We Hyperboreans: Naturalism, Nietzsche, and Topography

Jeff Malpas

"Who are our nomads today, our real Nietzscheans?"—Gilles Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought'.

I. Sometimes what is not spoken about directly is as important as that which is explicit in our speaking—the background to thought can be as important as what appears at its centre. In Nietzsche's case, although, for the most part, it is not a topic that appears explicitly in his writings, place and the relation to place nevertheless seems to be a powerful presence and influence in his thought. Some indication of this is given by the well-known passage in *Ecce Homo,* in which Nietzsche writes:

> Intimately related to the question of nutrition is the question of place and climate. No one is at liberty to live everywhere, and anyone who has to perform great tasks that call for all his strength has indeed a very limited choice in this respect. The influence of climate on the metabolism- slowing it down, speeding it up-is so extensive that a mistake over place and climate can not only alienate someone from their task but can keep it from them entirely: they never get to see it (*Ecce Homo,* 11.2).

This passage, which is sometimes seen as an example of a certain naturalistic or even materialistic strain in Nietzsche's thought, also reflects his preoccupation with the need to find a location attuned, not only to his physical, but also his mental and spiritual needs. Here is a thinker who is far from being detached from his surroundings, but whose very capacity for thought depends upon them. Scattered throughout writings, one finds comments concerning the relation between his work and state of mind, and the places in which he resides, as well as descriptions,

positive and negative, of those places. Nietzsche's unsettled mode of life, especially after his resignation from his post in Basel, reflects the unsettled character of both his body and his mind, and his need for a constant adjustment in climate and location according to changes in season, mood, and in the circumstances of his life. Far from indicating a lack of concern with place, Nietzsche's unsettled mode of life and thought is the strongest indication of its importance. In this paper, which is really no more than a first foray into the area of a topographical reading of Nietzsche, I will, first, look at the existing literature that exists that might be deemed relevant to the topic—and there is such a literature even though relatively small; second, I will look at some of the elements in Nietzsche's own writings that might provide the first elements towards a Nietzschean topography; third, I will sketch out some of the implications of such a topography. My discussion will form part of a larger argument concerning so-called "naturalism" in philosophy—where naturalism is understood, in very specific sense, as a turn back to the already given place in which not only philosophy, but life and existence, arise in concrete and materialised form.

II. For many, the idea of a contemporary exploration of the topographical elements in Nietzsche's thought will immediately bring to mind David Krell and Donald Bates' work in their volume *The Good European*—a work that might be thought to undertake just such a topography through its documenting of Nietzsche's principal work sites in text and photograph. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Krell and Bates' approach does not pursue the question concerning the role of place in Nietzsche's work in any deep fashion. Instead, theirs is largely a documentary approach, and the connections they suggest are of a relatively straightforward and familiar kind: that certain places provided solitude or rest, that some resonated with Nietzsche's moods and feelings, that others were metaphorically or imaginatively productive. In fact, Krell and Bates announce their suspicion of the suggestion of certain deeper

Can one calculate the influence of Nietzsche's work sites on his principal ideas—will to power, eternal recurrence of the same, overman, transvaluation of all values, the innocence of becoming, perspectivism, genealogical critique, tragic affirmation, and love of fate—assuming that one can calculate the list of principal ideas? Is eternal return a thought of Alpine lakes, will to power an effulgence of the northern Italian city-states, overman a dream of the mountains near Nice, genealogy a strategy for defeating the tourists at Sils-Maria? Such judgments could only be quirky, and this book has no desire to make them.[1]

The sort of deterministic relationship between place and thought that Krell and Bates seem to envisage here, and that they also reject, is not merely quirky, but also rather simplistic (and perhaps rather vague—what would it be for the eternal return to be an "effulgence" of a place or city?). For the most part, it is not what is at issue in any genuine attempt at a topographic reading of Nietzsche nor is it what I intend in talk of a possible Nietzschean "topography" or topology". Such a topography cannot remain at the level merely of the documentary or biographical, and yet it also entails a more complex role for place in Nietzsche's thinking, both as an influence on that thinking and as something whose presence can be discerned, if often implicitly, within that thinking, than might be suggested by Krell and Bates.

