

***Kategoriai* and the Unity of Being**

J. E. Malpas

I.

Aristotle provides us with lists of *Kategoriai*, all of them very similar, at a number of places in his writings. There is, for example, a list in the *Topics*,¹ in the *Posterior Analytics*,² in the *Physics*,³ in the *Metaphysics*,⁴ and one also in the *Categories*.⁵ Just what these *Kategoriai* or 'Categories' are has long been a subject for contention among Aristotelian scholars. Assuming that the *Kategoriai* are, in some sense classifications (as the English translation of *Kategoriai* as 'category' might suggest⁶), the question has been just what do they classify. I shall argue in favour of the view that the classificatory role of the *Kategoriai* is primarily (though not exclusively) ontological rather than logical. But I shall also argue that this classificatory role must, insofar as it is classificatory, be seen as secondary to the ontological role of the *Kategoriai*. The *Kategoriai* may be classifications but, as I hope to show here, they are also more than just this. Indeed, it is only in virtue of their ontological role that the *Kategoriai* can be seen as classificatory.

These views are not, of course, without precedent. But there is another issue that I wish to raise here also. For recent work on the Aristotelian *Kategoriai* suggests that their role and composition is not the same throughout the Corpus. Michael Frede argues, contrary to the traditional view, that the idea of the first *Kategoria* as designated by substance (*ousia*) does not appear in the *Topics* and develops in an unequivocal fashion only in the *Metaphysics*.⁷ John Malcolm argues for different lists of *Kategoriai* appearing at various places in the Corpus depending on whether predicative or ontological considerations are at issue.⁸ Like Frede he too argues against a first *Kategoria* of substance in the *Topics*. The analyses of Frede and Malcolm seem to suggest that the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* (and the sense in which they transcend any purely classificatory role) probably developed only gradually in Aristotle and that it becomes properly explicit only in the *Metaphysics*. This is indeed the view that I shall adopt here. My claim is that the development of the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* is best seen as parallel to the development of Aristotle's metaphysical concerns towards their culmination in the central books of the *Metaphysics*. It is there we find an account of the *Kategoriai* which is integrated (though not completely) with the *archai* themselves.

Thus, I will argue that the *Kategoriai* should ultimately be seen as representing an articulation of the proper 'unity' of being (though this is not the only role which they play in the Aristotelian

Corpus). It is this that I shall deal with in the final section of the paper. To begin with, however, I want to develop a preliminary account of the notion of *Kategoriai* in Aristotle- particularly in their role as the ultimate genera of being-which will focus largely on the work which might ordinarily be taken as the *locus classicus* for discussion of the *Kategoriai*, the *Categories*.

II.

In Aristotle's Greek, the word *Kategoria* had a legal sense in which it meant an accusation (as one accuses someone *of* something) and also a corresponding, though more general, use in the sense of declaration or assertion.⁹ Aristotle takes up the word to give it a somewhat technical sense of his own, a sense which is usually rendered by the English translation of *kategoria* as 'predicate'.¹⁰ Thus it seems not unreasonable to say that for Aristotle a *kategoria* is that which is stated of a subject (*hypokeimenon*),¹¹ or, preserving the sense of accusation as something which is done, one might regard it as such a stating-as a 'predication'. Thus in the *Topics* Aristotle writes that the four predicables of definition, genus, accident, and property will always be found in one of the ten *Kategoriai* there listed or, to be more precise, in one of the ten "kinds of *Kategoriai*."¹² One can certainly see a clear connection between this technical use of *kategoria* in Aristotle and the legal sense of the term. For in accusation one accuses someone *of* something and in so doing that person is revealed in a particular light. So too in predication one asserts or 'predicates' one thing of another and in so doing one reveals the subject of predication as being in a particular way.

It is in chapter three of the *Categories* that we first encounter Aristotle's use of *kategoria* in the general, though for Aristotle, technical sense of 'predicate' or 'predication'. It is here that Aristotle asserts the transitivity of predication. Thus, we are told that "Whenever one thing is predicated [*kategoreitai*] of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also."¹³ It is this principle of transitivity which allows for the construction of categories in the modern sense of a system of classification. For the transitive nature of predication allows for the building up of what might be termed 'columns' of predicates in an ascending order of generality: individual under species; species under genus; genus under a still higher genus; and so on, until a highest genus (whether a separate genus for each column or a single genus under which all columns stand) is finally reached.

Now it is relatively easy to see that at the bottom of such categorial columns will be found various individuals. In the case of individual substances it is fairly clear that examples will be Socrates the individual man and Bucephalus the individual horse while examples of non-substantial individuals will be 'this white' or 'in the Lyceum'.¹⁴ Ordinarily we might expect that at the top of these columns of predication we will find a single highest genus-namely, 'being-in-general' (the class of all that is).

In Aristotle, however, each column culminates in a separate genus no one of which is reducible to any other. This is because Aristotle has a well worked-out notion of what it means to be a genus which excludes 'being-in-general' from qualifying as such.¹⁵ Being, according to Aristotle, is not a univocal term but is spoken of in many ways (*to on pollachos legetai*)¹⁶—though in the *Categories* this doctrine has not reached the level of articulation which it will find in the *Metaphysics*. Thus, Aristotle does not have a single ultimate classification for all things but has instead a number of highest genera-as many, in fact, as there are *Kategoriai*. The ultimate classifications of things were thus the *Kategoriai* themselves-Substance, Quality, Quantity, Relation, etc.-in the role of genera. The role played by the *Kategoriai* as divisions or classifications appears to be borne out in the *Topics*. For in chapter one of Book IV of that work, Aristotle specifically talks of the *Kategoriai* in the sense of "divisions,"¹⁷ into which genus and property may fall.

So, the *Kategoriai* clearly have an Aristotelian role as genera or classifications. Indeed, it seems reasonable to say also that they can be seen as classifications of predicates, of things that are stated of a subject. This does seem to be how Aristotle speaks of substance, quality and the rest of the *Kategoriai* in the *Topics*. They are, he says, "kinds [or classes-gene] of predicates [kategoriai]."¹⁸ If we take the translation of *kategoriai* by predicate seriously, then the *Kategoriai* will be taken as comprising a list of those kinds of 'things' which can be stated of a subject¹⁹ (as when we say that something is of this quantity, this quality, and so on) or, if one prefers the translation of *kategoria* as 'predication', as a list of ways of such stating. There is, however, at least one respect in which the *Kategoriai* do not fit tidily into this sort of account. For the items at the bottom of the various columns of predication seem to be individuals or particulars which cannot properly be stated of anything else. This is pre-eminently the case for the individual substances which fall into the first *Kategoria* as given in the *Categories*,²⁰ for these are not said-of other things nor are they present-in them.

A possible way to get around this difficulty is to take the *Kategoriai* as classifying the main parts of speech with which Aristotle seems to have been familiar-subject and predicate. Alternatively, we could take it as showing that the interpretation of the *Kategoriai* as classifications of the sorts of words which function predicatively is simply mistaken. Indeed the difficulty of finding a place for the *Kategoria* of substance on a purely predicative interpretation of the *Kategoriai* in the *Categories* has been taken as a reason for treating the list of *Kategoriai* there mentioned as genera of being rather than genera of predicates.²¹ But perhaps the real source of the difficulty here is simply the idea that we have to treat the *Kategoriai* as just logical or linguistic classifications to begin with-they may well be this and more besides. While the *Categories* itself is certainly concerned to a great extent with predication and other logico-linguistic issues it is not exclusively a grammatical or logical treatise.

