

‘Where Hegel Meets the Chinese Gulls’: Place, Word, and World in the Work of Kenneth White

Jeff Malpas

... We’ve been in this kind of context for a long time. Hegel tried to get out of it via dialectics. I suggest a further shift from dialectics to poetics. That is the empty shore where Hegel meets the Chinese gulls.¹

I. ‘The elucidation of the concept of world’, claimed Martin Heidegger in 1929, ‘is one of the most central tasks of philosophy’, and yet, he added, ‘the concept of world and the phenomenon it designates has never yet been recognized in philosophy at all’.² The problem of world is central to Heidegger’s own thinking—so much so that we might say that the celebrated ‘question of being’ (*die Seinsfrage*) is itself inseparable from the question of world. The latter question is also at the very core of Kenneth White’s work. As he says in one of the essays in *On Scottish Ground*: ‘I talked about a sense of world. All my work is about this theme, which is more than a theme, maybe more like a destiny’,³ and in ‘The White Bag of Books’: ‘Out of that original territory, and from territory to territory, it’s always world I’m trying to get at, to work my way into. World, that is, an area beyond the person, beyond the social context: a space of general being’.⁴ Yet if philosophy has had difficulty in even giving proper recognition to ‘the concept of world and the phenomenon it designates’, so too does world as it appears in White’s work appear often to be similarly overlooked or taken for granted—it is not that the importance of world in White’s work is ignored, but it is seldom interrogated or elucidated. Undoubtedly this is partly connected with the relative paucity of critical philosophical engagements with White’s thinking, especially in English, and the associated tendency for White to be approached from within frameworks that are primarily literary (the vast majority of critical writing on White in English comes from those working within literature, and especially Scottish literature), but it also seems to be a function of the fact that philosophy, along with contemporary thought in general, continues to have difficulty in recognising the concept of world and

the problem that it presents, while the more specific philosophical approaches that dominate among many of those who have engaged with White's thinking (approaches deriving, for instance, from the work of Gilles Deleuze) similarly tend to ignore or even to eschew any concern with world in the sense at issue here—such engagements are usually more concerned with Deleuze than with White, and I know of no serious attempt genuinely to think through the philosophical aspects of White's work in its own terms.

From the perspective of Heidegger's thinking, the thematization of world in White's work makes that work especially interesting and significant. It also places White within a tradition of contemporary thought that goes beyond the purely philosophical. As a thinker of world, Heidegger locates his own work in relation to that of poets such as Hölderlin, Char, and Bashō, as well as artists such as Cézanne and Klee,⁵ and at the same time characterises his thinking in ways that draw it into proximity with poetry—a poetry 'that thinks'. White locates his work—including his poetry and his prose, his 'fiction' and his essays—in relation to a company that includes philosophers and explorers ('adventurers of ideas' in the broadest sense) no less than fellow-poets and writers. Like Heidegger, White also owes a heavy to Nietzsche, whose own work displays a similar eclecticism as well as idiosyncratic brilliance (and perhaps even a sense of world-concern that adumbrates that of Heidegger and White), although the particularities of their respective relationships to the genius of Sils Maria are very different. 'Geopoetics' is the term that White has made his own, and the term could as easily be understood as 'World-poetics', were it not for the fact that the latter term might be thought too suggestive of something similar to 'world literature' or 'world music' (terms that can sometimes carry problematic associations). White himself tells us that 'geopoetics is concerned with "worlding"', and, after noting parenthetically that "'wording" is contained in "worlding"', he adds that 'in my semantics, "world" emerges from a contact between the human mind and the things, the lines, the rhythms of the earth'.⁶ The active sense of world as 'worlding'—as, one might say, the *happening* of world—itself echoes an idiosyncratic Heideggerian usage (*die Welt weltet*—'the world worlds'). Moreover, if we read into White's use of poetics Heidegger's understanding of the Greek *poiesis* as a mode of 'bringing-forth', then one sense to be attached to geopoetics is the idea of the 'bringing forth' of world—not only in the sense of the world's own self-presencing in relation to the earth, but also in the sense of the bringing to presence of that very bringing forth of world. Significantly, that bring-forth, whether in its original and

primary sense as the worlding of world, or in the bringing to presence of that worlding, cannot be understood apart from the poetic understood, not only as a bringing forth, but also in its relation to language, to the word, to the gatheredness of *logos*. Word and world do indeed belong essentially together.

