears in Davidson and in Heidegger depends on understanding both the transcendental-topological (and also hermeneutical) structure that underpins Heidegger's argument for unconcealment as the proper origin and ground of correctness, and the formal-analytic structure evident in Davidson that reveals the truth of individual assertions as always dependent on truth as it inheres in the larger background to assertion (a sense of truth that stands in the background even of attempts to inquire into or to define truth itself). These two aspects to the twofold conception of truth can both be seen to point towards the character of truth as pertaining both that which is spoken or asserted, and, more fundamentally, to the prior involvement with the world on the basis of which such speaking or asserting is possible.

The idea of truth as other than correctness remains somewhat obscure, but this is because the fact of our being already given over to the world – our being ‘in’ the world, which is to say, our being always ‘placed’ – is itself obscure, and must always remain so. Even the attempt to thematize that very ‘being-given-over-to’, that very ‘being-in’, that very ‘placedness’, is to presuppose it. It also remains the case that the idea of truth at issue here cannot be subjected to normative assessment in any direct way – it is not a sense of truth that operates with respect to the idea of a bivalent ‘truth value’. Indeed, what Davidson’s argument shows, in particular, is that the idea of bivalent truth – normative truth – already implies the idea of a truth that is not bivalent. There is thus a symmetry that operates with respect to truth and falsity at the level of individual assertion, but which does not operate at the level, one might say, of assertion *as a practice*, since the practice of assertion presupposes that assertion is mostly true – and this follows from the close reciprocity that obtains between truth and meaning (a reciprocity that does not hold between truth and falsity).<sup>59</sup> As truth operates within the practice of assertion, so it also operates in the same way as part of the practice of criticism: criticism depends on the same twofold character of truth that distinguishes between that which is the focus of critical assessment and that which enables such critical assessment to proceed. There is thus no failure of critical capacity in being unable to assess as true or false one’s original being-placed in relation to things – there is, indeed, no sense to attach to the idea of

critical assessment or engagement that could be applied here. Critical assessment, like assertion, is always tied to particular claims or statements, but as soon as we move to attend to such claims or statements, we are no longer dealing with anything that properly belongs to the structure of what Heidegger calls unconcealment. The fact that unconcealment cannot be taken as a direct focus for critical judgment – one cannot say of unconcealment either that it is false (as opposed to true) or that it is not unconcealing (which does not mean that it does not also conceal) – does not mean, however, that the idea of truth as unconcealment stands entirely apart from *any* critical practice.

The idea of truth as unconcealment is not an idea arrived at merely by some sort of unquestioned revelation, but arises out of an original questioning of the possibility of truth as correctness. Indeed, the preceding pages have been concerned with nothing if not the attempt to argue for and to elucidate the idea of truth that is at issue here – they thus operate *within* a framework of criticism, rather than outside of it – and so also within a certain normative practice. One must be clear, however, that this is not a normative practice directed *at* unconcealment as such, but is rather part of the philosophical inquiry *within which* that idea is taken up. One might add here that the idea of truth as unconcealment itself supports and sustains the possibility of any form of critical engagement, and not only in the sense noted above in which it provides the necessary ‘background’ against which specific criticisms operate.

Genuine criticism, genuine questioning, depends on there being a space for thinking in which different possibilities and alternatives can be envisaged, in which connections and disconnections can become evident. It requires something like the very place that is at issue in Heidegger's notion of the clearing – the opening up of truth in the unconcealment of the clearing is thus itself the opening up of the possibility of questioning and of critique.

*Aletheia*, unconcealment, is one of the terms that Heidegger gives to the original dynamic opening-up of the world – this 'event of truth' is the *Ereignis* that it is also the happening of the Fourfold that is the worlding of world.<sup>60</sup> *Aletheia* does not occur as some strange ethereal event occurring outside of or beyond the concrete world in which we find ourselves – it occurs both in the temporalized-spatialized unfolding of ordinary life and activity, and in the character of the ordinary as part of a larger happening of history as that occurs in and through certain encompassing forms. Heidegger gives a name to that which determines the contemporary happening of truth: *Gestell*, meaning, in English, something like 'framework' or 'enframing'.<sup>61</sup> *Gestell*, he says, is the essence of the technological mode in which the contemporary world unfolds itself.<sup>62</sup> If this is so, however, then Heidegger's own analysis of *Gestell*, his critique of technological modernity, provides a striking exemplification of the way his twofold conception of truth not only allows for a mode of critical engagement, rather than closing it off, but is centrally oriented towards just such critique – and to a more encompassing and radical

mode of critique than is perhaps envisaged in the normativity of truth as captured in the idea of truth as merely 'correctness'.

