Action, Intentionality, and Content

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Edward Munch’s ‘The Scream’, painted in a number of versions in 1893, is one of the best known works of modern art – even more famous, perhaps, since the theft of one version of the painting in Oslo in August, 2004. Perhaps you can bring an image of the painting to mind, but if you don’t quite recall the picture, let the art critic Robert Hughes remind you:

...a ghost with a squalling mouth, it curves with the rhythm of the sunset clouds and the vicious looking pool of the fjord. Can only have been painted by a madman, Munch scribbled in the upper part of the picture, and one senses the separation between normal and neurotic experience in the two ordinary figures, walking on, for whom the sunset holds no such terrors; they cannot hear the Scream. The perspective of the railing, rushing away, with the vertiginous gulf of landscape below it, combines with the threatening sky to create one of the most baleful environments for a figure in all modern art. The otherness of nature has reduced man to a cipher, a worm, “an O without a figure”.

What is the relation between the description that Hughes provides here and Hughes’s own seeing of the painting? How does the seeing differ from the describing? Is the content of the describing different from the content of the seeing?

For many contemporary philosophers, the relation between Hughes’s seeing of the painting and his describing is simple enough, the seeing is a cause of the describing (though things get more complicated, and contentious, when we ask whether the one is a justification for the other). But in addition to this some would also say that there is a basic difference between the seeing and the describing that is best expressed in terms of a difference in the content of the one as against the other: while the content of the describing is propositional and conceptual, the content of the seeing is non-propositional and non-conceptual. This view, which is often seen to have its contemporary origins in the work of Gareth Evans, takes there to be a sharp dichotomy between the sort of content that belongs to our judging and believing (and so also to linguistic acts such as describing) and that which belongs to our
seeings, hearings and the like – between the content of thought and the content of experience. As Evans writes: “The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual or non-conceptualised. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualisation… The process of conceptualisation or judgement takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state (with a content of a certain kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of cognitive state (with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual content).”

Sometimes the distinction at issue here is explicated purely in terms of a distinction between judgement and information – judgement requires concepts, whereas mere information, which may be contained in the growth rings of a tree no less than in the deliverances of the human perceptual system, does not.

A variety of arguments have been advanced as to why we need to distinguish between two varieties of content in this way. One set of arguments derives from the possibility of apparently inconsistent elements in perceptual experience. Tim Crane has argued in this way on the basis of the existence of certain visual illusions in which we see things as, for instance, both moving and not-moving. Related to this is the resistance of perceptual content to revision in the face of epistemic change. In the case of many illusions, for instance, coming to know that the illusion is indeed an illusion and even coming to understand how the illusion occurs, does not change what is actually seen. The perceptual or experiential content remains the same in spite of changes in belief. Such considerations are taken to imply that the content of perception cannot be conceptual, since conceptuality is indeed bound by requirements of consistency and revisability. Another set of arguments, often associated with Christopher Peacocke, concern the character of perceptual content as apparently more “fine-grained” than can plausibly be allowed for in terms of our existing conceptual repertoire – we can discriminate more features than we could plausibly have concepts. For instance, when I look at Munch’s ‘The Scream’ I can discriminate between a number of different colours and shades some of which I may never have encountered previously and for some of which there may be no distinct name or concept. Yet this does not affect my capacity for such discrimination. Given
then, that there are discriminable differences in the content of my seeing, and yet those differences do not seem to be matched by any difference in concept, so the conclusion is drawn that the content of the perception must be non-conceptual.

Another version of what is often taken as an argument for the existence of non-conceptual content, though it is not explicitly presented as such, can be found in Thomas Nagel’s famous ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ There Nagel argues that the ‘what it is like to be’ any individual experiencing creature has a certain character or content to it, and yet that character or content cannot properly be expressed in objective terms. Nagel intends this as an argument against certain reductionist approaches in the philosophy of mind, but it also seems to provide an exemplification of what is now more commonly understood in terms of the idea of non-conceptual content. Nagel’s argument focuses attention on the way in which a creature’s experience of the world is tied to a subjective “point of view” – to its bodily capacities, position and spatial location – that resists characterisation in the objective terms of language or conceptuality. On this account the supposedly non-conceptual content of experience is thus directly tied to its what might be termed its “egocentric” character. One of the crucial differences between Hughes’s seeing of Munch’s painting as against his describing of it, is thus that his seeing always involves an experience of the picture as being related to him, and his body, in quite specific ways, ways that not only reflect his particular location and position, but also his own bodily capacities and skills. This way of thinking of perceptual or experiential content is already evident in Gareth Evans’ work, but it also appears in a slightly different form in Christopher Peacocke’s idea of “scenario content.”