The proximity of White's work to Heidegger's is striking—and unsurprising given the extent to which White not only draws on many similar sources to Heidegger himself, but also given White's own close reading of the Freiburg philosopher. Part of what I will offer here might thus be construed as an exploration of that proximity, and so as a 'Heideggerian' reading of White. But my own relation to Heidegger himself is far from straightforward, and my reading of Heidegger is one that looks to situate his thinking within a very particular landscape.⁷ Rather than an attempt to assimilate White to Heidegger, this essay is part of a larger project aimed at the mapping of the landscape of a kind of *topographical* thinking to which I would argue both White and Heidegger, can be said to belong (talk of 'topographical thinking' deliberately harks back to Immanuel Kant's characterisation of himself as a 'geographer of reason',⁸ but also draws on Martin Heidegger's identification of his own thinking as taking the form of a 'topology of being'⁹). The affinities between White and Heidegger are thus the affinities that come from being situated within the same or neighbouring territories (neighbouring 'fields' as White puts it)—an affinity, essentially, of *place*. In fact, it is this latter concept—place or *topos*—that is the key term that underpins the focus on world, and without which the concept of world cannot properly be elucidated. Perhaps one might say that I therefore read White's *geo-poetics* as also a *topo-poetics*. In the focus on *topos*, it is *place* that is brought to the fore, and it is place that seems to me to be a central notion in White's poetic thinking. The core of this essay is thus an exploration of White's thinking as essentially a thinking and poetising of place. It is also an attempt to delineate the place of White's own thinking—perhaps a delineation of the 'white field' itself. It is a place found on that 'empty shore between Hegel and the Chinese gulls'—an intermediate and open space between traditions, even as it is also grounded in a tradition of its own; between cultures, even though it shapes its own culture; between thinkers and between realms, even as it also draws out its own thought, evokes its own realm.

II. Heidegger famously writes about the locatedness of his thinking in a particular place: a two-room wooden hut on the hillside at Totdnauberg in the Black Forest.¹⁰ No less clearly,

and in some ways even more directly, Nietzsche ties his thinking to place, and to very specific places: most obviously, Sils Maria, high on the Engadine plateau in the Swiss mountains, but also Turin, Genoa, Nice and, especially, Venice.¹¹ Something similar can also be said of a host of other philosophers, poets, and artists—including many of those already cited above—from Cézanne, grounded in the countryside of Provence (named by Heidegger as his own second homeland), to Hölderlin (perhaps the pre-eminent German ‘poet of place’), as well as Albert Camus, René Char and even Montaigne, another thinker who looms large in White’s personal pantheon. The origins of White’s work in the places in which he has lived, worked, and travelled, most notably the mountainous landscape of the Pyrenees (the focus of White’s first major work *Letters from Gourgounel*¹²), and, latterly, the often wild Breton coast (“this north coast of Brittany where I now live, work and have my being”¹³) is something to which he himself returns on many occasions in his writing. The very room in which White works, a room that connects to a library below, and might be thought to be an extension of it (the thinking and writing done above being founded on the materials held in the library below), is explicitly invoked in some of White’s writing,¹⁴ but beyond that, the building of which the room is part, and the land on which it sits—the ‘white field’, *Gwenved*—and the places around that place, from the fields and towns to the coast and sea, appear throughout his work.¹⁵

