Putting Space in Place:

Heidegger, Technology and the Problem of Spatiality in <u>Being and Time</u>

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In what manner space <u>is</u>, and whether a Being in general can be attributed to it, remains undecided.

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I.

"The discussion of spatiality" writes Hubert Dreyfus "is one of the most difficult in <u>Being and Time</u>, not because it is deeper than any other discussion but because it is fundamentally confused."2 Dreyfus claims that the source of this confusion lies in Heidegger's failure adequately to distinguish the "public space in which entities show up for human beings" from "the centered spatiality of each individual human being."3 Yet, although I agree with Dreyfus that Heidegger's discussion of spatiality is indeed confused, it seems to me that the problems at stake in that discussion lie at an even more fundamental level than just the distinction between public space and the spatiality of individual Dasein. Those problems do, as I shall argue here, go to the very heart of Heidegger's thinking and can be seen to be central to the path of thinking – the <u>Denkweg</u> – that leads from <u>Being and Time</u> through to the later writings.4

In the pages that follow, my intention is to take up some of the issues at stake here by looking more closely at the analysis of spatiality which Dreyfus discusses in Being-in-theWorld as a means to sketch out both the way in which the question of spatiality can indeed be seen as marking a central problem within the project of Being and Time as a whole and the direction that must be taken by any adequate approach to that question. One of the crucial points to emerge here is the intimate connection between the question of spatiality and the concepts of place and dwelling that can be viewed as playing an increasingly important role in Heidegger's thinking in the period following Being and Time. In this respect, the lessons that emerge from the analysis of spatiality in Being and Time are important, not only in terms of their relevance to the project of "fundamental ontology", but for Heidegger's thought as a whole, including, as will become clear from the discussion below, the question of technology and its relation to modernity that so preoccupies the later Heidegger.

Although the arguments I will advance in this essay will, in various respects, diverge from Dreyfus's account, this should in no way be taken to detract from the admiration and respect I have for Dreyfus's work. He has shed new light on Heidegger's own thinking while also extending and elaborating Heideggerian ideas in new and original ways. Few other contemporary philosophers have done as much as Dreyfus in bridging the gulf between so-called "continental" thought and its "analytic" counterpart and

few other philosophers can compare with Dreyfus in their commitment and dedication to the discipline. On a more personal note, I will always be grateful for Bert's friendship – for what I have learnt from him, for the pleasure of his company, and for his loyalty and support. This essay must stand as a small and very inadequate repayment for so much.

II.

Spatiality emerges as a problematic concept quite early in the discussion in <u>Being and Time</u>. One of the first steps in the analysis of the structure of Dasein – understood as "being-in-the-world" – is the clarification of the notion of "being-in". This concept, as with a number of other key Heideggerian concepts such as "Situation" and "environment" (<u>Umwelt</u>),5 seems, at first sight, to have clearly spatial connotations. Heidegger acknowledges this, but he also denies that the sense of "being-in" that is associated with spatiality, as it is ordinarily conceived, is the primary sense at issue here. Clarifying the sense in which "being-in" is, indeed, not a matter of being "in space" turns out to be crucial to the overall project of <u>Being and Time</u>.

"Being-in" has, on the Heideggerian account, two distinct senses. The first is that which involves spatial or physical containment and designates, as Heidegger puts it, "the kind of Being which an entity has when it is 'in' another one, as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the cupboard".12

The second sense of "being-in" – the sense that Heidegger takes to be proper to the structure of "being-in-the-world" – is that associated with residing or dwelling ("wohnen, habitare, sich aufhalten"13) and is presented by Heidegger as not primarily a matter of being "in space" at all, but rather of "familiarity with" and of "looking after".14 In this sense, "being-in" seems to be primarily a matter of a certain sort of engagement or involvement and, indeed, Dreyfus characterises the contrast between the senses of "being-in" at issue here in terms of a contrast between „two senses of 'in': a spatial sense ('in the box') and an existential sense ('in the army', 'in love'). The first use expresses inclusion, the second conveys involvement."15