At this point the idea of non-conceptual content, and the way in which it is deployed in order to capture the embodied, located character of experience and perception connects directly with another strand in recent philosophical thinking, though a strand that begins in the work of phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, rather than analyticians such as Evans. It is an especially interesting connection inasmuch as many of the concerns that otherwise lie behind the idea of non-conceptual content – concerns relating, for instance, to problems of our perceptual access to the world – are concerns that seem not to be shared by
phenomenologically inclined thinkers. What phenomenologists have emphasised, however, is the idea that our involvement in the world cannot be understood in purely epistemic or ‘cognitivist’ terms, but must rather be thought of in ways that give priority to the non-linguistic, non-conceptual grasp of things associated with bodily comportment and practical activity. Often this is taken to be captured in the early Heidegger’s treatment, in Being and Time, of our being-in-the-world as primarily articulated through our involvement with things as ‘equipment’ (das Zeug) and of his distinction between hermeneutic and apophantic modes of interpretation – taking up the hammer and using it, as opposed to stating something about it. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of embodiment as worked out in The Phenomenology of Perception provides another important source for this approach. Merleau-Ponty develops an analysis of the structure of intentionality that is based, not in certain cognitive states or capacities, but in our bodily capacities and modes of operation. The model for intentionality is thus reaching and grasping something – a doorknob, a cup of coffee – rather than conceiving of or thinking about it. More recently, thinkers such as Foucault and Bourdieu can be seen as developing accounts that are similarly opposed to any understanding of our involvement in the world that gives priority to the conceptual or the cognitivist, but rather than emphasising the body, although they do not ignore it, they focus on the way our grasp of things is essentially articulated through social-cultural forms of practice that resist any simple formalisation.

Within contemporary English-speaking philosophy, Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor have both developed these ideas in their own ways. Dreyfus, in particular, has argued for an approach to intentionality and action that emphasises the way they are grounded in what Dreyfus terms ‘absorbed coping’. Rejecting the idea that action is best understood in terms of the belief-desire model that he identifies with the work of Searle and also Davidson, Dreyfus argues that it must instead be viewed in terms of a non-propositional engagement with the world and the things around us that is based both in our implicit social understanding and in our bodily skills and capacities. In some of his most recent work, Dreyfus has
talked of this non-propositional mode of engagement in ways that connect it explicitly with the idea of non-conceptual content.11

If we think of non-conceptual content in the way that Dreyfus and Taylor’s work suggests – in ways that allow it to be explicated in terms of a range of non-propositional modes of engagement with the world – then it will be important to note that the notion of non-conceptual content at issue cannot be treated as identical with ‘information’ as it figures outside of judgement. Although it is sometimes used in this way, and Evans’s work might be taken to suggest such a usage, ‘information’ is simply too broad and generic a notion to be much help here notion (information, after all, is everywhere); moreover the notion clearly does not capture what is at issue in the work of such as Dreyfus and Taylor. The idea of non-conceptual content that they seem to employ, albeit often implicitly, is a notion that already presupposes an intentional context that goes beyond the merely informational, even though it also stands outside of the province of judgement and proposition. Thus, for Dreyfus and Taylor, what is at issue is the distinction between the conceptual and the non-conceptual as it figures in the phenomenon of intentionality itself rather than in some causal-informational process or set of processes on which intentionality might supervene.

