Place and Placedness

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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the difference between the notions of place and placedness. This difference relates to an important point of differentiation between genuinely a topographical approach and those other approaches that tend to dominate in the existing literature, including approaches associated with 'situated cognition'. If place is taken as the primary concept, as I argue it should be taken, then that means that being-placed, as it might be viewed as determinative of experience and cognition, has first to be understood in relation to place.



Colin McCahon, *Takaka: night and day*, 1948 (Auckland Art Gallery Toi o Tāmaki, NZ) – in McCahon's words: "landscape as a symbol of place and also of the human condition".[1] By kind permission of the Colin McCahon Research and Publication Trust.

1. Is there a philosophically significant difference between the notions of *place* and of *being-placed* – of what might be termed *placedness*? The question might also be put in terms more directly relevant to the idea of situated cognition by asking whether there is a philosophically significant difference between *situation* and *being-situated* or *situatedness* (assuming

'situation' is understood, *prima facie,* as that *wherein* one is situated). That there is a difference is easily elided by the fact that, in the latter case, the notion of situation is frequently discussed alongside and often interchangeably with being-situated. One might thus talk equally of one's situation or one's being-situated without any necessary shift in meaning.

The question might seem to be a relatively minor one, but it relates to an important point of difference between a genuinely topographical or topological mode of thinking,[2] the sort of thinking that both Ed Casey and I have tried to develop, each in our own way,[3] and certain modes of thinking that may draw upon elements of the topographic, but for which *topos,* place, is actually a secondary concept. My suggestion here will be that the focus on being-placed, placedness, or, as it may also be put, on being-situated, situatedness, can itself obscure the question of place, and that the question of place must come before any question of being-placed or placedness – even though it is only through being placed that we gain access to place. The difference may also be important in marking out a further and more specific difference between the way in which notions of place and situation enter into much cognitive scientific discourse, including that of situated cognition, and the way the notion of place, especially, may appears within broader forms of place-oriented discourse.

2. That there is a *prima facie* difference between place and placedness seems undeniable – at least if one gives a little thought to the matter. In simple terms, 'placedness' or 'being placed' names a characteristic, even if generalizable, of that which is placed, whereas 'place' names that to which what is placed stands in relation. *Placedness* would thus seem, on the face of it, to presuppose *place*. On that basis, there can be no placedness without place, and the two notions are inextricably bound together even though they are also distinct – the same reasoning may also be applied to the notions of situation and situatedness or being-situated. Yet what appears to be a simple and obvious difference here conceals a larger set of complications. There is a general tendency for place and placedness not to be distinguished even in discussions in which the concepts play an important role – the most obvious indication of which is the widespread identification of place with some notion of *meaningful space,* that is, with space as it is given meaning by a subject. Such a way of thinking about place is evident, for instance, in the work of one of the most influential writers on place and space, Yi-Fu Tuan, who writes that "in experience, the meaning of space often merges with that of place. 'Space' is more abstract than 'place'. What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value."[4] Here it seems that space and place essentially exist on a continuum in which the move towards place is also a move

toward the human valuation of space. Tuan thus distinguishes place from space, after a fashion, but the way he does this effectively reduces place to a variety of space – space as given human valuation – and since he treats place as dependent on a human mode of apprehending space, he leaves no room for place other than as tied to such apprehension. Place is apprehended space, or as we might also say, it is space understood as it belongs to our being in space and our responding to it – it is, one might say, the space of our situatedness and understood in terms our situatedness or placedness.

The tendency to treat place in this way reflects a broader lack of attentiveness to place as a genuinely *sui generis* concept (even among many of those who seem otherwise to take place as a significant notion) – a lack of attentiveness that, whatever else it signifies, often amounts to an effective reduction of place to placedness or the replacement of place by placedness. When this happens, the very notion of place undergoes an important shift, since placedness no longer involves standing in a genuine relation *to place*, but instead seems to imply that place somehow belongs to the character of that which is placed – as the valuation of space arises on the basis of the human being in space. If this sounds odd or obscure – and it ought to – then the reason is simply that it is so. Moreover, even though this implied shift to placedness over place is commonplace, its oddity or obscurity typically goes unremarked because the shift itself is seldom acknowledged.