Throughout the *Categories* we find a mixture of both logical and onto-logical issues and Aristotle continually slides between talking in the formal and the material modes. This is most in evidence in the early discussion of equivocals, univocals, and paronyms for, as Ackrill points out, these terms “apply not to words but to things.”²² Indeed it is probably true to say that Aristotle speaks neither purely formally nor purely materially but tends always to speak, to a greater or lesser extent, in both modes at once. Certainly, this seems to be so in the *Categories*. That such a manner of speaking might be found irksome and untidy by many contemporary philosophers perhaps betokens, not so much Aristotle’s ignorance or lack of sophistication, but the extent to which we have lost any proper sensitivity to the proper belonging together of what is with what is spoken.

The intertwining of ontological and logical issues is clearly present in Aristotle’s introduction of the *Kategoriai* themselves in chapter four of the *Categories*. Previous to this section Aristotle has distinguished between things said involving combination (‘interweaving’-symploke) and things said which do not involve combination; a distinction often taken as one between propositions and the simple signficatory elements of propositions. Yet the complexity or simplicity involved here is not so much linguistic or grammatical in kind as it is conceptual (perhaps reflecting also a certain ontological simplicity in the things designated). Thus ‘in the Lyceum’, which is certainly a simple expression for Aristotle,²³ although grammatically relatively complex, is indeed conceptually simple insofar as it is just the designation of a single place: a definite location. ‘In the Lyceum’ is, one could say, conceptually one (as that which it signifies is something which is ontologically simple also)-a single indivisible ‘being’ or ‘way of being’. Conversely, a word such as ‘fishmonger’, while linguistically simple (being merely a concatenation of term and suffix), is much more of a conceptual composite and thus not simple but complex. In fact, it is through the combination, the ‘interweaving’, of the simple basic elements (such as ‘in the Lyceum’, ‘fish,’ ‘man’, and so on) that things can be stated or asserted.

Now, in relation to the *Kategoriai* Aristotle asserts, not that such conceptual simples—‘in the Lyceum’, ‘man’, and suchlike—are themselves the things categorised, but rather that “Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification....”²⁴ What seems to be indicated here is that it is not so much *what is said* which is to be found classified within the *Kategoriai* as *that which is signified* in such saying.²⁵ Here it seems as if the *Kategoriai* are actually classifications, not merely of subject and predicates, of things said, but of the things themselves. Such a view is reinforced in the same passage by the examples Aristotle gives for each *Kategoria*: man, horse, white, and so on.²⁶ Again Ackrill makes the point mentioned earlier but this time with respect to the *Kategoriai* themselves. “The items in the categories,” he writes, “are not expressions but things.”²⁷ Likewise in the *Topics* Aristotle repeats the idea that it is what is signified

which is categorised and once again the examples he uses emphasize the point that the *Kategoriai* are classifications, not of linguistic entities, but of the things themselves²⁸—though, of course, they are not all ‘things’ in the same sense.

This conclusion is not, I think, particularly contentious (unless one objects to the particular use of the term ‘thing’²⁹). Indeed, it is, as we have already seen, a point made by J. L. Ackrill, among others. It is, however, a conclusion which must appear somewhat at odds with the, surely equally uncontentious, claim that the *Kategoriai*, in their role as genera, are classifications of predicates. Moreover, Aristotle’s own statement in the *Topics* that the *Kategoriai* are indeed “genera of *Kategoriai*” -kinds of predi- cates-appears to contradict the view so clearly evident in the remainder of that same passage that the *Kategoriai* classify real entities and not just words or sentences.

Now while it will become apparent later on in my discussion that there probably is a difference between the *Kategoriai* as they are conceived in the *Topics* and the way they are conceived in the *Categories*, the inconsistency which seems to arise between the use of *Kategoriai* to designate the genera of being and their use to designate the genera of predications is surely more apparent than real. To begin with *Kategaria* is, as we have already noted, a technical term in the Aristotelian vocabulary and thus not a term whose meaning is to be simply assumed. Thus we need to be particularly careful in talking of *Kategaria* as ‘predicate’ since the latter may carry connotations which are not appropriate to the original Aristotelian term. Indeed, it should not be assumed that the *Kategoriai* are solely linguistic (as might be suggested by the translation of *Kategaria* as ‘predicate’), nor should we assume that the two possibilities concerning what it is that the *Kategoriai* classify-whether kinds of ‘predicates’ or kinds of real things-are mutu- ally exclusive. Certainly, the term *Kategaria* relates to predication and the *Kategoriai* are in some sense classes of predicates; but equally there is more involved here than just a matter of logic or grammar. The term *Kategaria* does not refer solely to linguistic entities and nor are the *Kategoriai* merely linguistic classifications. One of the themes of the present inquiry will be Aristotle’s tendency, already mentioned above, not to separate but to hold together linguistic or logical and metaphysical considerations. Now if the *Categories* as a whole is concerned with both sides of this philosophical coin then so too are the *Kategoriai* (insofar as they may be characterized as ‘things stated’) inclusive of both the thing as well as the stating. In this respect the old dispute between ontological and predicative interpretations of the doctrine of *Kategoriai* is perhaps itself mistaken.³⁰

Certainly, there is nothing in Aristotle’s work to suggest that the *Kategoriai* are *just* classes of terms while there is everything to indicate that they are, in some important sense, *also* classes of ‘things’. Yet whether those ‘things’ are qualities, locations, relations, or whatever, they are also things known-things spoken. The classifications of the *Kategoriai* are classification of just those kinds

of things that can be spoken. Indeed, their thingness is evident in just such speaking.³¹ Insofar as the *Kategoriai* classify that which is signified by those simple elements of our saying, then so the *Kategoriai* must be seen as classifications both of what is as well as what is said, for both are tied intimately together in the relation of signification. Thus, the *Kategoriai* might best be described as classifications of possible modes of signification. For in this light the *Kategoriai* can be seen as encompassing both the thing spoken of as well as what is spoken.