If one pursues the idea of a Nietzschean topography further in the existing literature, then one soon encounters a small body of literature that takes up what is usually referred to as Nietzsche's 'geophilosophy'. The term is taken originally from the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who, in their 1992 book, *What is Philosophy?*, identify a geographic mode of philosophical thinking that makes use of a set of landscape and related metaphors, transposing philosophy from a temporal into a spatial frame. Deleuze and Guattari identify Nietzsche as the one who "founded geophilosophy", as they put it, "by seeking to determine the national characteristics of French, German, and English philosophies",[2] and the reading of Nietzsche in this

fashion, which remains largely undeveloped in Deleuze and Guattari's own discussion, has since been taken further by others, most notably Stephan Günzel,[3] and following on from Günzel, Gary Shapiro.[4]

The observation of the prominence of geographical, or what I would call topographical elements in Nietzsche's writings is not new, nor is it an unfamiliar characteristic (my own brief examination, in the next section, of some key instances of such elements is, in this respect, essentially a reminder of what will already be evident to any attentive reader). Indeed, Günzel and Shapiro both note the way in which previous writers, even before Deleuze and Guattari arrived on the scene, had engaged with Nietzsche's predilection for the geographic and topographic. Günzel as well as Shapiro acknowledge the work of Ernst Bertram in this regard,[5] a figure to whom I shall return, as well as that of Thodore Lessing[6] and Karl Jaspers; and, in different ways, of Gaston Bachelard,[7] Christine Buci-Glucksmann,[8] and Luce Irigaray.[9] Interestingly, in spite of his closeness to Jaspers, as well the evident influence of Bertram's reading on his own work, nowhere does Heidegger directly address the topographic elements in Nietzsche, although he occasionally makes use of such elements (Günzel draws attention, for instance, to Heidegger's use of the Nietzschean image of the desert or wilderness, *Wüste,* as a signifier for nihilism).

Krell and Bates tend to treat the topographic in Nietzsche as essentially background. In contrast, Günzel, and those who use the language of Nietzschean 'geophilosophy', treat the topographic as part of the foreground. Yet at the same time, it is not the topographic as such that is important, but rather the topographic as played out in a set of metaphors, figures, and tropes—the idea of the topographic that is at play here is itself metaphorical, and in one sense, a sense that may even be said to run counter to Deleuze's own emphasis elsewhere on a form of "empiricism" in thinking, to be an abstracted, de-naturalised sense of topography. Günzel makes very clear that geophilosophical reading of Nietzsche depends on the drawing of a clear demarcation between "experience and the significance of

metaphors".[10] Thus Günzel writes that:

> Nietzsche's poor health did not allow him to visit all the places he described, and his poor sight did not allow him to see everything clearly or in detail. One consequence of this is that Nietzsche's descriptions of landscapes consist in more or less stereotypical literary descriptions that he applied to the places he imagined himself to be.[11]

Elsewhere Günzel suggests that actual landscapes and places are of little relevance to Nietzsche's geophilosophy, instead "only *theoretical* landscapes can give us maps of Nietzsche's critical geography"[12]—and in supposed contrast to Heidegger, Nietzsche's geographical reflections are based on a "virtual geography".[13]

This shift to the 'metaphorical' or 'theoretical' or 'diagrammatic' is one that is already present in Deleuze and Guattari. Moreover, although it appears as a move of philosophical clarification, associated with greater conceptual rigour, it seems to me to typify one of the most problematic features of this style of approach (a style that I would argue suffuses Deleuze's work and is not merely restricted to the idea of the geophilosophical). By treating the topographic elements in Nietzsche, or in any other thinker, as operating solely at the level of a certain sort of philosophical imaginary, two ideas are set in train. First, philosophy itself is implicitly understood as essentially an exercise of metaphorical exchange and exploration. Not merely is metaphor affirmed as a legitimate philosophical device (a claim against which it is difficult to erect any reasonable objection), but the metaphorical effectively becomes the only domain within which philosophical discourse can operate, and the only basis on which its significance can be assessed. In this way, philosophical thinking is set adrift from its concern with the world as that might be other than what is given in metaphor or image. This is especially problematic in relation to the topographical, since, as I will argue below, the topographical has its origins precisely in the refusal of the separation of thought from its object or of the thinker from her environment. Moreover, it is not as metaphor that place—or earth or

landscape—comes to figure as central in a genuinely topographic mode of philosophising, but *as place,* as that in which thinking is grounded, by which thinking is sustained, and which thinking both opens up and to which it is itself opened.