To illustrate what is at issue here let me take as an example an idea developed by John Campbell.[5] In his *Past, Space and Self*, Campbell argues, primarily against the Strawsonian claim that subjectivity requires objectivity (or at least that a subject requires objects in order to operate as a subject), that one could conceive of a case in which an agent was capable of moving itself in a coordinated fashion and yet has no sense of space other than as purely subjective. What Campbell apparently has in mind is a case in which an agent guides its movements according to subjectively presented features – something that he suggests can be illustrated in the case of human agency by navigational instructions of the sort: 'steer always with the wind at your back' or 'keep on a course that has the setting sun at your right shoulder'.[6] Important to Campbell's account is the idea that the space he has in mind here, or at least the grasp of that space, is dynamic – it is essentially tied, not to some static model of space, but directly to action – Campbell talks in fact of this as a mode of 'egocentric space' that is 'immediately used by the subject in directing action.'[7] Here egocentric space seems to be in some sense a structure of the acting subject rather than referring to something that stands apart from the subject.

The idea an *egocentric* space such as Campbell describes that is independent of any

notion of space as *objective* seems exactly analogous to the idea of a mode of placedness that is distinct from place. One might argue about whether Campbell's account, as he characterizes it, is fully consistent or coherent – the maritime examples he uses are not entirely convincing, and it may be that the sort of system he has in mind is actually much better characterized in purely functionalist terms (the aligning of certain perceptual inputs with behavioral outputs) that need not imply any necessary reference even to spatiality. Still, Campbell's example does seem to provide us with an example of a position that allows a reasonably clear separation of what might be interested as a mode of placedness as apart from a notion of place. Notice that Campbell's account really only works for the analysis of individual behavior – it is directed at an analysis of a mode of subjectivity and so it is perhaps not surprising that it involves a notion of a subjective space or being-place. Campbell does not reject the idea of a notion of place that goes beyond such subjectivity, just as he allows a notion of objective space that goes beyond egocentric space. The point of disagreement one might have with Campbell is to what extent the idea of a subjective space is genuinely independent of (even if not reducible to) a notion of intersubjective or objective space – and so also whether the being-place on which he focuses can be made sense of apart from place. Campbell tends to view his concept of egocentric space as indeed independent.

Campbell's discussion might be taken to suggest that the difference between place and placedness is the same as or at least analogous to the distinction between egocentric or subjective space and objective space – a suggestion that would, however, set place in a quite opposite position to that which is common in much of the literature according to which place is most often taken to be associated with the subjective rather than the objective. Yet although the shift away from a subjective understanding of place is important, we ought to resist the idea that placedness is to be identified with *space as subjective* and place with *space as objective*. Part of the reason for this, of course, is that place *and space* are distinct notions, even though related, but more important is the fact that place is not to be construed as an objective structure to be set against the subjective. If one takes subjective and objective to be correlative notions or structures, as in one sense they surely are, then subjective and objective only appear in relation to one another and within a larger frame that encompasses both. Such an encompassing frame can belong wholly neither to subject nor object. This seems to me a point well-illustrated by Donald Davidson's thinking around the notion of triangulation – itself an essentially topographical or topological notion.[8] Davidson treats, not only subjective and objective, but also the intersubjective, as part of a single interrelated structure articulated through the idea of triangulation which here names both an epistemological and ontological

formation. The triangular structure within which subjective, intersubjective and objective are worked out can be taken to be equivalent to the notion of place as understood not merely as some location in the world, but rather as that within which any sort of appearance or encounter is possible.