Moreover, as *Kategoria* can be defined as “that which is stated of a subject” so it is evident that in the use of *Kategoriai* things are seen as determinate—*Kategoriai* are real determinations of things and thus, as they are real, so they can be stated also. Only through statement do such determinations become manifest. Given these considerations—and given also the almost purely logical connotations of the modern term ‘predicate’—there is perhaps some cause to reconsider the modern translation of *Kategoria* as ‘predicate’. However, if this translation of the Aristotelian term is misleading, it may be that it is because the term ‘predicate’ has itself been misconstrued as having a purely logical significance. Perhaps our word ‘predicate’ (from the Latin *praedicare*—to cry forth, to proclaim, or to declare) ought to be seen as having a similar categorial sense of ‘assertion’ such that it too encompasses both the spoken and the real.³² Such a move may well have interesting consequences for the way in which we conceive of language (and human knowledge in general) and its relation to the world. Perhaps language itself ought to be seen primarily in this sort of ‘declarative’ or ‘assertive’ mode—a mode in which both word and thing are brought into view—rather than as some subjective structure standing over against the things in the world.³³

It is through *Kategoriai* that things can be stated of other things.³⁴ It is this relation of ‘predication’ (a relation which is a real as well as a linguistic one) which is captured in the notion of *Kategoria* for *Kategoriai* are just those things which, as they can be stated of a subject, can also be ‘of’ that subject in reality. To categorize something is thus at once to place it in a genus (or column of predication) and also to give it a certain recognised determination, a thing categorized is a thing determinate. Thus, the *Kategoriai* can be further characterized as classes in that they are modes of possible determination and this immediately suggests the thought that the *Kategoriai* are in fact ways (or modes) in which a thing can be. Of course this relates directly back to the previous discussion of the so-called ‘columns of predication’ where we saw that, for Aristotle, the *Kategoriai* represent the highest genera, the broadest possible classifications for all things.³⁵ Thus as the *Kategoriai* are now seen to be possible modes or dimensions of being, and as being itself is not a genus, so the role of the *Kategoriai* as highest genera is affirmed. In this role the *Kategoriai* can also now be seen as providing an articulation of the ‘many ways’ of being³⁶; they give an account of the differing senses of being. So, Aristotle states in the *Meta-physics*:

The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication [the *Kategoriai*]; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity etc . . . , being has a meaning answering to each of these.³⁷

In discussing the development of columns of predication, I noted the familiar Aristotelian point that there is no single genus in which all the *Kategoriai* could be united-there is no idea of 'being-in-general' as a highest genera within which all things stand just insofar as they are. Insofar as the *Kategoriai* represent the various ways of being so they affirm the irreducible plurality of being itself. Being is indeed said in many ways and they are ways which are irreducibly many just as the *Kategoriai* are themselves irreducibly many.³⁸ As the *Kategoriai* are indeed modes of being in this sense so it seems not unreasonable to conclude that in this manner they are indeed classifications of things-of things that are. That is, they are classifications of substances, qualities, quantities, relations, and so on. In each of the *Kategoriai* will be found 'simple' things that can be stated of other things (typically of things in the *Kategoria* of substance) and that can stand in a real relation of categorization (or 'predication') to those other things.

The *Kategoriai* appear at the interface of logical and ontological considerations in Aristotle's work. Indeed, it must always be the case that our speaking, in order to be speaking at all (and thus to be possibly true or false), must have a sense, a significance, which cannot but be derived from the intimate belonging together of the spoken with the real. The characterisation of the *Kategoriai* as 'modes of signification' is itself indicative of the way in which the *Kategoriai* stand at a place where the thing and the speaking must always meet. For the Aristotelian *Kategoriai* in particular, and systems of Categories in general, must stand as the ground of possibility of both our speaking and of the determinate Being of things. Thus, Kockelmans writes:

Doctrines of categories are developed by those philosophers who critically turn their back upon the philosophical reflection itself in order to examine precisely how the determinations of the *logos* in thought and in language are to be related to things in their Being.³⁹

Indeed, only the ontological reality of the *Kategoriai* makes possible their logical role as classifications of predicates. The *Kategoriai* thus represent the 'common natures' of things which unite our speaking with the reality of the things themselves. It was this notion of the *Kategoriai* as the common natures of things which appeared amongst medieval interpretations-and it is still an important way of understanding the significance of the *Kategoriai*. So, Joseph Owens claims that:

The discussions have left unassailable the fact that both logical and metaphysical features are involved in Aristotle's presentation of the categories. In explanation I would suggest that the natures upon which the categories bear are common to both logic and metaphysics. They are the property of neither but are rather the common pasture land of both. The common natures of man, horse, extension, colour, and so on,

are what the categories envisage in both their logical and metaphysical function.⁴⁰

The *Kategoriai* provide a point of unification between the logical and the ontological. They are the common ground of intelligibility which unite both. Yet the need for such unification is not seen as problematic by Aristotle. That the spoken and the real belong together is an assumption at the core of Aristotelian thought. Thus, talk of somewhere 'between' logic and ontology, even though metaphorical, is not wholly appropriate to the Aristotelian context. Such a 'between' cannot involve any great separation between the logical and the ontological but can only be the place of their natural belonging together: a place of 'common pasture' for both.

The *Kategoriai* must stand as what is common to both the thing and our speaking of it. Substance, quality and the rest name the various ways in which things can be; they hold open as possibilities the different ways in which we can approach things and things can approach us. In this respect, however, it is evident that the classificatory role of the *Kategoriai* is a very secondary one. Indeed, in a sense, the *Kategoriai* are not classifications at all. For the *Kategoriai* do not classify the things that are but instead represent the very ways (the many ways) in which those things can be. There is no categorial order prior to the order of the *Kategoriai*-thus there can be no substances, qualities, quantities, and so forth that are prior to the *Kategoriai* and merely organised by them. The order given in the classificatory structure of the *Kategoriai* derives from the *Kategoriai* themselves. Thus, insofar as the *Kategoriai* are the very ways of being of things so they do not classify things in any unqualified sense.

Yet it might well seem that it is the classificatory role of the *Kategoriai* which is foremost in the Aristotelian corpus. Certainly, there is little discussion of the details of the ontological role which the *Kategoriai* must play. However, this is perhaps not so surprising. For Systems of Categories, like the Aristotelian *Kategoriai*, will typically become the subject of explicit philosophical reflection as to their ontological role only when the relationship of predication, or, more generally, the relationship between language and the world, becomes problematic-where, in fact, the belonging together of language and world is cast in doubt. And while Aristotle certainly recognises the possibility of error or confusion arising out of a misunderstanding or misuse of the tie between language and the world,⁴¹ he does not doubt the intimate belonging together of the spoken and the real. It is because this is indeed not doubted by Aristotle (or by Greek thought in general) that the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* remains implicit. In contrast, the ontological role of the Kantian Categories is quite clear (even if the details remain contentious) for in Kant it is precisely the possibility of speaking meaningfully about things (of synthetic *a priori* judgement) that is at issue. Yet given that the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* in Aristotle is not explicit, is there nevertheless anything more that can be said about this matter from an Aristotelian point of view? It is to this question that I will turn

shortly. But first there is a complication in the discussion of *Kategoriai* in Aristotle with which I must deal.

III.

Recent work by Michael Frede and John Malcolm has suggested that the traditional reading of Aristotle's discussion of the *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* (in particular at *Topics* I, 9)-a reading which assimilates the treatment of the *Kategoriai* in that work to the treatment in the *Categories*-may well have been mistaken. Not only does the discussion of the *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* seem to suggest a stronger emphasis on the *Kategoriai* as genera of predicates but, more significantly, it seems to involve a list of *Kategoriai* which differs from the list given in the *Categories* insofar as it makes no mention of a first *Kategoria* of substance or *ousia*.⁴² Instead, the *Topics* gives the first *Kategoria* as 'ti esti'-'what it is'-a term often translated as 'essence'. The standard reading of this has been to take 'ti esti' as an equivocal which refers in this case only to substance or to essence in the sense of substance.⁴³ This reading ensures the agreement of the list of *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* with that in the *Categories*. Both Frede and Malcolm, however, provide reasons for thinking that this standard reading is incorrect and that the use of 'ti esti' at *Topics* I, 9 should not be taken as referring only to substance but includes non-substances also.⁴⁴ The evidence which Frede and Malcolm adduce in favour of this interpretation is not wholly conclusive (nor has it achieved unanimous acceptance⁴⁵), but it is strongly supported by textual and overall interpretative considerations.