In bringing to the fore the idea of non-conceptual content as associated with certain non-propositional, context-bound, embodied modes of intentional engagement, a possible ambiguity also seems to come into view. Although the idea of non-conceptual content would seem to lead fairly directly to the idea of a certain non-conceptual mode of engagement with the world, it is not at all obvious that the idea of a non-conceptual mode of engagement requires the notion of a form of non-conceptual content. Indeed, one might even be lead to wonder whether talk of non-conceptual content really amounts to a commitment to a different form of content at all or whether it is not really about a different form of engagement. Certainly, part of what is usually implied in the idea of content is that content is something that can be specified or stated – with respect to some state that has content, we should be able to say, epistemological difficulties aside, what that content is. And such statement would seem to require language and conceptuality. But if we can make sense of the
idea of content only inasmuch as such content can indeed be specified in a way that is not dependent on the state whose content it is, then I cannot see that we have any choice but to suppose that it is not so much non-conceptual content that is at issue here (except somewhat indirectly), but non-conceptual states, modes of engagement or something similar.

It seems as if Tim Crane provides a way of characterising non-conceptual content that follows just this sort of strategy. Although Crane does not specifically acknowledge the possible difficulty in talking about a form of content that cannot be given any propositional specification, he nevertheless seems to treat non-conceptual content as a matter of non-conceptual states rather content as such. Thus he writes that:

…for a subject S to be in a non-conceptual state with content P, S does not have to possess the concepts which S would have to possess if S were in a conceptual state with content P. If we call these concepts the concepts which are canonical for P, then we can say that a state with non-conceptual content is one of which the following is true: in order for a subject, S, to be in a state with a content P, S does not have to possess the concepts canonical for P.12

Non-conceptual content is thus, on this account, the content of a state with respect to which, for S to be in that state, S need not possess the concepts necessary to characterise it. This characterisation does not focus on the content of the state as such, but rather on the nature of the state that has that content. Non-conceptual content thus refers us to a type of state more so than to a type of content. The notion of non-conceptual content turns out, it seems, to follow trivially from the fact that there are non-conceptual states that have content – non-conceptual content is just the content associated with such a non-conceptual state (but it does not imply anything much about the nature of such content).

Of course, this account would seem to imply that two different states could have the ‘same’ content and yet one state may be conceptual and the other non-conceptual. In fact, it is hard to see how matters could be otherwise. To suppose that two different kinds of state would, by the very fact of their being different in kind, have to possess two different kinds of content, would seem to confuse the content of
a state with the way in which that content is grasped. To return to our original example: it would be to confuse the character of Hughes’s description of Munch’s painting as a description with the content of that description – as if the fact that it is a description thereby changes the content of the description. Yet the description can be said to describe the content of Hughes’s seeing either in the sense that it describes Hughes’s experience of his seeing of the painting or, what is more to the point in the present context, in the sense that it describes what he sees when he sees and if it does the latter then it will share the same content as Hughes’s seeing.

Now Crane’s characterisation of non-conceptual content seems to me to have a number of virtues. Most importantly, perhaps, it does not commit us to any radical incommensurability between the content of different states or modes of engagement, while at the same time allowing us to maintain that such states or modes of engagement might be quite distinct from one another. We can thus say that the ‘same’ content can be given both visually and linguistically (as Hughes’s description attempts to convey some of the same content as might and educated viewing of the painting), without being forced to treat seeing and describing as somehow interchangeable.

This last point is quite important. There is a tendency to think of seeing (or other forms of perceptual access to things) as somehow richer and more direct than anything that could be achieved by means of language or conceptuality. Some might take this to be neatly captured by Donald Davidson’s comment that “A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture.” The idea of such a contrast between the linguistic and non-linguistic or the conceptual and the non-conceptual is sometimes taken, though usually only implicitly, as a consideration in favour of the idea of non-conceptual content – the difference at issue is already assumed to imply a difference in types of content. But to treat matters in this fashion actually depends upon not attending to the character of seeing and describing as indeed different states, modes of relating to things, or whatever, and this is what I take to be the real point of Davidson’s comment: to see something is not to describe it and vice versa – they are different ‘currencies’. Seeing and describing (and the same applies to a range of
other activities or modes of engagement) cannot be exchanged for one another. And the reason for their non-convertibility is not that the one has a richer or different content than the other, but simply that seeing and describing are themselves different – they are different activities, different modes of engagement, or, if one wishes to put things in representational terms (as writers such as Dreyfus and Taylor do not), different modes of representation.