The sense of "being-in" that is explicated in terms of what Dreyfus calls "inclusion", and that might also be understood in terms of "containment", is essentially a conception tied to a particular understanding of space – a characteristically modern understanding that is exemplified, in one especially significant form, in the writings of Descartes, and that takes containment as basic to the idea of space as such.16 In the <u>Principles of Philosophy</u> Descartes treats space as essentially a matter of bodily extension writing that "the extension in length, breadth and depth which constitutes a space is exactly the same as that which constitutes a body"17 – space is to be understood, it seems, in terms of a body's extendedness and so in terms of the volume that a body contains. From the idea of space as tied in this way to the extension or containment associated with a

particular body, it is easy to arrive at a more generalised notion of space as the extended realm within which all bodies can be contained. Albert Einstein talks in just this way of the development of the modern idea of space: the idea of an „independent (absolute) space, unlimited in extent, in which all material objects are contained" is arrived at by „natural extension" from the concept of the particular space that exists within any particular enclosing body.18

Of those entities whose being is simply a matter of their being "in space" – of their being "contained" in relation to some other such entity or in relation to "world-space" – Heidegger says that they all possess a characteristic sameness: „All entities whose Being 'in' one another can thus be described have the same kind of Being — that of being-present-at-hand — as Things occurring "within" the world."19 In this assertion Heidegger connects the modern or "Cartesian" understanding of spatiality directly with the other important "Cartesian" idea – central to much of Heidegger's critical analysis in Being and Time – that understands things as theoretical or epistemic "objects"20 that are merely "present" or "occurrent" (Vorhanden) rather than "available" (Zuhanden) for use. We might say, then, that grasping things as spatial, in the modern understanding of the term, is also to grasp those things as "objects" and so as "objective".

The sense in which "occurrent" or "present-at-hand" entities are "within" the world is, in fact, a somewhat impoverished sense

– with respect to all such entities, they are "in" the world only in the sense in which they are "contained within" other such entities or in which all such entities may be said to be contained with the space of the world or, better, of the physical universe. This point is given a special emphasis inasmuch as merely "occurrent" entities that have their being "in space" cannot, according to Heidegger, stand in any essential relation of involvement or contact with one another: "When two entities are present-at-hand within the world, and furthermore are worldless in themselves, they can never 'touch' each other, nor can either of them 'be' 'alongside' the other."21

Here Heidegger essentially reiterates the contrast between the "being-in" of "inclusion" or "containment" and that of "involvement", but in a way that puts additional stress on the "merely occurrent" character of entities as they are "in space". Entities can only be brought into any real contact – and so, one might say, be properly grasped from "within" the world – inasmuch as they are taken up within Dasein's own context of involvement. Dasein itself, however, brings its world with it inasmuch as Dasein and the world are given together. This is part of what is meant by treating the "being-in" of Dasein as a matter, not of spatial "inclusion", but of "involvement". As Heidegger writes „Being-in... is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand."22

At this point it becomes very clear, if it were not already so, the way in which the concept of space is, on the Heideggerian approach, intimately bound up with an ontology to which the account developed in Being and Time is fundamentally opposed. Thus, in discussing the concept of "environment" ("Umwelt") Heidegger writes that "the spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment, can be clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood. From this point of view, Dasein's spatiality ... becomes phenomenally visible. In ontology, however, an attempt has been made to start with spatiality and then to Interpret the Being of the 'world' as res extensa. In Descartes we find the most extreme tendency towards such an ontology of the 'world'".23

This passage is particularly significant, not only in foregrounding the contrast between Heidegger's approach and that which takes the being of things "in" space as its starting point, but also inasmuch as it indicates something of the tension in Heidegger's approach to the question of spatiality: the account of Dasein cannot begin with spatiality even though it does begin with a set of concepts that seem to carry spatial connotations; Dasein cannot be properly understood on the basis of spatiality conceived in terms of the notions of containment, extension and "occurrentness" and yet Dasein does have a spatiality of its own. Of course, the solution to these tensions, at least as Heidegger presents matters, seems clear enough: Dasein's own spatiality ("existential spatiality") is explicated through the structure of

Dasein's involvement within the equipmental ordering of things which, as we shall see below, is itself grounded specifically in temporality; the broader sense of spatiality that might seem already to be implicated in the discussion of Dasein as "being-in-the-world" (but which tends to remain implicit in Heidegger's discussion) is in fact to be understood in terms of the "being-in" of involvement which receives its full explication in terms of the notions of care (Sorge), of "being-towards-death" and so, ultimately, of temporality also. It thus turns out that the spatiality that is proper to Dasein, whether understood in terms of the particular spatiality proper to Dasein or in terms of the apparently spatial character of Dasein's being as such – a spatiality which, in either sense, is distinct from the spatiality associated with merely occurrent entities – is actually to be understood as fundamentally temporal.