The revised reading of the *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* would seem initially to cast doubt on the claim that the *Kategoriai* are primarily genera of being. Thus, Frede himself says that:

. . . if we take the phrase 'what it is' in this generous way, it is not just clear that the first category of the *Topics* is not a category of substance; it is also clear that the categories and the classes of predicates defined by them cannot be identified with the ultimate genera of what there is.⁴⁶

Frede does not, however, deny that there is in Aristotle a use of *kategoria* in which the first *Kategoria* is indeed substance and in which the *Kategoriai* are indeed genera of being. Instead he claims that this represents a development on the original notion of the *Kategoriai* as set out in the *Topics*.⁴⁷ One might say that, for Frede, what has hitherto been seen as an equivocation on 'ti esti' in the *Topics* is replaced by a form of equivocation on '*kategoria*' elsewhere in the Corpus. John Malcolm also accepts an ontological use for the *Kategoriai* and in fact distinguishes different lists of *Kategoriai* according to whether they appear to depend on ontological or predicative considerations.⁴⁸

If we accept, in its general outlines, the interpretation of the *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* suggested by Frede and Malcolm then I think we are indeed led to the conclusion that the doctrine of *Kategoriai*

in Aristotle is, at the very least, equivocal. In fact, I think that Frede is probably right in his suggestion that the doctrine develops from an account of the genera of predicates to one which is primarily an account of the genera of being. Such an idea is not new however. Indeed, the idea that the *Kategoriai* might differ according to whether their application is logical or metaphysical is not new either. As Owens commented in 1960 “what are distinct categories from the logician’s viewpoint need not be so for the metaphysician.”⁴⁹

It seems that what Owens had in mind here, however, is not that logic and metaphysics might treat the first *Kategoria* differently but that metaphysical concerns might lead to a tendency to collapse some of the non-substantial *Kategoriai*—Owens gives the example of action and passion as both expressing, from a metaphysical point of view, one and the same reality. In fact, I think that there may be reasons for regarding the list of *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* as a less satisfactory list than that in the *Categories* just insofar as it does fail to distinguish a first *Kategoria* of substance. For a first *Kategoria* of ‘what it is’ in the “generous” sense proposed by Frede and Malcolm seems too broad and looks suspiciously like a genus of ‘being-in- general’. It includes so much that it is hard to see how one could prevent it from engulfing all the remaining *Kategoriai*. Surely if colour is to be placed in the first *Kategoria* of ‘what it is’ (as Malcolm suggests) then so will quality also. Now I do not suggest this is, on its own, a reason for rejecting the interpretation of Frede and Malcolm but I do think it shows that there was good reason for Aristotle to develop and modify the categorial system if indeed it had its beginnings in the sort of list Frede and Malcolm find in the *Topics*.

The list of *Kategoriai* in the *Categories* is, I suggest, a stage in that development rather than its culmination. That this is so is indicated by a number of considerations. First the list of *Kategoriai* in the *Categories* is the only list, aside from that in the *Topics*, in which we find the full ten *Kategoriai*. If we take the comment of Owens above as suggesting that metaphysical considerations may well lead to the collapsing of some *Kategoriai* into a single *Kategoria* then the existence of the full ten *Kategoriai* might indicate that such metaphysical considerations have not yet become paramount. Certainly we do find that some *Kategoriai* apparently lose their importance in other works or disappear altogether.⁵⁰ Moreover there is, in the *Categories*, no mention of the more complex integration of the categorial system which seems to become apparent later on—particularly in the *Metaphysics-an* integration according to which form, matter, actuality, and potentiality come to be seen as applying analogously within each *Kategoria* and in which the relationship between the non-substantial *Kategoria* and the first *Kategoria* of substance is developed beyond the narrow structure suggested by the present-in/said-of distinction.

The *Categories* thus represents a point on the way to the more developed use of *Kategorilli* in the *Metaphysics*. That more developed use seems to coincide with Aristotle’s increasing predilection to

take substance as properly essence or form (and his tendency also to treat 'ti esti' as properly to do with substance) and with the development of the idea of a science of being which deals with being *qua* being.⁵¹ In this respect John Malcolm in fact suggests that the change in Aristotle's use of *ti esti* from the more general use in the *Topics* to the more restricted use in *Metaphysics Z* (where it clearly refers only to substance) can be explained in terms of the development of the notion of *pros hen* equivocation or 'focal meaning'.⁵² I think that Malcolm may well be right on this matter. Frede points out that the use of *ti esti* as restricted to substance is "largely, though not entirely, limited to the *Metaphysics*,"⁵³ and it is in the *Metaphysics* that the science of being develops—an idea which, in Aristotle, itself depends on the development of the idea of 'focal meaning'—so too the role of the *Kategoriai* must become increasingly significant as a way of expressing the many senses of being. But this in turn requires the organization of the *Kategoriai* around a first *Kategoria* of substance. It is thus that the *Kategoriai* come ultimately to represent an articulation of the manifold unity of being.

IV.

The first two chapters of the *Categories* present us with a set of distinctions which already foreshadow the major division within the list of *Kategoriai* which follows. The distinction of items present-in from those said-of a subject enables Aristotle clearly to distinguish primary and secondary substances as those items never present-in anything else. It is this all-important distinction,⁵⁴ between substances and non-substances, which is reflected in the categorial division between the so-called 'accidental' *Kategoriai* and the first *Kategoria* of substance. Now just as the *Kategorilli* are all modes of being so in a sense (though not a univocal sense) we can say that the *Kategoriai* (and those items classified by them) are all 'beings'-things that are—whether they be substances, qualities, or whatever. Yet of course the non-substantial *Kategoriai* are only beings or things insofar as they bear relation to a substance, for only substances can be said to be in an unqualified sense (*einai haplos*).⁵⁵ Thus we do not find disembodied colours, sizes, places, or activities floating about in the world (nor, it should be noted, do we encounter Horse or Man except as instantiated in individual horses and individual men). All of these only exist as 'things' insofar as they belong to things which exist in and of themselves—that is, as substances.