To go back to Campbell's example, however, one could read the sort of case Campbell presents, not merely as attempting to establish the idea of an egocentric or subjective space as an independent or sui generis notion that is nevertheless part of a larger framework of spatial and topographic elements, but instead as showing that there is no necessity for anything beyond a notion of egocentric or 'subjective' space in understanding the possibility even of agency that seems to involve spatial orientation and direction. Since what is required for spatial agency is a way in which the spatial engages with the agent's capacities for action, then all that is needed is a subjectively presented space (which need not imply a subjectively represented space) – and any space must be subjectively presented if it is to engage with action. Indeed, one might argue that all action is action in a subjectively presented space – or, as one might also put it, in a subjectively presented environment. One might put this point more generally and say that, on this reading, neither action nor cognition need involve anything other than the direct responsive interaction of an acting subject with its environment. Moreover, on this account, there need be no notion of an internal representation of the environment, but neither need there be any idea of an environment that stands apart from, or that can be characterized apart from, the acting subject. This means that such an account is compatible both with what might be thought of as traditional 'idealist' or 'subjectivist' positions and with positions that are 'realist' or 'physicalist'.

3. The sort of account at issue here – the sort of account that might be drawn out of Campbell's position – is not unlike that which one can find in some accounts of situated or embodied cognition. One can characterize such accounts as subjectivist, since they rely on a mode of subjective presentation, one can take them as objectivist, in the same sense that behaviorism is objectivist, or one can take them, as they often do, as standing outside of the subject-object distinction altogether – which is how they often present themselves. A useful example of this latter sort of approach is Hubert Dreyfus' notion of embodied coping as developed in many publication over the last forty years or so (since the first publication of his ground-breaking book *What Computers Can't Do*[9]). Dreyfus takes our being in the world to be determined in terms of our activity, and without any representational intermediaries. In the terms I have used, however, there is no 'place', in Dreyfus, that is distinct from 'placedness'.

Instead, there is only the causal-physical structure of the world and the direct interactive responsiveness with the world that belongs to the coping agent. Dreyfus' account thus combines a phenomenology grounded in the early Merleau-Ponty with a behaviorism largely derived from (or at least convergent with) key aspects of the work of Gilbert Ryle. Just as Dreyfus seems not to distinguish place from placedness, so neither does situation appear apart from situatedness or being-situated. 'Situation' becomes simply the particular differential orientation in the world that belongs to the acting subject and that is necessarily implied by the subject's capacity for engaged coping.

Dreyfus is an interesting figure to consider in this context, since it is Dreyfus who has largely been responsible for the introduction of phenomenological, and especially Heideggerian, influences into contemporary cognitive science. This has been particularly so in respect of the anti-representationalist – one might even say 'anti-cognitivist' – tendency that is associated with both embodied and situated cognition. As elaborated by Dreyfus (most notably in his *Being-in-the World*[10]), Heidegger shows us that our primary mode of being-in-the-world is given in terms of action rather than knowledge, and on the basis of our engaged involvement rather than our detached observation – on the basis of *praxis* rather than *theoria*. Yet although this has been a key element in Dreyfus' appropriation of Heidegger into cognitive science, as well as of his reading of Heidegger more generally, it is a highly problematic reading of Heidegger, and the problems associated with it are not far distant from the issues relating to the distinction I have suggested between place and placedness.

Although it is true that Heidegger rejects the claim that we can understand being-in-the-world on the model of a detached, 'scientific' understanding, this does not mean that the standpoint of the 'theoretical' is thereby taken to be essentially secondary to the 'practical'.[11] What Heidegger is concerned to reject is the prioritization of the scientific projection of the world that he actually takes to constitute a form of subjectivism and nihilism, and which constitutes only a particular development of a certain mode of theory. Our engaged involvement in the world is an involvement that can take both practical and theoretical forms, with theory itself having its own mode of *praxis*. That the theoretical cannot be taken as secondary is especially obvious once one reflects on the role of philosophy, of thinking, in Heidegger's account – and, in the later work, such thinking is fundamentally about a certain sort of attunement to place, even a mode of contemplation of place and our relation to it.[12] The latter itself depends on distinguishing place from our own being-in-place, and only if we do indeed distinguish place from being-in-place, from placedness, can we make sense of the Heidegger's topological project (whether in *Being and Time* or elsewhere) as also a genuinely

ontological project that is addressed to *being* rather than merely to *human* being, and so as a project that is not to collapse into some form of subjectivism – which is what the prioritization of the 'scientific' itself tends towards.