III. Günzel and Shapiro both draw attention to the fact that Nietzsche was a close reader of the first volume, published in 1882 (the second volume appeared in 1891), of Friedrich Ratzel's *Anthropogeographie,* among other contemporary writings on geography. Today Ratzel is most often seen as the originator of the idea of geographical determinism—the notion that human culture and society is to be understood as a direct function of geographical location—and is also frequently viewed as a forerunner of Nazi geopolitical thinking, since it is he who first formulates the idea of *Lebensraum.* In fact, Ratzel was one of the pioneers of ethnography, who argued that the differences between peoples were less significant than their similarities, and who was particularly impressed by the hybrid, immigrant societies of the New World, especially the United States, as a model for the future. Ratzel was also a vehement opponent of racialist, as well as anti-Semitic thinking, and his idea of *Lebensraum* was essentially the deployment of the notion of habitat, or life-space, in relation to the idea of the nation-state, and was not seen by Ratzel as justifying militaristic expansionism. Ratzel's own emphasis on the geographic as playing a key role in cultural and social formation (which did not amount to any simple determination of the one by the other), also put his position in opposition to the racial determinism that was characteristic of Nazism.[14]

Ratzel's significance for topographic thinking lies in his conception of human culture as developing, in thoroughly naturalistic fashion, in close inter-relation with modes of spatial and geographic formation, and allied to this, his repositioning of the spatial and the geographic so that they could no longer be viewed as secondary to the

temporal and historical. Indeed, subsequent French thinkers especially, notably the geographer Paul Vidal de la Blache, and also historians such as Lucien Febvre, developed this position further so that geography and history, and so also space and time, were seen as inextricably bound together. This interconnecting of geography and history is not merely the inscribing of geographical tropes into historical writing, but more than this, a rethinking of the underlying ontology of the historical and the geographic. No longer is the historical to be thought apart from geography, nor geography apart from history; rather the two are bound together in the same dynamic interplay. Not only does this reconceptualisation of the historical and geographic have an impact within the disciplines themselves, but it seems to me the entanglement of spatiality and temporality that is at work here carries over into other domains, including literature and also philosophy.

Nietzsche's relation to Ratzel seems not to be one **in** which Nietzsche is directly influenced by Ratzelian ideas. Instead, if there is a significant relation between them, it seems more likely to have been one in which Ratzel's work connected with ideas already present in Nietzsche's th in kin g. In particular, the reorientation towards the spatial and geographic that is present in Ratzel must have resonated with Nietzsche's own tendencies in that same direction. Moreover, that this was indeed a tendency **in** Nietzsche's thought even prior to 1882 seems clear. In this respect, rather than reading the topographical elements in Nietzsche as the internalisation of an external topography
- an internalisation accomplished through the metaphorization and figuration of places and landscapes—it seems more accurate to treat it as the externalisation of experience and thought, an externalisation that has the consequence that 'inner' and 'outer' are no longer capable of ready differentiation. Such externalisation is one that bears comparison with the similarly externalist and naturalistic tendency that has been a hallmark of much twentieth-century thinking from Davidson to Heidegger.

It is against this background that perhaps we should read Nietzsche's

comments regarding the importance of place and climate in *Ecce Homo*—as expressing ideas that clearly resonate and may be directly indebted to Ratzelian thinking. But already, in 1880, Nietzsche had talked of his own relationship to Sils Maria in a way that suggests, just the sort of externalisation of the inner, although expressed in the form of a 'doubling', that is surely at issue here:

> In many of nature's regions we rediscover ourselves, with a pleasing sense of dread: it is the loveliest way to traffic in doubles. How happy must that one be who experiences such a thing precisely here—in this perpetually sunny October air, in this jocular and happy play of the winds from dawn to dusk, in this purest brilliance of light and most moderate coolness of temperature, in the entire, charmingly earnest character of this plateau, with its hills, lakes, and forests, a plateau that has imperturbably nestled quite close to the terrors of the eternal snows—here, where Italy and Finland unite, here in the homeland of all the silvery hues of nature. How happy must that one be who can say "There are surely many things in nature that are more grand and beautiful, but *this* is intimate and familiar to me, related to me by blood, and by more than blood." ('The Wanderer and His Shadow', *Human All Too Human,* II.)