It is through the distinction between truth as correctness and truth as unconcealment that we are opened up to the possibility of a form of critique that, even though always expressed in terms of particular claims, can nevertheless engage with and draw attention to the larger framework within which our modes of thinking, and indeed, our very lives, are shaped and oriented. Moreover, part of Heidegger's own argument here, even if not entirely explicit, is surely that the refusal to acknowledge the twofold character of truth – the refusal to allow that there is a larger transcendental-topological determination to thinking, the refusal to recognise the *placed* happening of truth as such – is itself characteristic of the contemporary mode of unconcealment that is *Gestell*. It is thus that Heidegger can say of the world in which we now find ourselves that it is a world that no longer thinks; that no longer holds open a space for genuine questioning; that, one might say, no longer allows for the possibility of critical engagement of a fundamental kind. Kockelmans' draw together some of the various lines of argument at issue here when he writes:

When truth became reduced to correctness, man himself became the center and focal point of all beings. And when man began to circle about himself in search of certainty and security, thinking gradually became a pro-posing, positing presentation, and the Being of beings

changed into sheer objectivity. All of that prepared the way for the modern era of technicity, concerning which man, thus, has completely lost the truth.<sup>63</sup>

The Heideggerian critique of technology, so central to Heidegger's later thinking, is thus itself closely tied to his twofold idea of truth.

If the idea of truth as unconcealment can in any way be said to set a *limit* to critical inquiry, a *limit to questioning*, it is only in the sense that it functions as its proper *ground*:<sup>64</sup> in understanding the twofold character of truth, we understand how questioning arises only on the basis of our prior being-given over to the world, and so on the basis of a singular opening-up of world in its concreteness, but we also understand how the most fundamental questioning of all must be directed at the very opening into possibility, and so into an inexhaustible multiplicity, that occurs in any and every such opening – even that which belongs to technological modernity, even that which would orient itself only to 'correctness'.

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<sup>1</sup> *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p.1. My own claim is that the focus on being and truth are together encompassed by the focus on *place*.

<sup>2</sup> See Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', in Brice R. Wachterhauser (ed.), *Hermeneutics and Truth* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1994), pp.83-97.

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<sup>3</sup> See Heidegger, 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking', in *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p.69 – the original essay is in *Zur Sachen des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemayer, 1969). Although there has been some controversy as to the extent to which Tugendhat's critique was recognized by Heidegger himself (a controversy briefly discussed by Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, trans. G. Harmon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.116-117), it seems clear that Heidegger was indeed aware of, and responsive to, the issues Tugendhat raises (as indicated by the 1964 letter from Heidegger to Tugendhat cited by Mark Wrathall in *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.37-38).

<sup>4</sup> See especially my *Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Unfortunately, I do not discuss the Tugendhat criticism explicitly here, just as Kockelmans does not discuss it explicitly in *On the Truth of Being*. Although, in hindsight, it would have been useful to have taken up the Tugendhat discussion directly in this earlier work, my failure to do so was partly a function of the fact that those criticisms simply do not have the same salience from a Davidsonian perspective as they may appear to have from the Heideggerian – see my discussion in Section V below.

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<sup>5</sup> See Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006) esp

Chapter Four.

<sup>6</sup> See for instance, Wrathall's discussion in *Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History*, p.35.

<sup>7</sup> William H. Smith, 'Tugendhat's Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Truth', *Inquiry* 50 (2007), p.157.

<sup>8</sup> Christina LaFont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, p.116. Lafont's query echoes the Tugendhat's questioning concerning: "With what right and with what meaning Heidegger chooses the word 'truth' to characterize his metatranscendental reference back [to unconcealment]', 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', p.84.

<sup>9</sup> According to Wrathall, not at all – instead, given the way Heidegger's usage deliberately went against conventional ways of thinking, his apparent change of position was "nothing more than a pragmatic response to the refusal to pay attention to his warnings" (Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, p. 37). My own reading largely agrees with Wrathall on this point, although, as will be evident below, I see it as a more problematic response than does Wrathall. Having said this, however, it remains the case that the posing of the original question concerning justification is a useful starting point for inquiring into the matters at issue.