A central problem that afflicts Heidegger's account in *Being and Time* is that placedness or situatedness readily appears there as a structure of Dasein and Dasein is itself understood as identical with the essential structure of human being. Already one can see the dangers of an incipient subjectivism here – even though such subjectivism is one of the things Heidegger aimed, in *Being and Time*, to overcome. Dasein is characterized by Heidegger as 'being-the-world', and although this does indeed shift the focus away from an internalized form of subjectivity that is set against the world, it nevertheless also runs the risk of effectively subjectifying the world, since the being-in that belongs to being-in-the-world is itself grounded in Dasein's own projection of possibilities (that projection being precisely the projection of world). The position is complicated, of course, by the fact that Dasein here does not name a mode of being-in that is apart from being-with or being-alongside (and so the subjectivising tendency at work here is by no means unequivocal or unambiguous), but it is a tendency that even Heidegger himself acknowledged.[13] In *Being and Time*, the main focus tends to be more on what is effectively a mode of placedness than it is a mode of place – and this itself reflects the fact that *Being and Time* is lacking in any explicitly topological vocabulary (certainly in comparison with the later thinking), and the notion of existential spatiality that is set out in the early part of the work (and which is, in any case, said to be secondary to temporarily) is actually closer to a mode of placedness than of place.[14]

It is out of Heidegger's recognition of the problems that remain within *Being and Time* – problems that can be seen centrally to rest on the work's treatment of space and time, as well as place – and so out of his attempts to resolve those problems, that Heidegger's thinking undergoes a significant shift. In simple terms, the shift at issue here is from a position in which *place* is a projection of human being (or better, of Dasein as the essence of human being) to one in which *human being* is a projection or 'function' of place (and so human being comes to belong essentially to place). This shift is thus one that can be characterized as being from *place* as the projection to *placedness* as that which is projected, but, at the same time, what also occurs is a separating out of place from placedness and the emergence of a genuinely *sui generis* concept of place – the latter occurring largely through Heidegger's engagement with Hōlderlin beginning in the mid-1930s.[15] The shift to place in Heidegger's thinking, which is to say the development of his thinking as having the form of what he calls a 'topology', also brings with it a rethinking of Dasein itself, since Dasein now

names place rather than any form of placedness – it names the being of place (and the place of being) rather than being-in-place or as we might also put it, situatedness

When one takes seriously the topological character of Heidegger's thinking that has been briefly sketched here, then it soon becomes evident that Heidegger's thought diverges significantly from much of what is taken for granted within contemporary cognitive scientific thinking. Indeed, I would argue that Heidegger cannot be assimilated to a cognitive scientific perspective without significant distortion of his thinking. This ought already to be obvious, however, from the fact that his own focus is on *being* rather than on the structures of human *cognition* (which is why Heidegger denies his position is anthropological or humanistic) or, at least, the latter is significant for Heidegger only inasmuch as it sheds light on the former (and it will do so only if the question of human cognition is already taken to lead on to the ontological question).

In this respect, Heidegger's position can be contrasted with that of Merleau-Ponty, whose early work is more directly and readily assimilable to a cognitive scientific perspective (which is why Dreyfus' account actually tends to be much closer to the French thinker than the German), but which does not bring the question of being to the fore. Indeed, in contemporary cognitive science, and in many contemporary fields in which place seems to figure, it is Merleau-Ponty who most often occupies center stage, and this is surely because Merleau-Ponty, especially in his earlier work, offers a way of thinking about place that is both more accessible and that tends to treat place much less equivocally, which is to say, in terms that allow its construal as more or less indistinguishable from placedness. One indication of this is Merleau-Ponty's tendency to emphasis *the body* rather than place, in spite of the fact that it is hard to make sense of the body independently of place. This tendency reflects a more widespread tendency to look to the body as some of kind of foundation or *subjectum* – to treat the body as an explanatory ground rather than as itself in need of explanation. What the body *is* cannot be taken for granted and the nature of the body remains always in question just so long as the body is treated as prior to or as apart from a mode of being-in-place (which means that the analysis of *place* has to come before the analysis of the *body*).[16] Unlike Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty is also more congenial to the strongly non-cognitivist approach that is characteristic of much contemporary research that purports to take place as a key theme. The reason for this is largely that the emphasis on the body enables a stronger focus on purely bodily and behavioral responses – which is precisely what one finds in Dreyfus – and which is therefore also more amenable to analyses in terms of underlying bodily processes and structures. This is also, of course, a reason why such an emphasis is