Of course, in recognising this point, and in recognising, therefore, that a seeing and a describing may share the same content, we must also recognise that the notion of ‘sameness of content’ does not mean sameness in the mode of engagement. The same content may be shared by different such modes. Moreover, ‘sameness of content’ does not and cannot mean complete identity of content either. Sameness is always sameness in some respect or other, not sameness is all and every respect. Here talk of ‘the content’ of a seeing or a describing can be particularly misleading. Whether we talk of a seeing or a describing (or a hearing or tasting or a touching or a ‘what it is like’) there is nothing that corresponds to ‘the content’ of that seeing or describing. By this I mean that there is no finite or determinate content to either describing or seeing that can be captured in anything other than a simple repetition of the original describing or seeing. When we look at something afresh, or when we describe it in different words, we may be said to grasp the same content differently, but we can also be said to have seen or described something new. To use Quine’s way of putting matters, there is no ‘fact of the matter’ here, and if there is one way of describing or seeing, then there are many such ways.

But doesn’t this just neglect the radical nature of the difference between seeing and describing? After all, whatever else may be said here, describing something can never be a substitute for seeing it – thus no description of the colour red can substitute for actually seeing red. Moreover the difference here is surely that seeing delivers a certain content that is not delivered by describing alone. There is no question that seeing is not describing, and similarly, describing something often fails as a substitute for seeing it (although not always – it depends on what the need is that has to be met by the substitution). Instead, what is at issue here is how this difference is to be understood and, more particularly, whether it is a difference that
is to be located in the content of an act (whether it be seeing, describing or whatever) understood as distinct from the act itself. Certainly there are differences between seeing and describing that can be expressed without reference to content – seeing and describing each connect up, directly and indirectly, with a range of other capacities and causes such that the difference between them can be articulated through those different connections and the different roles they make possible. But however we explicate such differences, the argument advanced here is that they must be differences that are seen to pertain to the act, rather than to the content as distinct from the act. This is so, partly because content lacks the determinacy to play the role of a real marker of difference here, and, perhaps more importantly, because, insofar as the content of an act can be distinguished from the act of which it is the content, so content, almost by definition, is just that which carries over from one act (or mode of engagement or whatever) to another and by means of which we can grasp the interconnected character of those acts. It is just this aspect of content that is brought to our notice by Crane’s account of the nature of non-conceptual content.

Crane’s account certainly makes a great deal sense of what may otherwise appear a rather obscure notion. But precisely insofar as it plays down the sense in which non-conceptual content really is a matter of a different kind of content, so the approach that I have developed on the basis of Crane’s account is unlikely to be satisfactory to all. The idea of non-conceptual content, as it is seen by many, does indeed imply a bifurcation in the very nature of content – in this respect, it often marks a prior commitment, not so much to the variety of our modes of engagement with the world (modes that might nevertheless be interconnected through overlapping contents), but to the existence of a radical dichotomy between just two such modes – a dichotomy that mirrors an equally radical dichotomy between language and world, and between ‘mind’ and embodied activity. Hubert Dreyfus puts the idea at issue here in the following terms:

Are there two fundamentally different ways we make sense of the world, or does all understanding consist in using concepts to think about things? The philosophical tradition has, generally assumed, or in the case of Kant, argued persuasively, that there is only one kind of intelligibility, the unified understanding we have of things when we make judgments that objectify our experience by bringing
it under concepts. But there have always been others – painters, writers, historians, linguists, philosophers in the romantic tradition, Wittgensteinians and existential phenomenologists – who have felt that there is another kind of intelligibility that gets us in touch with reality besides the conceptual kind elaborated by Kant.16

That “other kind” of intelligibility is variously understood – perception and action provide two possible avenues by means of which it might be expressed. However, it is clear that Dreyfus places himself among those philosophers “in the romantic tradition, Wittgensteinians and existential phenomenologists” who do indeed think that there is another mode of intelligibility besides the conceptual. Thus Dreyfus has elsewhere emphasised a sharp distinction between the practical and the theoretical – between the mode of intelligibility that is associated with our skilful, absorbed ‘coping’ with things and that associated with conscious deliberation and judgement.17

It is worth reflecting, however, on the very dichotomy that Dreyfus seems here to assume. There is no doubt that not all understanding consists in using concepts to think about things. But this need not force us to the conclusion either that there is some other mode of intelligibility to be sharply contrasted with the conceptual or that the conceptual and the non-conceptual (if we accept some such duality) stand in a relation in which one is secondary to the other. Indeed, the idea that there are two fundamentally different modes of engagement with the world gives rise to some perplexing difficulties once we acknowledge that that, in our own case at least, it is one and the same creature that understands and engages with the world in these two quite distinct ways.