   Heidegger's determination to exclude spatiality from any fundamental role in the understanding of the structure of Dasein is evident, not only in passages such as that concerning the nature of "environment", but, most explicitly and directly, in the discussion of the priority of temporality in §70 of Being and Time – the section titled 'The Temporality of the Spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein' („Die Zeitlichkeit des daseinmässigen Räumlichkeit").25 Here the primary aim is the establishment of the derivative character of Dasein's own existential spatiality, but it can also be taken as indicative of the derivative character of spatiality as such – something that

is, of course, also evident as part of the larger argument that gives priority to the being-in of involvement over that of inclusion and to availability over occurrentness.

The argument that Heidegger sketches out here (and it really is the barest of outlines) focuses on the character of existential spatiality (already set out, as I noted above, in §§22-24) as based in the referential ordering of things within a "region" (Gegend) of activity, that is, in the ordering of things (as "available" or "ready-to-hand" – Zuhanden) within an equipmental totality. Hammer, saw and other tools thus each have a "place" (Platz) within the interconnected network of places that is the region of activity established through the work of carpentry and only through being ordered within this region, and so in relation to the overarching activity with respect to which it is constituted, are they available as the tools that they are. Each tool thus "refers" to the larger structure and framework of activity within which it is "placed" and made thereby made available. While the ways in which we read the details of Heidegger's analysis may vary, it is this equipmental ordering that is the basis for Dasein's oriented spatiality – a spatiality elaborated further (and this is where Dreyfus's focuses his criticism) through the notions of "directionality" or "orientation" ("Ausrichtung") and "dis-stance" or "de-severance" ("Ent-fernung").26 Heidegger argues that this equipmental ordering, and the referentiality that is characteristic of it, derives from the directionality of temporality. To put matters

slightly differently, since the ordering of equipmentality in which spatiality is based is tied to activity and since activity is always projective – presently oriented towards a set of future possibilities on the basis of a past actuality – so it is temporality that enables the opening up of the spatial ordering of Dasein's world.

The centrality of concepts of activity, and so of temporality, to the problems at issue here – including those relating to space and place – cannot be doubted.26 What is quite clearly open to doubt, however, is the idea that one can indeed achieve a derivation of the spatial, in any significant sense, from the purely temporal. In fact, if we consider the issues at stake here more closely, it soon becomes evident that such a derivation, as Heidegger himself came to recognize, is impossible.

Perhaps the most immediate problem here is that temporality lacks the resources to establish any sense of simultaneous dimensionality, and with it the sense of externality, that is necessary, not only for spatiality, but also for the possibility of distinguishing between different entities or between oneself and entities other oneself. Thus, when Heidegger considers the structure of equipmentality, the impression one is given is of a network of inter-related entities whose spatial arrangement is wholly dependent on their belonging within a system of referential ordering that derives from the directionality and referentiality of the temporal. Already, however, in the very

assumption that there are indeed a set of distinct entities involved here, some notion of spatiality would seem to have been assumed, since only within a spatial domain - that is, within a realm of simultaneous and extended dimensionality – is it possible for entities to be arrayed in such a way.28

Now it might seem as if this is already to treat the entities at issue here as if they were merely occurrent rather than available. But this would be, in part, simply to assume that the only model of spatiality that is available here, other than the "temporalised" model that Heidegger advances as the basis of existential spatiality, is that of Cartesian spatiality. Certainly, the account of spatiality found in Descartes and in modern thinking generally, does represent a particular way of trying to articulate what is involved in the idea of space, but it need not be supposed that it represents the only, or, indeed, a fully adequate and exhaustive articulation of the concept of space as such. Heidegger, at least in <u>Being and Time</u>, seems to assume that it is, and so it is not surprising that he is led to insist on treating spatiality, as it is relevant to the existential structure of Dasein, as derivable from temporality. The alternative, however, is to view the Cartesian idea of spatiality as expressing what is already a particular appropriation of the idea of the spatial and to take the basic notion of spatiality as identical with the notion of simultaneous dimensionality that is, phenomenologically, an irreducible element in the experience of movement and is presupposed by the

capacity to distinguish between ourselves and the things around us, both available and occurrent. Understood in this way, spatiality is only partially understood in the "objective" terms of Cartesian thinking, since such thinking leaves no room for space as it is a feature of our own locatedness – or our own place-ing – in the world (a locatedness which, it should be noted, is not to be understood as purely "subjective", but also as "inter-subjective" – which is not completely identical with being "objective"29). Such a way of conceiving of spatiality requires, of course, that we grasp it in relation, not to temporality, but to place and location.