indeed more congenial to cognitive scientific approaches and to the increasing prominence of ideas and approaches taken from contemporary neuroscience.

4. Earlier I noted the possibility that, understood as distinct from placedness, place might seem to converge with the idea of objective space or even with the idea of objectivity. I also noted that although it is indeed mistaken to construe place entirely subjectively, it is nevertheless inappropriate to regard place as therefore to be construed in solely objective terms either. Precisely because place *encompasses* both the subjective and the objective, thinking in terms of place is amenable to thinking in terms of both subjective *and* objective, and entails the irreducibility and indispensability of both of these even though they are nevertheless also inevitably entangled with one another[17]. Subjectivity and objectivity are both structures that appear only within or in relation to place and arise only out of the engagement with and in place.

In analogous fashion, one cannot simply identify a topographical or topological mode of thinking with either a first-personal or a third-personal approach, as if place were just one or the other, but will always involve the interplay between them. The first-personal and the third-personal are thus both to be understood only from within the framework of place. In this way the topographical thereby also has to be understood as standing outside of the usual contrast between the phenomenological and the empirical scientific – which are themselves often identified with the first personal and the third-personal. Adopting a properly topographic approach does not mean ruling out such perspectives, but it does mean recognizing their location within a larger landscape that allows of multiple descriptions. Moreover, while it allows that there will be relations between different sorts of descriptions here, topographic thinking nevertheless refuses to allow any unambiguous reduction between descriptions or any determinate level of description that underpins all description.[18]

Such an approach to the notions of the subjective and objective (and the intersubjective) as well as the first-personal and third-personal, along with the emphasis on descriptive indeterminacy and multiplicity, are indeed characteristic features of the work of those thinkers who I would argue exemplify a mode of genuinely place-oriented thinking: thinkers such Davidson, but also Heidegger and even Gadamer – those who also exemplify what I have elsewhere characterized as a mode of hermeneutic-topographical thinking.[19] The emphasis on the hermeneutical here (in contrast, notably, with the phenomenological) is also important: understanding is grounded in the placedness or being-placed of the one who understands just as that being-placed is itself determined by the general structure of place as

well as the singular character of that very place that is at issue (and so the singular character of that being-placed).[20] Moreover, the hermeneutical also brings with it a tendency to treat subjectivity and objectivity, first person and third person, as both structures that are part of a larger 'event' or, as I would say, a larger 'taking place'. In this way, hermeneutics can be seen to bring a mode of topography or topology along with it even as topography draws us into proximity with the hermeneutical.[21]

Even though there may be reasons for taking the hermeneutical to stand in a particularly close relation to the topographic or topological, still the emphasis on place does not mean ruling out either phenomenological or empirical scientific approaches just as it does not imply of rejecting notions of subjectivity or objectivity or of ignoring either first personal or third personal perspectives. Instead, the emphasis on place allows us to attend to all of these without giving absolute priority to any one. This means too that the emphasis on place as distinct from placedness or being-placed does not entail the dismissal of placedness, in particular, as a significant notion. Indeed, it is only if one retains a clear sense of the distinction of place from placedness that either of these concepts can properly remain in view. The tendency to ignore place actually results, not in the prioritization of placedness, but rather in the obliteration of both place *and* placedness, since the latter itself depends on the former. This is why Heidegger's *Being and Time* serves as an important opening up of the way into the thinking of place since the manner in which it takes up the idea of situatedness is such as already to invoke a notion of place even though it is also a notion that it does not, in the end, properly address – hence the incomplete and uncompletable character of the work.