In all of an agent’s engagement with the world, it is the one agent that acts, feels, sees, and thinks. Even the act of picking up a coffee cup, while it depends on a range of informational-causal systems at a level below the level of our ordinary mental lives, and even though the picking up of the cup has a character to it that is not completely captured in any purely descriptive account nor even in terms of the interaction of belief and desire within the schema of practical inference, still that does not mean that the action occurs in a way that has no connection with our conceptual and propositionally oriented capacities. When Robert Hughes describes
the painting that he also sees standing before him, the experience of describing and of seeing are not dissociated from one another – there are not two discrete things going on here any more than there are two distinct agents. It is the same Hughes that sees the painting and describes it. Moreover, the capacities for discrimination that Hughes manifests in his description and his seeing are not independent of one another (as is evident to anyone who compares the way an artwork is seen by a trained, as opposed to an untrained, eye and the descriptions that ensue). And if we insist on the sharp dichotomy of seeing from describing or of non-conceptual from conceptual in the way that, not only Dreyfus, but many others seem to insist upon, then we make it impossible to understand how the two can interact; when we give the non-conceptual independent priority over the conceptual, then we run the risk of making the conceptual redundant in the structure of intentionality – it becomes a sort of ‘epiphenomenon’, and a purely contingent one at that.

Moreover, the idea of content is precisely that which, inasmuch as it can carry over from one ‘mode of engagement’ to another, thereby enables such modes of engagement to be connected – that enables the conceptual to be connected with the non-conceptual, the action with the thought, the seeing with the describing. If we separate our various modes on engagement with the world from one another by insisting on a complete bifurcation in the content of those modes of engagement, then how can we make sense of the way in which our seeing that something is red can connect up with our saying that it is red or with our placing of our foot on the brake because something (namely the traffic light) is red? In this example, the integration of the agent’s perception, thought and behaviour is largely achieved and articulated (both in the case of our own view of the agent and her own view of herself) through the integration of content by which the various states, acts and so forth are related – by the way in which those different ‘acts’ all stand in relation to the same content, namely, that something (the traffic light) is red.

In this respect the idea of a schism between the conceptual and non-conceptual is particularly problematic inasmuch as it suggests a division within the very structure of intentionality itself. For writers such as Dreyfus and Taylor, in particular, the division between different modes of engagement is a distinction
between different modes of intentional comportment that are distinguished largely by that which they are directed towards. One is taken to be oriented toward the propositional, the consciously deliberative, the conceptual and the cognitive. The other is characterised by an orientation toward the non-propositional, the non-deliberative, the non-conceptual. Moreover, the former is seen to be secondary to the latter: our primary mode of access to the world is the non-propositional and non-conceptual mode of access that comes from our embodied, located, socialised involvement with things. Indeed, for Dreyfus it sometimes seems as if the conceptual mode of involvement could be completely abandoned without any loss in the character of our pre-conceptual engagement. Language and conceptuality thus seems to have no real role to play, except, perhaps, inasmuch as they are important for social and cultural articulation.