The fundamental role played by some such notion of spatiality is not evident only from a consideration of the problems relating to the analysis of existential spatiality – indeed, it is perhaps, even more clearly apparent when one looks to certain other aspects of Heidegger's analysis and, in particular, to treatment of issues to do with Dasein as embodied. The body is something to which Being and Time devotes almost no attention whatsoever, even though Heidegger seems to recognize the importance of the topic. „[Dasein's] bodily nature hides a whole problematic of its own", he writes, but then adds, "though we shall not treat it here."30 One of the surprising things about Being and Time, however, is not merely its relative neglect of the body, but its apparent relegation of the body to the realm of Cartesian spatiality. The mode of embodied spatiality – of corporeality – is thus contrasted with the spatiality of Dasein,

the former being assigned to the realm of present-at-hand
extendedness or containment. So Heidegger writes that „Dasein
does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of
equipment would...It is by no means just present-at-hand at a
position in space which its body fills up".31 Heidegger's
distinction between the two senses of "being-in" – the being-in
of inclusion that is associated with entities as available and
the being-in of involvement that is associated with existential
spatiality – seems to be deployed so as to place the body firmly
within the realm of the former. It is as if to understand
something <u>as a body</u> is already to treat it as just an extended
thing – as if, for Heidegger, "body" can refer only to the idea
of a Cartesian <u>res extensa</u>.

Clearly one can see why Heidegger is led to this position,
since to deny the objective spatiality of the body would be
tantamount to accepting some form of idealism – an option almost
as unacceptable to Heidegger as Cartesianism or its variants. But
if one is to retain a conception of the body as spatial in this
"occurrent" sense, and yet also insist on the derivative
character of such spatiality, then it seems one must be forced to
reject the body as existentially significant. Any role the body
might play in the essential constitution of Dasein is completely
subsumed under the idea of action within an equipmental frame and
so the body disappears from an existential point of view.

That Heidegger does indeed view the body as largely
restricted to the realm of objective spatiality is reinforced by

the fact that Heidegger's treatment of existential spatiality is also undertaken in terms that effectively sever it from the body. Certainly there are references to the bodily and to bodily sensation in the account of existential spatiality, but these remain undeveloped and play little or no part in the central argument. This gives rise to a serious problem in Heidegger's account which Dreyfus points out: our orientational capacities – our grasp of left and right, up and down, front and back – would seem necessarily to depend on our having a body, but Heidegger's insistence that the body is not essential in the constitution of Dasein, and his account of orientation in terms of the purely equipmental structure of the ready-to-hand, seems to involve a denial of this. This leaves Heidegger with no way of explaining the nature of such orientational capacities.32

Certainly orientation cannot be adequately treated without reference to embodiment. And although Heidegger takes temporality to be what establishes the possibility of such orientation, orientation is not solely dependent on temporality. While the capacity for activity is undoubtedly structured in relation to temporality, the orientation that is a prerequisite for activity must involve spatiality and an embodied spatiality at that. This is a point made quite clearly by Kant and, indeed, in this respect Kant proves himself to be more attentive to issues of embodiment and spatiality than Heidegger. Kant argues in a number of places in both his Pre-Critical and his Critical writings, that orientation requires a grasp of differences that are