If we distinguish place from placedness, thereby also retaining both concepts even as we also insist on the primacy of place itself, then perhaps we must also distinguish between two notions of placedness – although one might argue that only one of these is properly so called.[22] The first of these forms of placedness is the placedness that stands in an essential relation to place. This is the placedness that just because it is indeed a being *in-place* thereby calls upon a notion of place that is nevertheless also distinct from it. The other notion of 'placedness', and it is here placed in quotation marks to indicate its anomalous character, is something like Campbell's notion of a purely egocentric or subjective 'space' or perhaps as we may also term it a purely behavioral 'space'. This notion of 'placedness' is only ambiguously characterized as indeed a mode of space or spatiality or as a mode of placedness. This is because the 'placedness' at issue here is really an attribute or set of attributes belonging to a creature, agent, or *subject* – what might be termed a mode of behavioral responsiveness that could, as I noted above, be characterized purely functionally.

It is certainly unclear to what extent such a notion of 'placedness' requires a notion of *place* in its explication or even a notion of *space* (other than as a nexus of causal relatedness).

Place and placedness disappear in the face of the reduction of being-placed to a property of the agent; but place and placedness, and so the distinction between them, also disappear in the fact of the widespread tendency to treat place (and so placedness along with it) as a product of the subject or of the interaction between subjects, in other words, as subjective or intersubjective (psychological, social, cultural, or political) *constructions*. On this account, there may still be a notional distinction of place from placedness, but since there is no *sui generis* notion of place or placedness, both being mere 'effects' of supposedly more basic structures and processes, so the distinction turns out to be merely notional. One cannot treat place as having a distinct character apart from placedness or being-placed, since there is no place that is not itself a psychological, social, cultural or political structure, process, or phenomena, and no being-placed that is not such either.[23]

Holding fast to the distinction between place and placedness means holding both to the idea of placedness or being-placed as involving a genuine relation *to place* and a refusal of any reduction of place to something else or its treatment as merely derivative. This means according a particular *ontological* status to place, and, indeed, place itself already stands in a very particular relation to *being*. To be, one might say, is to be placed – and this idea is one that Aristotle invokes when he repeats, in *Physics* IV, the Archytyan dictum that to be is to be somewhere.[24] This means that for any being, what it is for it to be is for it to be in place – to be placed – and this opens up the question (as it is opened up, if also somewhat problematically, in Aristotle) as to what place itself might be.

The question about place thus emerges through a question about the being-placed of some thing, and yet the former question is indeed a question about place and not merely about being-placed. The question about the being of place is a peculiar one, however, since it cannot properly be a question that asks after the being of place as if this concerned merely the being of this or that place or as if this concerned some independent mode of being that might or might not attach to place. If to be is to be in place, then being and place appear as correlative notions, so closely tied together that they can barely be separated. If this is often overlooked, the reason is simply that all too often we treat place as identical with places – with individual *locations* or *locales*. Yet to ask after what place is, and so after the mode of being of place, we are really asking after what place is independently of any individual place, independently of any specific location or locale. This question is almost indistinguishable form the question of being, and yet, in recognizing this, the question of being itself appears in

a new light, as essentially topographical or topological – hence Heidegger's claim that his own inquiry into being takes the form of a *topology*.[25] Recognizing the way the question of place and the question of being converge also allows us to see how the question of being that is now seen to be at issue here is not a question that concerns the being of this or that – it does not concern the being merely of a being or of beings any more than the question of place at issue concern the 'place' or 'being-placed' of any thing or things. Instead what is at issue is indeed the being that belongs first *with place* in the same way as the place at issue is the place that belongs first *with being*.