In this dependence on a substantial subject, which is a dependence on the first *Kategoria*, a certain unity is manifest within the *Kategoriai* as a whole. They are not a simple list of separate sorts of things. Only as they relate to each other through the first *Kategoria* of substance do they function as *Kategoriai* proper—that is, as determinations of the various ways of being of things. Moreover, it is only insofar as they must all relate differently to substances, and specifically to primary substances, that each can have the status of a distinct mode of being. This point is clearly made by Brentano

when he writes:

... if it is first substance which underlies all accidents, it is clear that the highest genera of accidents must each display a quite different manner of inherence, a special relation to first substance. It is also clear that the different relations to first substance generate a difference not only between substance and accident but also among the accidental categories themselves.⁵⁶

Certainly, one would expect that the *Kategoriai* would possess some sort of internal unity; there must be some sort of organization amongst the *Kategoriai* if they are indeed to perform their ontological function in providing an articulation of the various ways of being which focus on the first being of substance. The need for some such organization is thus already foreshadowed in the *Categories*, even if it is not developed in that work insofar as the *Kategoriai* are even their genera of being. Brentano himself attempted, as his comments above suggest, to provide a detailed account of the relations between the various *Kategoriai*.⁵⁷ And Walter Leszl suggests that the *Kategoriai* may be organized according to certain “ontological criteria” such that the various *Kategoriai* can be seen as standing to one another in relationships of dependence.⁵⁸ Certainly there is evidence that Aristotle himself saw the *Kategoriai* as organised in a hierarchial fashion. Thus, it seems that relation may be posterior to quality and to quantity as well, of course, as to substance⁵⁹; that quality may be posterior to quantity⁶⁰; and that time and place may be dependent on quantity also.⁶¹

It is the organization around substance, however, which is the most significant feature of the categorial system as it develops towards its mature expression in the *Metaphysics*. And it is in the *Metaphysics*, not surprisingly, that we find the priority of the first *Kategoria* over the other non-substantial *Kategoriai* spelt out in the most detail. John Cleary has provided a detailed account of the notion of priority in Aristotle. Significantly, Cleary argues that the Aristotelian notion of priority develops from somewhat problematic beginnings in the *Topics*,⁶² through the *Categories*, to a more articulated (and more thoroughly Aristotelian) use in the *Metaphysics*.⁶³ Such a path obviously parallels the development of the *Kategoriai* in their ontological role. In the *Metaphysics* it becomes clear that the priority of substance over the other *Kategoriai* is a priority which encompasses all of the various senses of priority in Aristotle—substance is prior in *every* sense. This is made explicit at *Metaphysics Z 1*, where Aristotle tells us that:

... the term ‘primary’ (or ‘first’ or ‘prior to all others’) is used in many senses, yet a substance is primary in every sense: in formula, in knowledge and in time. For of the other categories no one is separable, but only substance. And in formula, too, substance is primary; for in the formula of each of the other categories the formula of a substance must be present. And we think we understand each thing to the highest degree when we know, for example, what a man is or what a fire is, rather than their quality or their quantity or their whereness.⁶⁴

Earlier, of course, I pointed out that the irreducibility of the *Kategoriai* represents the Aristotelian

conception of the irreducible multiplicity of being. This multiplicity does not, however, entail a lack of unity. The various senses of being are related by *pros hen* equivocation-what G. E. L. Owen has called “focal meaning”⁶⁵—and in the case of the *Kategoriai* the focus is on the first *Kategoria* of substance.⁶⁶ Thus focal meaning provides a unity across the categorial senses of being as well as across the other senses. According to Cleary ‘priority’ is also a *pros hen* equivocal whose equivocality is analogous to that of ‘being’.⁶⁷ It is consequently not surprising to find that it is similarly in the *Kategoria* of substance that the central meaning of ‘priority’ comes to focus. So the unity afforded by the focus on substance as the primary sense of being is paralleled, as we can now see, by the unity provided through the focus of priority on substance (as actuality) also. Indeed, so close is the tie between the two that we might regard them, not as parallels, but as merely aspects of the same unitary structure—a structure which is a unity of being in which the primary sense of being (the sense which is prior to all others) is substance.

The unity of being which is given in the notion of focal meaning is, moreover, a unity reinforced by the unity of analogy. For there appears to be an ordering within each *Kategoria*—an ordering which is analogous from one *Kategoria* to the next.⁶⁸ Thus the principles of matter and of form apply analogously within each of the *Kategoriai*:

The causes and principles of different things are in a sense different, but in a sense, if one speaks universally and analogically, they are the same for all . . . different things have different elements; and if we put the matter thus, all things have not the same elements, but analogically they have; i.e. one might say that there are three principles—the form, the privation and the matter. But each of these is different for each class [genos].⁶⁹

Insofar as form and matter do have an application within each *Kategoria* so the relation between the *Kategoriai* could be taken as one involving an ordering of forms and material within the entity belonging under the first *Kategoria*. And insofar as the *Kategoriai* are determinations of the public, encounterable things of our everyday living in the world so the non-substantial *Kategoriai* must relate to the first *Kategoria* of substance insofar as it is a composite (*synholon*) rather than to form or matter alone. The latter is indeed implied by the idea that form and matter apply within each of the *Kategoriai* in an analogous fashion. For in that case form and matter will apply within the first *Kategoria* as well as within the accidental *Kategoriai*.

The categorial application of the principles of matter and form is repeated in the case of actuality (*energeia*) and potentiality (*dunamis*). Both are said to apply analogously to all things,⁷⁰ and so across the *Kategoriai*. The case of actuality here is an interesting one because of the way in which actuality seems to represent the focus for the various senses of priority in Aristotle’s mature thinking on this matter. As substance is the primary sense of actuality within the *Kategoriai* so actuality itself operates as a principle which orders the *Kategoriai* such that substance is placed prior to the non-

substantial *Kategoriai* of quantity, quality, and the rest.⁷¹ But even within the *Kategoria* of substance actuality provides an ordering in which substantial form is ultimately prior insofar as it is pure actuality. The structure imparted by the ultimate focus of priority on the pure actuality of substantial form thus provides a more complex ordering within the *Kategoriai* than we might have otherwise suspected. Actuality orders the *Kategoriai* in relation to the first *Kategoria* as well as providing an internal ordering within each *Kategoria* and, most importantly, within the first *Kategoria* itself. As Cleary writes:

Even within the category of substance ... there is an ordering that depends upon the degree to which the substantial form is separated from matter and hence from the potency for corruption and change. Since they have such a potency, therefore, living things in the sub-lunary sphere are inferior in substance to the heavenly bodies that have merely a potency for eternal and circular locomotion.⁷²

It is the internal ordering of the *Kategoria* of substance (itself prior to the other *Kategoriai*) which provides for the overall focus of priority (and presumably of being) on the pure actuality of substantial form.

The *Kategoriai* are thus unified through the unity of focal meaning and of analogy. These provide a certain ordering within the categorial system and within each of the *Kategoriai* themselves. Substance (and ultimately, in the *Metaphysics*, substantial form) is the primary focus for this ordered unity- it is substance which is prior to all else. Insofar as this priority implies that the non-substantial *Kategoriai* must find their unqualified being (being in the primary sense) in the first *Kategoria* of substance so being, as articulated in the *Kategoriai*, is thereby given a unity which reflects the unity of subject and property and of substance and accident. It is this unity which we encounter in the sensible world in the form of snub-nosed Socrates, the spirited Bucephalus, and so forth. It is this unity which focuses, in the *Categories*, on the unity of those primary substances which are the concrete individuals such as Socrates, Callias and so forth. In the more mature thought which is found in the central books of the *Metaphysics* it appears as a more complex and articulate unity which must ultimately focus on the unity of primary substance understood in terms of the unity of substantial form. In all cases, however, it is a unity articulated through the irreducible multiplicity of the *Kategoriai*.