represented in space <u>and in one's own body</u>.33

Heidegger, although aware of Kant's emphasis on orientation as tied to embodiment, takes this to be a remnant of Kant's subjectivism arguing that such orientation is actually derived from our equipmental involvement34 – thus even here Heidegger argues for the secondary character of the body and of the spatiality associated with it. The crucial point in the Kantian analysis, however, is that orientation depends on a grasp of simultaneously presented regions of space and of an ordering among those regions. Such ordering cannot be given in the regions themselves, but must be an ordering derived from my own person. And such ordering in myself must equally be a matter of my grasp of simultaneously existing parts of myself. Thus Kant talks elsewhere of the way in which, „no matter how well I know the order of the divisions of the horizon, I can only determine the regions in accordance with them if I am aware of whether the order progresses toward the right or the left hand."35 In the absence of a body it seems there is no way to make sense of the ideas of simultaneous parts of oneself that could provide the basis for the orientation of left and right, front and back, up and down. Embodiment is a prerequisite for orientation. Heidegger is correct that orientation in space cannot be just a matter of "feeling" (one of the grounds on which he criticises Kant), but he is mistaken to suppose that this means that it can be wholly given through a purely equipmental structure or on the basis of a structure that is primarily temporal. Only if these can be tied

back to an extended and differentiated body is orientation possible.36

The discussion of the relation between embodiment and spatiality leads us back to the need for any adequate analysis of our "being-in-the-world" to encompass the necessity and irreducibility of spatiality. This does not mean that what is required is, after all, an "objective" conception of spatiality of the sort exemplified in Descartes (though the idea of objective space must certainly be taken account of here), but rather a concept of spatiality that does indeed include an appropriate sense of dimensionality and extendedness of the sort that cannot be derived from the temporal and that, as I noted above, seems likely to be inseparable from to the concept of place. Heidegger is right, of course, that without temporality, there can be no spatiality, but the reverse also holds – both space and time must play a role (hence Heidegger's later talk of "Zeit-Raum"37) – in the opening of that unitary "place" that is understood, in Being and Time, as the being-in-the-world of Dasein.

Within the framework of Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time itself, however, such a shift towards recognizing the "equi-primordiality" of time and space – of understanding Dasein as "as 'temporal' 'and also' as spatial coordinately"38 – was impossible. Not only would such a shift have threatened the project of understanding Dasein in relation to historicality, but it would also have undermined the unity of Dasein as Heidegger

envisaged it.39 The whole drive of the Dasein-analysis is to understand Dasein "as a whole", as a unitary phenomenon, something to be accomplished through the existential-temporal analysis of Dasein – an analysis that understands the complexity of Dasein in terms of the unfolding of a single structure organized around temporality alone. One could not incorporate spatiality into such a structure, in a way that allowed its non-derivative character, without shattering that structure. But this means that any move to take account of spatiality here requires, not merely a reassessment of the relation between spatiality and temporality, but also a methodological shift. The unity of the structure that is at issue cannot be a unity understood as based in the derivation of that structure from a single, underlying principle – whether it be temporality or something else. Inasmuch as it attempts this <u>Being and Time</u> remains a metaphysical project. Instead what must be attempted is the articulation of a structure whose unity consists in the mutual inter-relation of equi-primordial elements which are themselves, taken singly, each dependent on the unitary structure they constitute but which structure is only constituted in terms of the mutual inter-relation of those elements. This is just the sort of structure that appears in the analyses to be found in Heidegger's later thinking – it is perhaps best exemplified in the gathering together of earth and sky, gods and mortals that is the Fourfold (<u>Das Geviert</u>),40 but it can also be discerned elsewhere. Such a structure is, I would suggest, precisely the sort of

topographical – or, to use Heidegger's term, "topological"41 – structure that can be seen as exemplified in the structure of place, for in place we find the same idea of a structure that, while it has a unitary character of its own, is nevertheless constituted through the mutual inter-relation of the elements within it, elements that derive their own character from the place to which they belong.42

III.

Heidegger's analysis of "being-in" suggests, though it does not elaborate on the point, that the being-in of Dasein's being-in-the-world is essentially a matter of "dwelling". Inamsuch as the whole of Being and Time can be seen as concerned to provide an account of the structure of being-in-the-world, and so of being-in, one may thus view it as already providing an implicit account of the structure, not only of place or locatedness, but also of dwelling itself – even though this concept does not as such become a focus for Heidegger's thinking until much later. Yet in this connection one of the notable features of Being and Time, and, it would seem, of Heidegger's thinking, even up until the mid-'thirties, is a view of Dasein as essentially beset by alienation or "un-homeliness"("un-heimlichkeit").43 Indeed, given Heidegger's emphasis in his early thinking, on the fundamentally temporal character of being-in-the-world, it is hard to see how matters could be otherwise.