5. The question of place, though it is indeed only to be approached through our own place, and so though our own placedness, is a question that goes beyond ourselves, beyond even those other selves and other things around us, and that thereby encompasses that wherein we always already find ourselves – a 'wherein' that points in the direction of the world, and yet also indicates the way the world itself begins only in and through place. Thinking, no matter where it eventually arrives, begins only in and out of this *being-placed* which is always a being *in relation to place*. It is thus that the question at issue here is indeed a question that concerns more than just our own *being* or our *own place*.[26] Place arises as a question out of being placed, out of placedness, but it certainly does not remain as a question merely of placedness. It is precisely because the question of placedness opens out into the question of place in this way that the question of placedness forces us to attend to our own radical finitude, our own boundedness, our own limit, and so, thereby, our own being – which is given only in and through this limit. Not only is place a notion that is itself tied to the idea of limit (although the limit that belongs to place must be understood as enabling rather than simply constraining),[27] but in recognizing the placed character of our own being we are also forced to recognize the way in which the being that is proper to us – a being that is a being in place – is also a being in which we are opened up to place and so to being. We thus come back to our own being through the encounter with the placed character of our being (through our being here/there) in which we are also opened up to place itself. It is in precisely this direction (the direction of a genuine topology or topography) that the thought of the later Heidegger moves, but it is a direction that can also be seen as indicated in the work of a host of thinkers, writers, and artists – in the work of any who attend to the real manner in which the world happens, the real manner in which the world does indeed 'take place'. In such work placedness and place appear together, though never as simply conflated. Thus a painter like the New Zealander, Colin McCahon, almost all of whose work can be said to explore both the

human being in place and the place that is thereby revealed (a place that in his work also opens up to the sacred), can be said to be a painter of place no less than Heidegger is a thinker of place, even though McCahon's work is also, of necessity, like Heidegger's own thinking, an exploration that occurs only in and through the human experience of place. The point, of course, is that the experience is never an experience of itself alone.

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[1] *Colin McCahon: A Survey Exhibition* (Auckland, NZ: Auckland City Art Gallery, March-April 1972), p.19.

[2] 'Topographical' and 'topological' are here used, as I have deployed them elsewhere, more or less as synonyms – as I would see it, one emphasises the 'writing' of place and the other its 'saying'.

[3] See, for instance, my *Place and Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) – a new and expanded edition of which is currently in preparation with Routledge, and Ed Casey's, *Getting Back into Place* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2nd edn, 2009).

[4] *Space and Place The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,, 5th edn 2001), p.6.

[5] This is an example to which I also make reference to in *Place and Experience* – see *Place and Experience* pp.130-132. There my concern is with the nature of spatial understanding and the interdependence of a conceptual grasp of space with a grasp of objects.

[6]Campbell, *Past, Space and Self* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995), p.14.

[7]Campbell, *Past, Space and Self*, p.14.

[8] For more on triangulation and topology see my 'Self, Other, Thing: Triangulation and Topography in Post-Kantian Philosophy', *Philosophy Today*, 59 (2015), pp.103–126.

[9] Hubert L. Dreyfus, *What Computers Can't Do* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972) – a more recent edition appeared as *What Computers Still Can't Do* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992).

[10] Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's* Being and Time, *Division I* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press: 1990).

[11] See my discussion in *Heidegger's Topology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006), pp.140-141.

[12] See *Heidegger's Topology,* Chapt.5.

[13] See, for instance, Heidegger's comment in *Contributions* that 'In *Being and Time* Da-sein still has an appearance that is "anthropological," "subjectivistic," "individualist," etc.'", *Contributions to Philosophy,* trans. Richard Rojcevicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), p.233. Heidegger makes this comment still emphasising that *Being and Time* itself aimed to take issue with such anthropologism and subjectivism, and yet part of the difficulty is this remains an issue as Heidegger's own focus on the matter here and elsewhere itself suggests.