One is reminded of Marcel Proust's descriptions, some decades later, regarding his intimate relation to his own Combray, and the places contained within it, in *À la recherche du temps perdu*. There too place is personalised, and the relation to place is akin to something familial, and more than familial. Admittedly, there is, one might say, a certain "romanticism" in the sense of the doubling of self with place that appears here, but one might equally view Ratzel's insistence of the conditioning of the cultural by the geographic as itself giving a more 'scientific' formulation to an idea that has a longer 'romantic' pedigree. Moreover, at this point 'romanticism' and 'materialism', or 'naturalism', may even be viewed as coming together—the romantic given in and through the material and the material in and through the romantic.

If the account offered by Günzel and Shapiro draws attention to the connection between Nietzsche and Ratzel, it gives no attention at all to those actual places to which Nietzsche himself attached significance, arguing for their relative philosophical irrelevance. Their focus is instead, as one might infer from my comments earlier as well as the Deleuzian-Guattarian framework within which their approach is couched, almost entirely at the level of metaphors, figures, and allegories that are essentially removed from any actual place or geography, displaced into the realm of the theoretical and the abstract. Here geography really has become a kind of writing, and place, if it names anything, names only the *topos* that appears within the written. Yet in Nietzsche, and also in Bertram, the places that figure so prominently appear, while they often do appear in metaphorical, allegorical or figurative guise, are seldom such that they can appear as only metaphorical, only allegory, only as figure or image. Indeed, one might argue that what occurs in Nietzsche, as it occurs in a number of key nineteenth and twentieth century thinkers, is the rejection of the metaphor, in particular, as *only* metaphorical. It is partly its capacity to connect or reconnect us with the concrete reality of situation and place—something that may be connected to the emotional power of metaphor, a power that, in its tie to emotion is also a tie to bodily situatedness - that enables metaphor to function. Genuine metaphor is never abstract, but rather has a concreteness, and a placedness, that belongs essentially to it.

When Nietzsche tells us of the origins of the thought of the eternal recurrence "six thousand feet beyond man and time" beside the pyramidal rock by Lake Silvaplana *(Ecce Homo,* XX), there is more at issue, certainly for Nietzsche, than merely a piece of accidental biography. The importance of the so-called "Zarathustra stone" is indicative of the extent to which Nietzsche's thinking is indeed embedded in his surroundings, and dependent upon them, as well as of Nietzsche's internalisation of landscape and place. This is evident, not least, in Nietzsche's predilection for *walking*—something he shared with Rousseau as well,[15]

as well as Thoreau.[16] Thought is not a sedentary activity for Nietzsche, but tied to physical movement. "Remain seated as little as possible," he wrote, also in *Ecce Homo:*

> Put no trust in any thought that is not born in the open to the accompaniment of free bodily movement. Nor in one in which even the muscles do not celebrate a feast. All prejudices take their origins in the intestines, a sedentary life, as I have already said elsewhere, is the real sin against the Holy Spirit *(Ecce* Homo, XX)

Nietzsche's emphasis on the value of movement, and of walking, can be understood, as it is in both Thoreau and Rousseau as having a genuine philosophical significance. Walking bring us into closer connection with the rhythms of a landscape—even of an urban landscape—as the movements of thought are attuned to the movements of the body.

The connection to the body, and so to place and landscape, that occurs in walking can also be said to occur, for Nietzsche, in another form—a form whose love he also shares with Rousseau (another composer, if more successful in his own time), namely, through music. The thought of the eternal recurrence, and the inspirational vision that occurs at the rock on Lake Silvaplana, is essentially tied to an experience of music, so that Nietzsche can say that "The whole of *Zarathustra* might perhaps be classified under the rubric music. At all events the essential condition of its production was a second birth within me of the art of hearing" *(Ecce Homo).* While one might read this as merely an expression of the life-long importance that music had for Nietzsche, in this context it also seem to indicate something more. In sound we are brought into a proximity to things that we do not experience in vision alone, or at least, not in vision as we ordinarily conceive it. There is an immersive quality to the acoustic—a spatiality even—that is much harder to appreciate in respect of the visual. In tone, pitch and reverberation, one can experience a sense of the quality and character of the space in which a voice or

instrument sounds, and not only the voice or instrument itself (although one might ask whether one ever hears only the voice, or only the instrument—there is always a space that is carried by any and every sound). Moreover, sound, and especially music, also carries movement within it, in the form of rhythm and melody. Perhaps this tells us something of Nietzsche's own preference for the melodic, but melody itself he also associates with the *south,* and the decay of melody with the *north,* with the *German,* and also with *Wagner.*