The bifurcation of the conceptual from the non-conceptual, and the associated bifurcation in the structure of intentional comportment, is the real problem that seems to me to underlie John McDowell’s complaint against the idea of non-conceptual content, as developed by Evans, to the effect that it involves an implicit commitment to the Sellarsian ‘Myth of the Given.’ Much the same bifurcation also underlies what Davidson presents, first, as the ‘third dogma’ of the distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content and then, more perspicuously, I think, as the Myth of the Subjective. In both cases what is at issue is the idea of a radical schism between the propositional and the non-propositional, or between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, according to which what comes first in our grasp of the world is some subjectively presented or unconceptualised ‘content’ which is then made available for judgement and conceptualisation. Both McDowell and Davidson reject such a schism on the grounds of its ultimate incoherence: if conceptual and non-conceptual are separated in such a radical fashion, then it becomes impossible to make sense of the possibility of real knowledge or experience of the world – it makes the very possibility of agency (which encompasses and depends upon both conceptual and non-conceptual capacities in their co-operative and interconnected employment) into an enigma.
In Evans account, the separation between the conceptual and the non-conceptual arises partly out of an attempt to do justice to the continuity between our own capacities and those of non-human animals who lack the capacity for language and conceptuality. But there seems no clear reason why that continuity need be understood by stripping away, as McDowell puts it, the conceptual from the non-conceptual or purely informational as if the commonality between ourselves and other animals lack in our possession of some common core. Here Evans’ approach connects with that of Dreyfus in the sense that each postulates a discrete and separable set of capacities with its own ‘content’ that is to be set against the conceptual, the prepositional, the linguistic. The source of the difficult here is what we might call the myth of discreteness: the tendency to suppose that we can treat intentionality, agency or experience as actually composed of what are otherwise discrete and separate capacities. Such a tendency is often given methodological expression in a focus on cases where the agent’s ordinary operation in the world is in some way or other impaired – on cases of neuropsychological dysfunction, for instance, or situations in which the underlying components on which unitary agency and intentionality ordinarily supervene can be artificially segregated from one another (the fact that such separation typically results in a loss of behavioural or intentional integration should be no surprise). The myth of discreteness that is at work here, and that looks to prioritise the marginal or anomalous over the central and the ordinary, and that takes the disintegrated, often dysfunctional system as its model, is the same myth that also appears in the myth of the given – in both cases the impetus is to understand what is actually a single, integrated system in terms of what are already assumed to be disintegrated and discrete components.

To understand the way in which a human agent acts in relation to the space around her requires that we understand not merely the way in which a grasp of that space is articulated by means of the agent’s motor and sensory capacities, but also by means of the agent’s cognitive and conceptual abilities. To omit any from the picture is to be left with only a partial picture. The one space in which the agent acts is a space that has to be grasped actively, by means of action and movement, and conceptually, in ways that require propositional articulation. And it is the same
space that is at issue here – a space grasped both subjectively and objectively at one and the same time. The lesson is thus not that we should reject the distinction between the conceptual and the non-conceptual as such, for that distinction is not without significance, but that we should not view them as constituting two distinct and incommensurable realms. Not only is it a single subject here, but a single world as well and it is that same world that is grasped both objectively, in terms of our conceptual understanding of the properties and relations that constitute it ‘in itself’, and subjectively, in terms of the way the elements that make up that world are related to our own perspective and to our own bodily capacities and skills.

Ironically, for writers such as Dreyfus and Evans, the impetus to postulate some notion of non-conceptual content seems to derive from a desire to develop and account that places human beings in the world as embodied, acting subjects – to overcome what might otherwise seem to be a separation from the world. Yet by bifurcating the conceptual from the non-conceptual, what actually results is a fragmentation in agency and intentionality. The unity of action and agency again becomes a problem, but in a new way. Moreover this fragmentation is merely the expression of a more basic tendency to want to understand agency and intentionality in terms of discrete components. In this respect, the myth of discreteness applies not merely to the understanding of capacities for action and cognition, but also to the understanding of concepts as such. Understood as discrete, it will always be problematic as to how concepts can relate to the world, and how they can function in action and experience.

2 For more on this issue as it arises in relation to Davidson, see Chapter Five above.
4 The Varieties of Reference, p.227.
7 See Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.196-213.


There is, in this respect, a certain ‘suspicion of language’ that sometimes seems to underlie the championing of the nonconceptual over the conceptual. It is a suspicion that has a long history to it and can be found in many different forms and genres, but which, as I hope the argument of this essay might suggest, is essentially misplaced. Nietzsche’s talk of ‘the prison-house of language’ (a phrase famously taken up by Frederic Jameson) can be taken as one expression of the ‘suspicion’ (often presented as much more than mere suspicion) at issue here.


It should be noted that this way of understanding the difference at issue does not preclude the possibility that the act may in some sense include its content – all it rules out is the idea of a difference that pertains to content as distinct from the act of which it is the content.


See, for instance, Dreyfus [insert reference].


Although the convergence in their positions on this point is something that McDowell seems to have radically misunderstood. See his discussion of Davidson in the early sections of Mind and World, pp.3ff.

For more on the interplay between subjective and objective in relation to the possibility of agency see my Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).