[14] In 'The Place of Mimesis and the Apocalyptic: Toward a Topology of the Near and Far', *Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture* 20 (2013), pp.1-24, Richard Schacht focuses on what he terms the 'topology' of Heidegger's early work, and especially *Being and Time,* and briefly takes issue with my own emphasis (which he takes to be characteristic of most commentaries) on the topology that becomes explicit in the later thinking (p.21, n.19). I do not disagree with the claim that topology runs through all of Heidegger's work, and this is a key claim in *Heidegger's Topology*, but what I think Schacht overlooks here is precisely the way *Being and Time* effectively neglects place in favour of placedness at the same time as it also favours place (inasmuch as it is addressed) as indeed a 'projection' rather than as projecting.

[15] See eg. Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also my discussion in 'Die Wende zum Ort und die Wiedergewinnung des Menschen: Heideggers Kritik des "Humanismus"' ['The Turn to Place and the Retrieval of the Human: Heidegger's Critique of "Humanism"'], in Hans-Helmuth Gander und Magnus Striet (eds.), *Heideggers Weg in die Moderne. Eine Verortung der "Schwarzen Hefte"* (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann 2016 [Heidegger Forum 13)).

[16] This point is very clear in Heidegger – see my 'Heidegger, Space and World', in Julian Kiverstein and Michael Wheeler (eds), *Heidegger and Cognitive Science* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), pp.311-312. – although it also means that he is often treated as neglectful of the body (especially in his treatment in *Being and Time*). It is worth noting

that than our being-in-place is not a function of our being-embodied, but rather, our being-embodied is itself derivative of our being-in-place – in exactly the same way that, as Heidegger points out in his 1929 *Kantbuch*, our dependence on the senses is a function of our finitude rather than our finitude being a consequence of our dependence on the senses – see *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans Richard Taft* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 5th enlarged edn. 1997), pp.18-19.

[17] This is essentially the line of approach I adopt in *Place and Experience*. There I argue that "place is not to be viewed as a purely 'objective' concept … [that is] a concept to be explicated by reference to objects existing in a purely physical space … [and] neither should it be viewed as purely 'subjective'… both subject and object are …placed within the same structure, rather than one or the other being the underlying ground for that structure" (*Place and Experience*, pp.34-5 & p.37).

[18] See 'Self, Other, Thing: Triangulation and Topography in Post-Kantian Philosophy'

[19] See my 'Placing Understanding/Understanding Place', *Sophia*, 2016, in press.

[20] On the singularity of place see my 'Place and Singularity', in Malpas (ed.), *The Intelligence of Place: Topographies and Poetics* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp.65-92.

[21] The way the hermeneutical appears here draws attention to another important feature of the topographic – one evident in the work of just those thinkers I have already invoked, especially Davidson and Heidegger – namely the connection between place and language. This may be thought somewhat odd given my emphasis on the distinction of place from being-placed and so the insistence on place as a structure that comes before the subjective. Yet as place is not to be understood as primarily subjective, neither, I would argue, is language, though this point depends on distinguishing the specificity of speech and script form the very articulation of the world that these make salient and express.

[22] On the assumption that situatedness is understood as distinct from situation, then the notion of situatedness will present a similar equivocity.

[23] For more on constructionist construals of place seem my 'Pensando topográficamente. Lugar, espacio y geografía', *Documents d'anàlisi geogràfica* 61 (2015), pp. 199-229; reprinted as 'Thinking topographically: place, space, and geography' in *Il Cannocchiale*, (2016).

[24] Aristotle, *Physics* IV, 208a30.

[25] See Heidegger 'Seminar in Le Thor 1969', *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp.41 & 47.

[26] Which is why Heidegger is so insistent that the question as he approaches it is not a question that can be adequately encompassed by the focus merely on the human – see again my discussion in 'Die Wende zum Ort und die Wiedergewinnung des Menschen: Heideggers Kritik des "Humanismus"'.

[27] On place and limit, see, for instance, the discussion in 'Pensando topográficamente. Lugar, espacio y geografía' ('Thinking topographically: place, space, and geography'). The topic also arises in *Heidegger's Topology* and elsewhere. Heidegger famously emphasises that a limit or boundary is "not that at which something stops but… that from which something begins its presencing" (in 'Building Dwelling Thinking', *Poetry, Language, Thought*, ed. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p.154.