Although dwelling is a concept that is indeed invoked in

Being and Time, albeit briefly, it seems to be a concept that cannot be given an adequate analysis within the framework of that work. In Heidegger's later work, however, dwelling is clearly a central concept, and, indeed, rather than understand Dasein as given over to homelessness, Dasein is here understood, just inasmuch as its mode of being is one of dwelling, as fundamentally "at home" – as belonging essentially "in place".47 What such a mode of being involves can already be gleaned, at least in part, from the discussion of spatiality in Being and Time.

First and foremost, perhaps, it has to be stressed that any adequate analysis of dwelling cannot be dissociated from the concept of place. Dwelling necessarily involves a certain "inhabiting" and so a particular locatedness and familiarity – as Heidegger already suggests in Being and Time, and repeats in the late essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" – and this encompasses a sense of "looking after", of caring for, preserving and protecting.48 One might say that dwelling implies an attending both to the place in which one dwells and to those entities through which the place is itself disclosed and that are disclosed within it. For human beings – mortals – to be in the world is already for them to dwell, but such dwelling is articulated and sustained only though the active engagement of human beings in place (and the consequent opening up of space) – through what Heidegger calls "building" (there is a clear analogy here between the role of building in relation to dwelling and the

role of activity in the structure of being-in-the-world as set out in <u>Being and Time</u>). It is in relation to such dwelling, and so also through human building, that the complex structure of the world is itself brought into focus and each element, including the being of the human (the mortal) itself, is thereby disclosed in its relationship to the other elements that are implicated along with it.49

    More importantly, however, the "place" of dwelling that is here presupposed cannot be understood as constituted in terms of any single entity or principle, but only in terms of that "inter-play" of mutually related elements that was alluded to in the discussion above. In "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" Heidegger names the elements that are centrally involved here as "earth, sky, mortals and gods" – the four elements of the complex but unitary structure that is the Fourfold.50 Clearly, however, space and time are also somehow implicated – though they are also implicated together, as "Zeit-raum", rather than singly. And just as the four elements of the Fourfold are only brought into focus through the gathering of the Fourfold as a unity, so too is spatiality opened up only through the establishing of those particular places "on earth, under the sky, before the divinites" that are the dwelling-places of human being. Thus, in this late essay, space itself is understood as that "in essence for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds... spaces receive their being from places and not from 'space'."51 Here it is not temporality that is the ground for spatiality, but the

complex unity of dwelling (in which every particular place rests) and the Fourfold.

The character of dwelling, including its intimate relation to place, is brought into sharp relief when considered in the context of the Heideggerian critique of modern technology. Heidegger writes of the technological, and of the reign of "En-framing" (Ge-stell), as bringing about a re-ordering of the world according to which things appear simply as transformable, useable resource – what Heidegger calls Bestand or "standing reserve".52 This re-ordering of the world is not something undertaken by human beings, but instead encompasses human beings themselves – even the human is brought within the frame of what is useable or consumable. But neither do space and time stand outside of the technological transformation of the world. Within the all-encompassing reign of Ge-stell, time and space are reduced to mere quantitative measures; they are everywhere "levelled out", made uniform and calculable – places and localities disappear or become nothing more than "positions" within a single, homogenous network. Thus Heidegegr writes that "Today everything present is equally near and equally far. The distanceless prevails".53 Significantly, the manner in which technology "unifies" everything within the frame of Bestand is directly counter-posed to the complex unification that is evident in the structure of dwelling according to which diverse elements, while gathered today, are nevertheless disclosed in both their unity and their plurality.

Although the Heideggerian account of technology is sometimes treated as a sort of radicalization of the instrumentality that might seem to be part of the equipmental structure elucidated in Being and Time, there is a crucial difference between the forms of ordering at issue. There is a spatial ordering associated with equipmentality that is based in the ordering of places and regions which is completely absent from the extreme form of technological ordering associated with the modern. Just as technology refuses to acknowledge any framework beyond the technological itself, so it cannot recognize any boundedness either – neither the boundedness that would imply technological limitation nor the boundedness that is consequent on regionality and place. Technology transforms, stores and makes available for use such in a way that obliterates even the localized differences that make for the ordering of equipmentality.