While it would be mistaken to force upon Aristotle some notion of Being which centred on some such trans-categorial unity (for that would be to introduce a thoroughly un-Aristotelian notion of being-in-general which transcended the various *Kategoriai*-as well as creating problems for the focus on substantial form) we can perhaps note that it is the articulation of such a 'unity of Being' which lies at the heart of many later categorial systems. In particular, it must lie at the heart of the Kantian system where the Categories perform a clearly constitutive function in bringing about that

'transcendental'⁷³ unity or synthesis which is central to the possibility of experience and knowledge- in which, one might say, our experience of Being is founded. It is in this direction that the true ontological role of System s of Categories in general, if not of the Aristotelian *Kategoriai* in particular, must lie.⁷⁴

It is the ontological role of the *Kategoriai*, on which I have touched briefly here, which provides the justification for the position of the *Ka- tegorai* as genera of predicates and as ways of being. Just how much that role can be articulated within the Aristotelian framework, however, is perhaps an open question. What is clear, nonetheless, is that the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* must represent a topic central to ontology itself. As Leszl points out, ontology is not just concerned with essences but also with the properties which belong (in one way or another) to those essences.⁷⁵ In this respect the *Kategoriai* stand at the very heart of the ontological problematic since the *Kategoriai* are involved with the unity of things as the concrete entities that they are-a unity which encompasses property as well as substance, accident as well as essence. Moreover, we also find that many of the central issues in Aristotelian ontology (and of ontology in general) do in fact intersect with the problem of the *Kategoriai*. Thus, not only does the study of the *Kategoriai* seem to involve questions of the relation between substance and property, essence and accident, but it also involves the issue of the relation between universal and particular.⁷⁶

What these considerations should bring home to us is the fact that the study of the *Kategoriai* cannot belong only or even primarily to logic. The study of the *Kategoriai* is first and foremost a study in ontology. Similarly, the *Kategoriai* are properly not classifications as such but, in their role as part of the structure by which things are brought to be, they are prior to and thus provide the ground for their employment as genera of predicates and classes of (in a qualified sense) beings or ways of being. As they represent the possible ways of being of things so they are neither classifications of things nor are they separate elements in the being of each individual thing but instead are elements in that complete structure by which beings in their concrete unity come to be.

V.

In one sense, then, the *Kategoriai* do represent a system of classification. As genera they can be said to classify both things spoken and things that are. Yet as they represent, together with the *archai*, part of the ontological structure according to which things are, so, in a more important sense, they are not classifications of things at all, but play a fundamental role in the manifold being of those things. In this light, it is of course quite clear that the old question as to the completeness of the *Kategoriai*, insofar as they are in some sense classifications, nevertheless has to presuppose a better understanding of how the *Kategoriai* are precisely *not* classificatory. For, of course, even if we asked

about the completeness of the *Kategoriai* just as classifications, the answer would necessarily depend on being able to establish or to refute the ontological completeness of the *Kategoriai*.⁷⁷ And this, I suspect, is something that cannot in fact be done. Certainly, I have not provided enough of an account here to answer that question.

Of course, insofar as the *Kategoriai* are said to underlie our speaking, so it *will* always be possible that a deduction of the *Kategoriai* from our ways of speaking, rather than their necessary ontological role, will in some sense be possible. In Aristotle's own case it seems likely that the *Kategoriai* are derived from a consideration of the sorts of questions that can be asked of things,⁷⁸ and thus originally arose out of dialectical considerations. The articulation of the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* might thereby be seen as arising out of their predicative role. In a similar fashion Kant attempted a logical deduction of the Categories from the Table of Judgement. However, such a move from the posterior to the prior—the deduction of Categories from our speaking rather than from what makes our speaking possible—must always be questionable. Any set of Categories which is arrived at as the conclusion of such a movement will always be open to criticism and will always have to jostle for a place amongst competing sets of Categories, each of them differing according to the sorts of classificatory criteria employed. Hence the Aristotelian *Kategoriai* (along with the Kantian Categories) will always be open to revision.⁷⁹ The only way in which a deduction of Categories is possible is from their role in the determination of beings. That is, only from their role as unities within that trans-categorical unity according to which beings in their wholeness come to be, can the precise determination of categories be arrived at.

Thus, any question about the completeness of the *Kategoriai* as a system of classifications can only be begun to be answered when it is seen how, in fact, the *Kategoriai* are not classifications. Yet such a question can perhaps not be given a proper answer from within the Aristotelian context just because the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* is never given any explicit or complete exegesis. The integration of the *Kategoriai* with the rest of Aristotle's metaphysics is something that has to be done piece by piece. And perhaps this is largely because the articulation of the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* (insofar as it is articulated) seems to be an aspect of the *Kategoriai* which develops only gradually. In this respect, then, the completeness of the *Kategoriai* must remain uncertain.⁸⁰ What should not, however, be lost sight of is that beyond doubt the *Kategoriai* were finite for Aristotle and thus the sorts of determinations which things could have was not infinite in scope.⁸¹ In addition it is true to say that even if the 'accidental' *Kategoriai* were collapsed into a single *Kategoria*, still the fundamental Aristotelian insight would be preserved that all things are either substance or affection of substance, and that it is in the relation of the two that things are and are spoken.