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<sup>10</sup> Consequently, one cannot adequately respond to Tugendhat by arguing that the notion of truth as correctness represents only one of a range of possible meanings – although truth may be said to have an application outside of the linguistic according to which truth is understood as ‘faithfulness’, such a sense of truth can itself be construed in terms of the correlation of word with deed, of promise with fulfilment, of semblance with reality, in a way that also lends itself to being understood in terms of something like correctness (especially as connected with correspondence) .

<sup>11</sup> In this respect, it seems to me mistaken to attempt to respond to Tugendhat by arguing that there is a properly normative dimension that operates in relation to unconcealment – something that seems to be attempted by Smith, ‘Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem’, pp.174-177, and also, to some extent (although in a very different way), by Daniel Dahlstrom – see Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.419-423. This is an issue to which I shall return, however, in Section V below, since although unconcealment cannot itself carry any normative element (since it is what makes normativity possible), this does not mean that the *idea* of truth as unconcealment is beyond normative assessment (essentially the point Dahlstrom contests) nor that we cannot critically engage with *particular modes* of unconcealment (the point Smith takes up).

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<sup>12</sup> 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', p.95.

<sup>13</sup> See Kockelmans, *On the Truth of Being*, p.4.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.8.

<sup>15</sup> In addition to my own work, see especially Timothy J. Nulty, *Primitive Disclosive Alethism: Davidson, Heidegger, and the Nature of Truth* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006); Mark Wrathall. 'The Conditions of Truth in Heidegger and Davidson', *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, pp.40-56; and also Mark Okrent, 'Davidson, Heidegger, and Truth', in Jeff Malpas, (ed.), *Dialogues with Davidson* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 20011).

<sup>16</sup> *Being and Time*, translated John Macquarie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), H30.

<sup>17</sup> Heidegger, 'The Way to Language', *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p.112

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p.133.

<sup>19</sup> See Heidegger, 'A Dialogue on Language', *On the Way to Language*, pp.28-32.

The idea of the hermeneutical that emerges here is developed in direct relation to an idea of the twofold, understood in terms of the twofold of presence and what is present, that is also a "simple oneness" (p.30). What this discussion indicates is indeed the fundamental role of the idea of the twofold in Heidegger's thinking – it does not refer only to the structure of truth nor does the question of truth stand apart from the question of being.

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The ontological difference is itself one form in which the twofold appears, although to think the ontological difference in terms of the twofold is to think the difference in terms of its essential unity.

<sup>20</sup> The shift away from the hermeneutical, like the shift away from the transcendental that I discuss briefly below, is actually a shift towards the topological. Yet inasmuch as the topological is already at work in the very idea of the hermeneutical as well as in the idea of the transcendental, then, regardless of Heidegger's own terminological preferences, the shift here must be seen as actually a realization of the topological character that belongs to the hermeneutical and the transcendental as such – and also, therefore, as a continuation of the transcendental and the hermeneutical in topological form, which is to say, in the form essential to them.

<sup>21</sup> 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', p.84. Tugendhat also refers to this movement of 'metatranscendental' (see the passage quoted from 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', p.84, in n7 above) as another means to distinguish it from the transcendental as it appears in Husserl. Part of what distinguishes the Heideggerian from the Husserlian notion of the transcendental, although Tugendhat does not make any real use of this idea, is precisely Heidegger's alignment of the transcendental with the hermeneutical.

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- <sup>22</sup> Heidegger also names the structure at issue here as *phenomenological*, implying an even more significant shift in the conception of phenomenology – something that is evident in Tugendhat's discussion.
- <sup>23</sup> The circularity evident here, both as a feature of the transcendental and the hermeneutical, is explored in Malpas, 'The Transcendental Circle', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75 (1997), pp.1-20.
- <sup>24</sup> See Malpas, 'The Beginning of Understanding: Event, Place, Truth', in Jeff Malpas and Santiago Zabala (eds), *Consequences of Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2010).
- <sup>25</sup> See Malpas, 'Ground, Unity, and Limit', in *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, forthcoming (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, in press, 2011).
- <sup>26</sup> See, for instance: Heidegger, *Being and Time*, H366, and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp.160-166; see also the discussion in Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), pp.162-171.
- <sup>27</sup> See *Heidegger's Topology*, Chapter Four, esp. pp.175-201.
- <sup>28</sup> This is an issue taken up at number of places in Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, forthcoming (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011).
- <sup>29</sup> See 'The Transcendental Circle'; see also 'Ground, Unity, and Limit', in Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*.