In *Ecce Home,* music is brought into direct connection with Nietzsche's topographical mode of thought—music seems, indeed, to bring a topography of its own. It is a topography in which the south, as so often for Nietzsche, takes precedence over the north, and in which one place stands out above all others: "If I say 'on the other side of the Alps', I am actually saying only 'Venice'. If I search for another word for music, then I always find the word Venice" *(Ecce Homo).* Although also forbidden to him (it is a watery place, after all), it is nevertheless of Venice that Nietzsche says, in a comment whose sentiment is repeated elsewhere, that it is "the only place on earth that I love" (Letter to Overbeck, 24 March, 1887).

Venice is the subject of one of the three essays by Ernst Bertram, in his study of Nietzsche, that are directly focussed on a place (a fourth, 'Claude Lorrain', takes up the issue of place and landscape, while a fifth, 'Eleusis', is less about the place, than about the mysteries, and all that goes with them, that the name evokes). It is also among the most most lyrical of Bertram's essays, being one of those that Thomas Mann defended against Walter Kaufman as "simply beautiful". In music and in Venice are brought together an attitude, a mood, and a sensibility that are, arguably, at the heart of Nietzsche's thought, and at the heart of any topographical reading of that thought. According to Bertram:

For Nietzsche, Venice became a city of symbol like no other. Symbol of all that "mattered most to him"—like the "fate of music"—symbol, above all, of his own innermost ambiguity and duality of soul. Just as ... the Engadin, by embracing all the

points midway between the ice and the south, is his *proper* landscape ... in precisely the same way Venice, the middle and mediator between Orient and Occident, half Byzantium, half Bruges, formed by amalgamating land and lagoon in an enigmatic double existence, the consanguineous city of his soul, the only one he loves—can love.[17]

In Venice beauty and death, happiness and tragedy, are found in the most intimate proximity- for Nietzsche, Venice thus symbolises both the duality of the world, but also the possibility, even if it be an illusion, of the overcoming of that duality. Calling on a list of other writers who have succumbed to the spell of the Venetian twilight, Bertram also invokes Georg Simmel's own, as Bertram describes it "Nietzsche-inspired", essay on the city—an essay that clearly has its own influence on Bertram. As Simmel writes:

> The tragedy of Venice, through which it becomes the symbol of a singular order concerning our whole way of conceiving the world, is that the surface that has left its ground, the appearance in which no being lives anymore, nevertheless presents itself as something complete and substantial, as the content of a life that can be truly experienced ... Only an appearance which has never corresponded to some being, and even whose opposite has died away and yet which pretends to offer life and wholeness, is simply a lie in which the ambivalence of life has coagulated, as in a body...The one certainty is that life is only a foreground behind which stands death. This is the final reason that life, as Schopenhauer notes, is "ambivalent through and through"...Venice ... has the ambivalent beauty of an adventure that is immersed in a life without roots, like a blossom floating in the sea. That Venice was and remains the classical city of adventure is only a sign of the final fate of its overall image, offering our soul no home but only an adventure.[18]

If Venice shows the essential ambivalence of the world, its duality and unity together, then Venice also exhibits the world as encompassing the whole of existence—as entirely immanent to us, as possessed of nothing that transcends what is immediately given. Yet this does not mean that what is given is without ambivalence, in a way that stands over and above a multiplicity of perspectives or views. Venice, as the city of masks, is the city that shows us that there is nothing

behind the mask—or at least nothing but another mask.

As the city that opens up the world in its encompassing ambiguity, so Venice, perhaps more than any other, is the city of the death of god (as it is also the city of the death of Wagner). Thus, Nietzsche's words from the *Gay Science* can be taken to have a special resonance for this place that was, for long, the crossing point of East and West:

> We philosophers and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news that "the old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." *(The Gay Science,* v 2, 256)