NOTES

1. I 9, 103b20-25.
2. I 22, 83b16.
3. V 1, 225b5.
4. K 12, 1068a8-10.
5. *Categories* 4, 1b25. O. Apelt gives a listing for all the various enumerations of the *Kategoriai* in the Aristotelian corpus (O. Apelt, "Die Kategorienlehre des Aristoteles," *Beitriige zur Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie* [Leipzig: Weidmann, 1891]). The list is reproduced in Leo Elders, *Aristotle's Theory of the One* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1961), Appendix 1, pp. 194-195.
6. Though such a translation may already be to impose a philosophical interpretation upon the notion of *Kategoriai* which is far from justified.
7. "Categories in Aristotle," *Studies in Aristotle*, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), pp. 1-24.
8. "On the Generation and Corruption of the Categories," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1981), pp. 662-681.
9. See Lambertus M. De Rijk, *The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's Philosophy* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1952), Appendix, pp. 89-92. Van Rijk is referred to by Joseph Owens, "Aristotle on Categories," *Review of Metaphysics*, 14 (1960) p. 76. See also D. W. Hamlyn, "Aristotle on Predication," *Phronesis*, 6 (1961), p. 110.
10. In Ackrill's translation for example. See also Robert Price, "On Aristotle's Categories," in *Categories: A Colloquium*, ed. Henry W. Johnstone (University Park, Pennsylvania: Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, 1978), p. 90. In his discussion of the *Kategoriai* in the *Topics* Michael Frede argues for the translation of '*kategoria*' as 'predication' (Frede, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-8). While I think there is something to be said for Frede's interpretation there is only a very fine difference between the two translations and I will generally keep to the more traditional translation of '*kategoria*' as 'predicate'.
11. In order to avoid possible confusion here I have used 'stated of' rather than 'said of'. Similarly, I shall talk later of the 'present in' / 'said of' distinction instead of the 'present in' / 'predicable of' found in Ackrill's translation of the *Categories* (Aristotle's *Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. with notes and glossary by J. L. Ackrill [Oxford: Clarendon Aristotle Series, 1974]). On the general question as to whether *legetai* and *kategoreitai* are interchangeable in Aristotle the distinction in Edward Harter, "Aristotle on Primary *Ousia*" (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 57 (1975), p. 2), should be noted. See also Russell Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Substances," *Philosophical Review*, 84 (1975), pp. 349ff.
12. *Topics* I 9, 103b20.
13. *Categories* 3, 1b10.
14. Though there is some dispute as to just what the non-substantial individuals really are. See G. E. L. Owen, "Inherence," *Phronesis*, 10 (1965), pp. 97-105; R. E. Allen, "Individual Properties in Aristotle's Categories," *Phronesis*, 14 (1969), pp. 31-39 and also "Substance and Predication in Aristotle's *Categories*," *Exegesis and Argument*, ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973), pp. 362-373; Gary Matthews and S. Marc Cohen, "The One and the Many," *Review of Metaphysics*, 22 (1968), pp. 630-655; Robert Heinaman, 'Non-substantial Individuals in the *Categories*,' *Phronesis*, 26 (1981), pp. 295-307.
15. See *Metaphysics* K 1, 1059b30-35 and I 2, 1053b15-25; also *Topics* IV 1, 121a15. On this general matter, see also C. H. Kahn, "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek Philosophy," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 58 (1976), pp. 323-324.
16. *Metaphysics* Γ 2, 1003a33, H 2, 1026a33, Z 1, 1028a10.
17. The word here is *diarsis*. See also *Topics* IV, I, 120b35-40, *Prior Analytics* 137, 49a7 and *De Anima* I 1, 402a24 and I 5, 410a14.
18. *Topics* I 9, 103b20-25.
19. The terms 'thing' and 'things' are used in the general sense which Ackrill employs. See Ackrill's notes to his translation of the *Categories*, *op. cit.*, p. 71. It should be noted that there are some dangers in such a usage. As J. F. Courtine points out Greek *onta* cannot be taken as things in the sense of the Latin *res*. See Courtine, "Note complémentaire pour l'histoire du vocabulaire de l'être," *Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1980), pp. 33-87. I am relying on the extremely flexible nature of the English word in my usage here.
20. Although sometimes such items do function, improperly, as predicates said of a subject. See *Prior Analytics* I 27, 43a35.
21. This seems to be the view of John Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 662. J. L. Ackrill, however, seems to regard this whole problem as only superficial. He comments that "it is substance, quality, quantity themselves which are the 'categories', that is, the ultimate predicates; items belonging to some category need not be items which

can themselves be predicated" (*op. cit.*, p. 80).

22. Ackrill, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

23. Since 'in the Lyceum' is given as an example falling under one of the *Kategoriai* at *Categories* 4, 2a1.

24. *Categories* 4, 1b25.

25. A distinction which also appears in *Topics* I 9, 103b25-40.

26. *Categories* 6, 1b6.

27. Ackrill, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

28. "For when a man is set before him and he says that what is set there is 'a man' or 'an animal,' he states its essence and signifies a substance ..." (*Topics* I 9, 103b30).

29. As I noted above, n. 19, I intend my use of the term 'thing' to be quite general and non-committal so far as any particular ontological analysis is concerned.

30. Much the same point is made by Abraham Edel ("Aristotle's Categories and the Nature of Categorical Theory," *Review of Metaphysics*, 29 (1975/76), pp. 48-49). As Edel points out, "Aristotle rarely makes us choose between a linguistic and physical investigation ..." (p. 48). In a similar fashion I suspect that many of the disputes which have arisen over attempts to find a unique way in which the list of *Kategoriai* (usually based on the list in the *Categories*) can be generated is itself based on the mistaken assumption that the *Kategoriai* can or should be understood in only one way. Edel suggests that the system of *Kategoriai* should be taken as the system "of philosophical concepts that emerged from the various problems to which Aristotle addressed himself. . ." (pp. 58-59). It is surely not unreasonable to suppose that the differing problems and concerns which motivate Aristotle in the various works of the corpus might have given rise to differing conceptions of the *Kategoriai* and even their being put to differing uses. Such an approach does explain the difficulties otherwise encountered in the attempt to find a single principle to generate the Aristotelian categorical scheme as it appears in various contexts and in various forms throughout the Corpus. (Such an approach, as we shall see, is implicit in the views of John Malcolm and, perhaps also, Michael Frede). On the other hand, I do not think that the *Kategoriai* represent a merely haphazard collection of concepts as Kant notoriously thought (*Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith [London: Methuen, 1938], A81/B107). My own claim is that the ontological role of the *Kategoriai* is primary even if it is not exclusive. I would also claim that it is this ontological role which is primary in those Systems of Categories that have been developed since Aristotle. Thus, *contra* Edel, I do not see Systems of Categories as merely systems of philosophical or scientific concepts. On this matter see below pp. 11, 16. (See also John Cook Wilson, "Categories in Aristotle and in Kant," *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. J.M. E. Moravcsik [New York: Doubleday, 1967], p. 87.)

31. Nothing could really be said to be, as Aristotle saw it, without being some thing; hence the insistence on the *Kategoriai* as modes of being and on being as always being determinate. The corollary of this, of course, is that something cannot be known to be unless it is known what it is.

32. David Londey has pointed out to me that in the *Peri Henneneias* of Apuleius (the earliest extant-2nd Century A.D.-treatise on Aristotelian logic) *praedicativa* is used as the label for what we commonly call a categorical proposition (explicitly contrasting these with conditionals). See *Peri Henneneius* II, included in David Londey and Carmen Johanson, *The Logic of Apuleius* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1987). It is interesting to note that Apuleius calls the predicate in such a proposition the *declarativa* because it declares something of a subject (subjectit1a)-the subject being seen as subordinated or placed under the declarativa (*Peri Henneneias* IV, *op. cit.*).

33. Donald Davidson is one contemporary philosopher who seems to argue against the idea that the linguistic is clearly to be distinguished from the extra-linguistic. Davidson's arguments are adumbrated in Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. See especially Davidson's paper "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 183-198.

34. See *Prior Analytics* I 37, 49a7-10.

35. See *Prior Analytics*, 27, 43a25-39 for Aristotle's comments on what can be said of any item at the 'top' of a 'column of predication'-it turns out that the highest genera can be predicated of those items below them but nothing can properly be predicated of the highest genera themselves. See Ross's commentary on this passage, W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 382-384.

36. *Metaphysics* Γ 2, 1003a32. The *Kategoriai*, while undoubtedly providing one of the most important senses of being for Aristotle (see Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975], p. 49) do not represent the only sense; see *Metaphysics* Γ 2, 1003b6. On the manifold senses of being see also J. Kung, "Aristotle on 'Being is said in Many Ways'," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 3 (1986), pp. 3-18.

37. *Metaphysics* Δ 8, 1017a24.