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- <sup>30</sup> See Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel, 'Kant's Geography of Reason' (with Karsten Thiel), in Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (eds), *Reading Kant's Geography* (New York: SUNY Press, in press, 2010).
- <sup>31</sup> See 'The Transcendental Circle', p.00.
- <sup>32</sup> To some extent one might argue that this idea is itself an echo of what is at issue in the idea of transcendence, but it also eschews certain key aspects of transcendence, namely, the move from one element in the direction of another. Here rather than a move *across* or *beyond*, the movement is an opening-up accomplished at the same time as a turning-in.
- <sup>33</sup> See my discussion of in 'The Place of Space: Geography and Philosophical Topography', *Planning and Environment C: Space and Society*, forthcoming, (2011).
- <sup>34</sup> Heidegger, 'Seminar in Le Thor 1968', Four Seminars, trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), p.41.
- <sup>35</sup> See especially 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', p.91. Such topological elements are never taken up by Tugendhat, however, and are neither made explicit nor are their implications drawn out. This partly reflects the limitations in Tugendhat's own appreciation in what is at work here, although it is also a function of the fact that Tugendhat's discussion remains so much focussed on the earlier thinking, especially *Being and Time*, in which the topological

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character of Heidegger's thinking is not yet fully realised. By contrast, if one looks at the account of unconcealment as set out, for instance, in 'The Origin of the Work of Art' (or in almost any of the later writings, including 'The End of Philosophy and the ask of Thinking' – see esp. pp.65-70), the topological framework of Heidegger's thinking is to the fore: here *aletheia* is clearly understood in terms of *a certain happening of place*.

<sup>36</sup> Which is not to say that Heidegger's reading of the transcendental as tied to transcendence is entirely without foundation, but rather that it is mistaken to see transcendence, in the way Heidegger understands it, as the underlying and determining idea in the structure of the transcendental.

<sup>37</sup> The idea of transcendence can itself be seen as based in a misapprehension of what is at issue in the phenomenon of place – but as such, it can also be seen as an attempt to engage, even if mistakenly, with the topology that is at issue here.

<sup>38</sup> See 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth', pp.94-95.

<sup>39</sup> See Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, pp.37-38.

<sup>40</sup> Although Davidson does not understand this sense of truth as entailing any substantive notion of truth as correspondence – see n.52 below.

<sup>41</sup> For a brief overall summary of the Davidsonian position see Malpas, 'Donald Davidson', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

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<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/davidson/>; see also *Donald*

*Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning*, esp. Chapt 2.

<sup>42</sup> See, for instance, Davidson, 'Belief and the Basis of Meaning', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., 2001), p.153.

<sup>43</sup> See Davidson 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', in *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp.205-220.

<sup>44</sup> Utterances, attitudes and actions are, on a Davidsonian account, also identified and individuated through their causes and causal effects, but this is not independent of the 'rational' (that is meaningful or contentful) connections that are also at work – see Malpas, 'The Constitution of the Mind: Kant and Davidson on the Unity of Consciousness', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, (1999), pp.1-30.

<sup>45</sup> See the discussion of this in Malpas, 'Philosophy, Topography, Triangulation', in Gerhard Preyer (ed), *Triangulation* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming, 2011).

<sup>46</sup> This is because the distinction between *being* true and *being held* true is itself a distinction that, inasmuch as it is a meaningful or contentful distinction, can only be given meaning in respect of individual sentences – the distinction itself depends on a larger context within which it is embedded.

<sup>47</sup> 'Three Varieties of Knowledge', p.214.

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<sup>48</sup> To some extent, Davidson himself accepts both such positions, but only to the extent that they are viewed as not concerned only with meaning, but as also encompassing truth – that is, both have to be construed in ‘externalist’ rather than ‘internalist’ terms. Yet the characterization of Davidson’s position as ‘coherentist’ misleads more than it illuminates – which is why Davidson later took back his own characterization of his position as a ‘coherence theory’. See his ‘Afterthoughts (1987)’, appended to ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’, in *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp.154-155.

<sup>49</sup> A possibility that is ruled out here, since there is no single set of sentences that must be true in order for the body of sentences to be (mostly) true – neither is it the case that the body of sentences makes up a determinate set of sentences nor is it the case that the set of individual sentences that must be true if the body of sentences is to be true is determinate either.

<sup>50</sup> There is also an obvious connection to Wittgenstein here (especially the Wittgenstein of *On Certainty*), although on some readings Wittgenstein stands in a closer relation to coherentism than would Davidson or Heidegger.

<sup>51</sup> An idea first set out in ‘Truth and Meaning’, in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp.17-42.