Fink suggests that what is to be found in Nietzsche is, above all, the thinking out of a "new experience of the world" that does not lie, according to Fink, "in Nietzsche's 'great war' against Western metaphysics, Christianity, and traditional morality", but is instead "hesitantly articulated in those phrases in which the world is celebrated as a game, as a roundelay, a happening that is driven by accident and chance, as the theatre of the god of masks, Dionysius, in such songs of Zarathustra as 'Before Sunrise' and 'The Great Longing'. Fink concludes: "Understood philosophically, what we need to do to understand Nietzsche today is not to inquire into that which is thought in the word formulas 'the will to power' and the 'eternal recurrence', but, before all else, to bring into words the relationship of human existence to the world, the experience of the world."[19] It is just this "new experience", an experience of the opening up of the world in both its duality and unity, that seems, in Nietzsche, to be given concrete form in the city of St Mark, and in its own opening to the horizon of the sea. It is a new experience that Nietzsche greets with joy, even though it is a joy that is tinged with a certain apprehension—the horror that is sometimes also

associated with Nietzsche's account of the death of god is present here too, just as it is present in the experience of Venice itself.

Tsarina Doyle has recently argued for a reading of Nietzsche's late thinking as responding to the supposed Kantian separation of the world of appearance from the reality of things that lies behind (a separation that Schopenhauer famously takes as the great achievement of Kant's thought) and instead affirming the idea that it is the world itself that shows up in the multiplicity of perspectives that also appear within the world.[20] Such a reading is certainly in accord with the sort of topographical reading I have suggested here, and, indeed, such a topography or topology is precisely one that, as I argued elsewhere, looks to understand appearances in terms of those appearances rather than by seeking some deeper principle or reality that lies beneath (which means that such a topographical approach may sometimes be expressed, as in occasional passages from Nietzsche, as a denial that there is indeed any access to 'the real' as it might be opposed to the apparent, to the superficial, to the topographic. Such a reading of Nietzsche positions him much closer to Heidegger than Heidegger's characterization of him as the last great figure in Western metaphysics would allow (although clearly Nietzsche is itself an ambiguous name in Heidegger's own thinking), but I would also argue that, in spite of readings such as Doyle's, it may also position him closer to Kant. Contrary to Karsten Harries and others,[21] the 'open sea' that appears with the new dawn that Nietzsche welcomes in *The Gay Science* cannot automatically be equated with that "wide and stormy ocean" that is "the true home of illusion" described by Kant in the First *Critique.* Kant too is a topographer, one who describes himself as a true "geographer of reason", even though Kant's topography is one of the plain, rather than of the mountain or the sea, and he too can be read as no less concerned with a similar return to the world to that which is often present in Nietzsche.[22] Where Kant differs is in his relinquishing of the language of the nomad and the adventurer, and instead his focus on the task of finding a proper dwelling

place on the earth, that is, which, as he emphasises, is the only place we can dwell.

V. The investigation of the topographical elements of Nietzsche's thought, especially when pursued, not so much through either 'geophilosophy' or photographic and textual 'documentary', as through the genuine interplay of thought and place in Nietzsche's writings, turns out not to be a detour through otherwise peripheral side-roads and tracks, but takes us instead through the very centre of Nietzsche's philosophical landscape. Within that landscape, ideas like the eternal recurrence and the death of god take on a different character, as devices that allow that landscape to emerge and its character be delineated; that allow the world to appear in all its plurality and ambiguity a world now no longer contained within the "all too human', but brought to appearance through the self-overcoming of the human in favour of the world itself. The investigation of the topographic in Nietzsche depends, not on the separation of experience from philosophical significance, but rather on understanding the way philosophical significance is also given in and through experience, and especially in and through the experience of place and of places, whether it be Sils Maria, the rock by Silvaplana, Basel, Genoa, Turin, or Venice. More generally, one might say that this understanding of the world as given only in and through experience, and through experience in its concrete embeddedness in place, can itself be seen as a form of genuine naturalism that looks, not to what transcends the world, but rather to the unfolding of the world in the world; the coming to appearance of things in the midst of things—evoking the sense of *physis* that the idea of the natural can also itself obscure. In my own terms, I have sometimes referred to such a mode of "naturalism", of topographical thinking, as a "romantic materialism', in which the materiality of the world appears as what is thought, felt and remembered, while that which is thought, felt and remembered is given in the very materiality of things.