The destruction of any proper spatial or temporal ordering is perhaps the real mark of the danger that technology represents. The technological transformation of the world, and of space and time along with it, involves an obliteration of the complex but unitary place in which human dwelling is possible, an obliteration of the near and the far, an obliteration the very things around which human building is centred and with respect to which both things and world are disclosed. Although, as Heidegger emphasises, any "re-turning" from the obliteration and forgetfulnes that is so characteristic of technological modernity cannot be accomplished by mere human "decision" or "action, such

a "re-turning" must involve a recovery of a sense of human dwelling, a recovery, one might say, of a sense of place. Such a recovery cannot consist in a rejection of the spatial, but must also involve a recovery of both the spatial and the temporal from their technological transformation into pure quantity and measure and their re-connection within the complex unity of place itself. In this respect, the problem that Being and Time presents – the problem of regaining, in the face of the modern appropriation of these concepts, a proper sense of the way in which space, time, place and dwelling are intimately interconnected, can be viewed as analogous to the problem presented by the challenge of technology – though in the case of technology the need is much more pressing and cannot be answered merely by any change in "attitude" or "approach".54 As Heidegger puts matters in "The Turning": "in order that man in his essence may become attentive to the essence of technology, and in order that there may be founded an essential relationship between technology and man in respect to their essence, modern man must first and above all find his way back into the full breadth of the space proper to his essence... Unless man first establishes himself beforehand in the space proper to his essence and there takes up his dwelling, he will not be capable of anything essential within the destining now holding sway."55 Only from within the space and place of human dwelling can the real question of technology be made clear and only from that perspective can it be adequately answered.

Notes

1. "Art and Space", trans. Charles Seibert, Man and World 1
(1973), p.4; originally "Die Kunst und der Raum" (St Gallen:
Erker Verlag, 1969).

2. Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1991), p.129.

3. Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p.000.

4. Maria Villela-Petit also points to spatiality as marking a
central problem in Heidegger's thought – see Maria Villela-Petit,
'Heidegger's Conception of Space', in Christopher Macann (ed.),
Heidegger: Critical Assessments, Vol. I (London: Routledge,
1994), pp.117-140 and a similar recognition of the centrality of
the problem of space is characteristic of many of the discussions
currently available in the literature that addresses the topic in
any detailed fashion – though the literature available on this
topic is relatively limited.

5. On the spatial connotations of "Situation" see Being and Time,
H299; on "environment" see Being and Time, H66.

12. Ibid, H54. See also the corresponding passage in the lecture
series given in the summer semester of 1925 and published in
English as History of the Concept of Time, translated by T.
Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp.157-158.

13. Being and Time, H54.

14. Ibid. See also note 47.

15. Being-in-the-World, p.43.

16. The idea can be traced back, however, to the Greeks, and particularly to the concept of kenon or void as it arose in the thinking of the atomists and was also adopted by the Stoics – see Keimpe Algra, Concepts of Space in Greek Thought (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp.38-70 & 263ff. Although the Greek concepts of topos and chora also had a part to play in the development of the modern concept of space that appears in Descartes and in subsequent thinkers, it is kenon that seems to have the more important role. For more on the history of the concept of space see Max Jammer, Concepts of Space. The History of Theories of Space in Physics, 2nd Edn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969); see also, for a somewhat perspective, Edward S. Casey, 'Smooth Spaces and Rough-Edged Places: The Hidden History of Place', Review of Metaphysics 51 (1997), pp.267-96.

17. René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy II:10; Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Ch. Adam and P. Tannery (rev. ed., Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964-76), p.45; translation from The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. I, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.227.

18. See Albert Einstein, Foreword to Max Jammer, Concepts of Space, p.xiii.

19. Being and Time, H54.

20. On this point, see also the discussion in What is a Thing?,

trans. W. B. Barton Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1967), pp.98-106.

21. "Zwei Seiende, die innerhalb der Welt vorhanden und überdies an ihnen selbst weltlos sind, können sich nie 'berühren', keines kann 'bei' dem andern 'sein'" – Being and Time, H55. This may lead us to question whether even the idea of containment can properly be made sense of here – indeed, it is notable that the Aristotelian analysis of the being-in associated with topos in Physics IV (which otherwise seems to stand in the background of Heidegger's discussion of "being-in") looks to the point at which an enclosing body "touches" the body enclosed. Topos is „the limit of the enclosing body, at which it is in contact with that which is enclosed" (Physics IV, 212a36).