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<sup>52</sup> In 'True to the Facts', Davidson defends a reading of the Tarskian account as a species of correspondence account, thereby also defending the idea that correspondence captures something important about truth – see 'True to the Facts', *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp.37-54; see also 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, p.139-140. The basis for Davidson's original acceptance of correspondence as a core element in the idea of truth is that truth involves "the relation between a statement and something else" ('True to the Facts', p.38) – a relation, one might say, between words and objects ('A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.139). This is an admission Davidson later retracts – see especially 'Afterthoughts (1987)', *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp.154-155. Davidson's retraction is not based, however, on a change of mind about the nature of truth, but rather about whether 'correspondence' is a helpful notion here. Even in a 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', he acknowledges that his use of the idea of correspondence is neither "straightforward" nor is it "nonmisleading" ('A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge', p.139). In his later comments, he says of the nature of the mistake that it is "in a way only a misnomer, but terminological infelicities have a way of breeding conceptual confusion...Correspondence theories have always been conceived as providing an explanation or analysis of truth, and this a

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Tarski-style of truth certainly does not do”, ‘Afterthoughts (1987)’, p.154-155.

<sup>53</sup> See Davidson, *Truth and Predication* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005), pp.37-42 & 155-156.

<sup>54</sup> There is a sense of correspondence that can be seen to be at work in the notion of correctness – a procedure is correct, for instance, if it matches the rules that govern such a procedure, and a claim is correct if what it claims fits that which the claim is about – but the notion of correspondence at work here is not such as to enable it to be generalised in any useful way, and it certainly cannot serve to provide a genuine explanation or elucidation of the sense of correctness that is at work in relation to truth (see n.52 above). Thus, while there are two senses of truth to be found in Davidson, they are just the sense of truth associated with the truth or falsity of sentences (‘correctness’) – which is not to be identified with any substantive notion of correspondence any more than it is to be identified with, for instance, coherence, warranted assertibility, or pragmatic usefulness – and the sense of truth that inheres in the larger body of sentences (or better, in the overall involvement in the world as that is expressed in terms of triangulation) against which the truth or falsity of individual sentences is possible.

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<sup>55</sup> See *Truth and Predication*, p.41. This is the decisive consideration against correspondence theories and undermines any substantive sense in which truth can be understood as correspondence. It is, however, less relevant to the issues concerning the twofold character of truth.

<sup>56</sup> See 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp.193-194. One might argue that this does not demonstrate that truth cannot be a matter of correspondence, but only that there is no way to elucidate the form of correspondence that belongs to truth. My use of the argument here, however, can be taken as directed only against that weaker claim – the stronger claim is undermined by the Davidsonian point noted above to the effect that there is nothing significant to which true sentences can correspond.

<sup>57</sup> This holds in relation to correctness also: since correctness applies more broadly than just to truth alone, so knowing what sense of correctness is at issue in talk of truth depends on already having a prior sense of truth. Correctness is thus not an elucidation of truth, but merely functions, in the appropriate context, as another way of referring to truth (or to one sense of truth).

<sup>58</sup> 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, pp.194-195

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<sup>59</sup> Which reinforces the idea that there are two sense of truth at work here: one in which truth is defined in relation to falsity, and the other in which it is defined as that which makes possible the disjunctive possibly of the true and the false.

<sup>60</sup> I use *Ereignis* here to refer to the event of truth, but *Ereignis* is a difficult term that can also refer to a more fundamental event – a radical turning of and turning back to the originary event of unconcealment. It might be said that *Ereignis* properly means the latter. There is, however, an essential equivocality at work here that cannot and should not be eliminated, and that is common to almost all of Heidegger's key terms (see Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, p.12). On the idea that *Gestell* might itself be thought of as a form of *Ereignis*, see Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, pp.288-289.

<sup>61</sup> See Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, p.280.

<sup>62</sup> See the discussion of this matter in *ibid*, pp.288-289.

<sup>63</sup> *On the Truth of Being*, p.233. At the end of the paragraph in which this passage appears, Kockelmans quotes from Egbert Schuurman: "Heidegger pleads for reflective consideration for Being or devotion to Being to show that the origin of technology is a *truth-event*" – Schuurman, *Technology and the Future* (Toronto: Wedge Publishing, 1980), p.89.

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<sup>64</sup> The sense of 'limit' alluded to here is a sense of limit to which Heidegger himself draw attention in a number of places – see Malpas, 'Ground, Unity, and Limit', p.00.