Deleuze asks after the 'real' Nietzscheans, the real *nomads,* of today. Already, in the terms I have used here, this is to place the Nietzschean in direct relation to the topographic, since the nomad is the one whose mode of being is defined by their relation to place, and by the intimacy of that relation (the nomad, then, properly understood, is also one who dwells). Perhaps the real Nietzscheans are those who are indeed capable of being moved, not so much by the displaced abstractions of 'geophilosophy', not by the diagrammatic relations of either metaphor of concept, but rather by the genuine freeing-up of possibility that occurs in the dynamic opening horizon of the world, as that opening is evident in places like Sils Maria and like Venice—in fact, as it occurs in the experience of the world that occurs only in and through our placed being in the world. In *The Anti-Christ,* Nietzsche declaims to his readers: "Let us face ourselves. We are Hyperboreans; we know very well how far off we live ...".[23] In response, the poet Kenneth White extends the thought: "I'm a Hyperborean," he writes. "The Hyperborean is engaged on an erratic path to a far-out something. What people see are the erratics (the stones he leaves on his path), what he sees are the flashes of the far-out thing."[24] What Nietzsche sees are the flashes of the world, and though he may well remain always "on the way", always the wanderer, still the flashes that guide him are to be found only in those places in which he also finds himself.

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[1] David Farrell Krell and Donald L. Bates, *The Good European: Nietzsche's Work Sites in Word and Image* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p.6.

[2] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Phil osophy?,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London: Verso, 1994), p.102.

[3] See Günzel, *Geoph ilosophie : Nietzsches philosophische Geographie* (Berlin Akademie Verlag, 2001); also 'Nietzsche's Geophilosophie',Journal *of Nietzsche Studies* 2003 (25): 103-16—Günzel has also adopted a similar geophilosophical approach in relation to Kant, see 'Die philosophische Geographie Kants', in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Hortsmann, and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung* (Berlin: New York: De Gruyter, 2001).

[4] See Shapiro, 'Nietzsche's Geophilosophy and the Direction of the Earth, *journal of Nietzsche Studies* 35- 36 (2008): 9-27; 'Nietzsche on Geophilosophy and Geoaesthetics ', in Keith Ansell Pearson (ed.), *A Companion to Nietzsche* (New York: Blackwell, 2006), pp.477-94.

[5] Bertram, *Nietzsche: Attempt at a Mythology,* trans. Robert E. Norton (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2009 [1918]).
[6] Lessing, *Nietzsche* (Munich: Matthes & Seitz, 1985 [1925]).
[7] Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement,* t ra ns. Edith R Farrell and C. Frederick Farrell (Dallas: Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1988 [[1943]), see p.368.
[8] Buci-Glucksmann, *L'oeuil cartographique de /'art* (Paris: Edition Galilee, 1996), Ch 1.
[9] lrigraray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche,* trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia, 1991).
[10] Günzel, 'Nietzsche's Geophilosophy', p.79. Significantly, while acknowledging the importance of Bertram's work (which he calls the "earliest and the most advanced "), Günzel writes that "li ke most interpreters, [Bertram] failed to differentiate between Nietzsche's experience and the philosophical 'meaning' of the metaphor", ibid., p.90, n.3.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., p.82.
[13] Ibid., p.87.
[14] See my discussion in 'Geography, Biology, and Politics', *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2012), pp.13 7-58.
[15] See especially Thoreau's essay 'Walking', posthumously published in 1862—and which has since become a foundational work in the ecological movement.
[16] See *Reveries of a Solitary Walker.*
[17] Bertram, 'Venice', p.226-7.
[18] Simmel, 'Venice', trans. Ulrich Teucher and Thomas M. Kemple, *Theory, Culture and Society* 24 (2007), pp.45-46.
[19] Eugen Fink, 'Nietzsche's New Experience of the World', in Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracey B. Strong (eds.), *Nietzsche's New Seas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 988), p.219
[20] See Doyle, *Nietzsche on Epistemology and Metaphysics: The World in View* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
[21] See, for instance, Harries, 'The Philosopher at Sea', in Gillespie and Strong (eds.), *Nietzsche's New Seas,* pp. 21-44.
[22] See Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel, 'Kant's Geography of Reason', in Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (eds), *Kant's Geography* (New York: SUNY Press, 2011), pp.195-214; and Jeff Malpas with Gunter Zoller, 'Reading Kant Geographically: From Critical Philosophy to Empirical Geography', in Graham Bird et al (eds.), *New Essays in Kant Studies* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
[23] Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ,* 1.
[24] Wh ite, *On the Atlantic Edge,* p.107.