22. Being and Time, H54. Notice the way in which corporeality is, in this passage, de-emphasised.

23. Ibid., H66.

25. Being and Time, H367-69.

26. See Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, pp.00-00. Yoko Arisaka takes issue with Dreyfus's reading in "Heidegger's Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus", Inquiry 38 (1995), pp.455-67.

27. Indeed, even after Heidegger rejects the attempt, in Being and Time, to derive existential spatiality from temporality as fundamentally misguided (a recognition to which he comes fairly quickly) still he retains the idea that a certain sort of "priority" is to be accorded to temporality nonetheless (see, for instance, What is a Thing, p.00 and also "Time and Being", in On

Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper, 1977]).

28. The argument for this claim is set out in detail in my _Place and Experience_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). One might ask why Heidegger is misled into thinking that temporality can indeed do the work required of it in this context. While there are undoubtedly a number of factors in play here, part of the answer may lie in Heidegger's hermeneutical orientation in _Being and Time_ and his focus on the problem of meaning. If it is the meaningfulness of Dasein's environment that has to be explained, then focussing on the referentiality of the equipmental structure, and so on temporality, will indeed look like a plausible path to take in looking for some way to ground such meaningfulness. Moreover, since meaning can be seen to inhere in a much more abstract structure (meaning is, one might say, about relations between types of entities, rather than between entities in their particularity), and as the importance of spatiality is partly tied to the importance of the concrete and the particular (spatial orientation is to do with orienting one's own body in respect of the particularities of one's immediate environment), so the focus on meaningfulness is likely to reinforce any tendency to neglect the spatial. It is perhaps no accident, then, to find the shift away from a purely temporal analysis to also be accompanied by a shift, as Heidegger describes it in the Le Thor seminar (see n.7 above), from meaning to truth and then to place.

29. See _Place and Experience_, pp.00-00.

30. Being and Time, H108.

31. Being and Time, §70, H368; see also Being and Time, §70, H368; the discussion of res cogitans versus res corporea at §19, H89-92; and the passage from §12, H54 quoted above.

32. Being-in-the-World, p.137.

33. 'What Does it Mean: To Orient Oneself in Thought?' [1786], Ak. VIII, pp.134ff.

34. See Being and Time, H##.

35. 'Regions', Ak II, p.379.

36. See, once again, the more detailed discussion of this question in my Place and Experience, pp.00-00.

37. See, for instance, What is a Thing?, p.00. Of course talk of Zeit-raum remains somewhat ambiguous as a way of referring to time and space, since in ordinary German it usually refers to a space of time.

38. Being and Time, H367.

39. See Villela-Petit, 'Heidegger's Conception of Space', p.118.

40. See "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and also "The Thing" in Poetry Language Thought.

41. On the role of the idea of "topology" in Heidegger's thinking see Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1987), pp.232-38.

42. For more on the ideas at issue here see, once again, my Place and Experience.

43. See Being and Time, H188-191, in which Heidegger makes

explicit the way in which the "unheimlich" character of Dasein is to be understood as a "not being at home" ("unheimlich" is usually translated as "uncanny"). Unheimlichkeit is also directly connected with what is, in Being and Time, the existentially basic experience of Angst ("anxiety").

47. This shift in Heidegegr's thinking is also accompanied, as Julian Young points out (see his "What is Dwelling?", in this volume, pp.00-00), by a re-evaluation of Nietzsche and an increasing regard for Hölderlin (see also Stuart Elden, "Heidegger's Hölderlin and the Importance of Place", Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, forthcoming [1999]).

48. Heidegger make use of much the same etymology in his introduction of the concept of dwelling in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" (p.147) as appeared in his characterization of the nature of "being-in" in §12 of Being and Time (discussed above p.00).

49. See "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", pp.151-54. In "Art and Space", pp.5-6, Heidegger also directs attention to human activity as that by means of which space is opened up (similarly he also stresses the way in which the unfolding of space is accomplished only in relation to the reigning of place – see note 10 above).

50. See ibid., pp.149-50; also "the Thing", pp.178-80.

51. "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", p.155 (translation amended).

52. See "The Question Concerning Technology", in The Question

<u>Concerning Technology and Other Essays</u>, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p.17.

53. "The Thing", <u>Poetry Language Thought</u>, p.177.

54. "The Turning", in The Question Concerning Technology, pp.39-40.