38. See *Metaphysics* H 6, 1045b1-8.

39. J. J. Kockelmans, "Towards a Transcendental-Ontological Doctrine of Categories," *Categories: A Colloquium*, ed. Henry W. Johnstone, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
40. Owens, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
41. See for instance Aristotle's discussions in *Sophistical Refutations* especially 3, 166b14-19 and 7, 169a30-b3. The abuse of the ontological tie between language and world which is the error of sophism is discussed by Plato also in his *Euthydemus*.
42. For a discussion of *Categories* 4 and *Topics* I, 9 which takes account of the views of Frede and Malcolm see Theodore Ebert, "Gattungen der Prädikate und Gattungen des Seienden bei Aristoteles," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 67 (1985), pp. 113-138. Ebert makes a stronger distinction between the genera of being and genera of predicates than I, perhaps, have allowed for in the discussion above.
43. See, for instance, Suzanne Mansion, "Notes sur la doctrine des catégories dans les *Topiques*," *Aristotle on Dialectic, The Topics, Proceedings of the Third Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. G. E. L. Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 189-201, especially p. 198.
44. Both Frede and Malcolm suggest that the more general use of *ti esti* is present at other places in the Corpus-Malcolm suggests that this is so at, for instance, *Metaphysics* B, 2 996b1 7-18 and . 7 1017a7 (see Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 669-670). Malcolm claims that in some cases *ousia* replaces *ti esti* in its general sense while retaining that sense-thus Malcolm takes *ousia* as sometimes referring, not to substance, but to 'what it is' in general.
45. J. D. G. Evans, for instance, argues in support of the traditional account by suggesting that the apparent inconsistency between the list of *Kategoriai* at *Topics* I, 9 and the list in the *Categories* can be resolved by making a distinction between terms used to *describe* things and to *identify* things. The differences between the two lists is, claims Evans, best seen as a difference arising from these two uses of predicative terms (see Evans, *Aristotle* [Sussex: Harvester Press, 1987], pp. 49-50).
46. Frede, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
48. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 668-671.
49. Owens, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
50. Though often Aristotle adds to the end of an otherwise shortened list of *Kategoriai* "and the rest."
51. See G. E. L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Göteborg: Elanders, 1960), pp. 163-190 and "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology," *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. Renford Bambrough (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 69-95; See also D. W. Hamlyn, "Focal Meaning," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 78 (1978), pp. 1-18 and Michael T. Frerajohn, "Aristotle on Focal Meaning and the Unity of Science," *Phronesis*, 25 (1980), pp. 117-128.
52. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, pp. 676-677.
53. Frede, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
54. A distinction reinforced by the characterization of substance as that which alone is capable of receiving contraries; see *Categories* 5, 4a10.
55. See *Metaphysics* Z1, 1028a29-31.
56. Brentano, *op. cit.*, p. 74.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 71ff.
58. See Walter Leszl, *Aristotle's Conception of Ontology* (Padua: Editrice Antenore, 1975), pp. 366-367. Leszl also cites the work of J. Vuillemin, *De la logique à la théologie, cinq études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1967. Vuillemin attempts to develop a worked-out system of *Kategoriai* in the 'deuxième étude'.
59. *Metaphysics* N, I 1088a22ff.
60. *Metaphysics* M 8, 1083a10-11; also *Categories* 6, 5a6ff.
61. See *Categories* 6, 5a6ff; see also Leszl, *op. cit.*, pp. 368ff. On the general issue of the organisation of the *Kategoriai*, John Cleary points to Aristotle's denial (at *Categories* 5, 2b26-28) of any hierarchical organisation of primary substances that "Perhaps this may be taken to imply that the other categories are so ordered with respect to each other" (Cleary, *Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority* [Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988], p. 5).
62. See *Topics* VI. At *Topics* VI, 4 (141b3-14) Aristotle seems to employ a notion of priority which leads to a somewhat Platonic conclusion. See Cleary, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-20.
63. See Cleary, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 1-6.
64. 1028a29-31, the translation is the same as that used in Cleary, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
65. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Early Works of Aristotle," *op. cit.*, p. 167.
66. See *Metaphysics* Z 1, 1028a15.

67. Cleary, *op. cit.*, p. 65. In fact, the focus is, as we shall see below, on pure actuality or substantial form. Thus, Cleary claims that Aristotle's "mature conception" of priority is that it is "a *pros hen* equivocal with pure actuality (or substantial form) as the focal meaning" (*ibid.*, p. 115 n. 28). Unity is, of course, another *pros hen* equivocal with an analogous structure, see for instance *Metaphysics* Γ 2, 1003b23 and I 2, 1054a13.

68. See *Metaphysics* N 6, 1093b19: "For in each category of being an analogous term is found-as the straight line is in length, so is the plane in surface, perhaps the odd in number, and the white in colour." See also *Metaphysics* Λ 4, 1070a31-35.

69. *Metaphysics* Λ 4, 1070a31 & 1070b15; see also N 2, 1089b27 and Z 9, 1034b7-19.

70. *Metaphysics* Λ 5, 1071a3-17. See Ross's commentary on this passage (and that immediately preceding it) in *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), p. 362 and also *Metaphysics* N 2, 1089b16ff.

71. See Cleary's discussion of *Metaphysics* θ, 8, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-63. Of course, as Cleary himself points out (*ibid.*, p. 115, n. 6), insofar as substance is the primary sense of actuality so it is somewhat "tautologous" to say that substance is prior in respect of actuality.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

73. "Transcendental" can here be taken as having both Kantian and more Medieval connotations since the unity involved here is both trans-categorical and also foundational to the possibility of knowledge.

74. Thus while it may be tempting, given the analysis of the *Kategoriai* suggested here, to say of the Aristotelian *Kategoriai* that they represent the ways in which the being of things is made determinate, this form of words is somewhat misleading in the Aristotelian context insofar as it incorporates the phrase 'the being of things'-a phrase which suggests that things might possess a being in addition to that of each *Kategoriai*. Aristotle denies that there is any 'being' which is common to all things in the same sense. Michael Loux, however, suggests that while it is true that being cannot function as a genus this does not entail that being cannot be used univocally in a sense which is neutral with respect to the various *Kategoriai* (Michael J. Loux, "Aristotle on the Transcendentals," *Phronesis*, 18[1973], pp. 225-239). If this line of argument were accepted, then perhaps there would be room for some notion of the *Kategoriai* as determinations of the being of things. It should be noted also that the account of the *Kategoriai* offered here is not new. In particular, a similar account can be found in John Cook Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-89.

75. See Leszl, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

76. See Ackrill, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-9.

77. Thus, Brentano attempts a deduction of the completeness of the Aristotelian *Kategoriai* on the basis of the relations each bears to substance. See Brentano, *op. cit.*, pp. 94ff.

78. See C. M. Gillespie, "The Aristotelian Categories," *Articles on Aristotle*, Vol. III, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1979), pp. 4ff.

79. See M. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 58ff.

80. Although admittedly Aristotle himself seems to have been relatively certain as to the correctness of his list, usually presenting either eight or ten *Kategoriai* consistently given as substance (or 'what it is'), quantity, quality, relation, where (place), when (time), activity (action), passivity (affection), and with the addition (in the *Categories* and the *Topics*) of position (posture) and state (possession). Such certitude, however, is no guarantee of philosophical truth.

81. See *Posterior Analytics* I 19, 81b10ff.