Where else can thinking—or writing—begin other than in the places in which we always already find ourselves? Not only do those places provide the physical support and sustenance that makes human thinking possible, but those places also provide the *stimulus* to thought, as well as the very the *stuff* of thinking. In White’s case, the room in which he writes is filled with a collection of books, maps, charts, and documents, as well as objects and curiosities from around the world,¹⁶ that make up a magpie’s nest of materials out of which thinking and writing can be made. In its setting within the Breton landscape, so too does that room—White’s workplace (and his homeplace with it)—open up to an even wider body of materials for thought, and through that landscape, opens to a horizon that in turn opens out to the world. Thinking is thus grounded no less in what is without than in what is within. If White sometimes identifies himself with those Celtic monks, sequestered away on the rocky coasts of Hibernia, it is not because he admires their studious isolation from the world, but because of the way they exemplify a mode of life that is turned *to* the world in and through the solitude of thought. Thinking, it is sometimes said, is without a place—

*atopos*¹⁷—but it is far better to say that thinking is always turned to the world *out of its own place*. It cannot forget that place, or at least, if it does, then it risks losing its proper ground, losing its footing, slipping into an empty meaninglessness.

This beginning of thinking in place is itself directed connected to what might be thought of as a certain *solitariness* that belongs to thinking. Such solitariness is clearly discernable in White’s case—and is so in spite of the fact that White’s life and thought has developed in the company of his wife, also his translator, Marie-Claude, and even though he is clearly nested within a wider community of thinkers, writers, and makers in Brittany, in Scotland, and from other parts of the world. The solitariness that belongs to thinking is not a matter of some sort of selfish isolation nor does it entail any failure of communality (genuine community is surely a belonging together of those who are also solitary¹⁸). Instead it involves a recognition and awareness of one’s thinking as essentially one’s own—as that which one must undertake by and for oneself and that for which one is alone responsible—and so too a recognition and awareness of one’s being *as oneself*. Such recognition and awareness requires attentiveness to one’s own apartness and relatedness—an apartness and relatedness that encompasses both others and the world (as Char writes of poetry, “[it] is the loneliness without distance amid the busyness of all”¹⁹)—which means an attentiveness to one’s own singular *placedness*.

Place is directly implicated here, since the very character of the self as self is inseparable from the self as placed, and as it stands in relation to place.²⁰ Moreover, place is itself that which relates, but only as it also separates; it is that which separates, but only as it also relates.²¹ Such relating-separating, and the bounded openness that it presupposes, is part of the *spatiality* of place, just as the dynamic character of that relating-separating (relation and separation are not primarily states, but modes of emergence, of unfolding, of coming to presence) belongs to place’s essential *temporality*.²² Thinking can thus be said to arise as a response to the questionability of our placed being in the world. We find ourselves in the world not in some generalised fashion—as if we were everywhere or nowhere—but always *in some place*, and in being *there*, we find ourselves already given over to a situation to which we must respond, a situation in which our own being is already at issue.

The solitariness of thinking, which is the very solitariness *of existence*, is evident in the work of every thinker and writer—but evident in a superlative fashion in those who are most given over to such thinking and writing and so to a reflective engagement in and with

it. Thinking is inextricably tied to such solitariness, is a response to it, and an articulation of it (it also requires it—as it requires a certain free and open space in which to find itself). In White's work, the solitariness at issue here is especially evident in the uncompromisingly personal tone of his writing. The thinking and writing that White undertakes is not some abstract, distanced form of analysis, but is always given in his own voice, through his own situatedness, from out of his own place—and that remains so in spite of the other thinkers and writers whose company White so often invokes. 'In the philosopher', Nietzsche famously writes in *Beyond Good and Evil*, 'there is nothing whatever that is impersonal; and above all, his morality bears decided and decisive witness to who he is'.²³ White's work is suffused with his own presence—his work (and the morality, or better, the *ethics* carried within it) bears clear witness to who he is. White's own references to the 'white world', and his frequent play on 'white' and 'whiteness', is an indication of the extremity to which his work is decisively personal, decisively his own, even as it goes beyond the personal alone. Indeed, it is because White is so clearly and personally present in his work that it can have the interpersonal force and character that it does.

The personal character of his work is something White himself acknowledges, although in terms of the 'individual' rather than the 'personal' as such. He writes:

My stance may seem highly individualistic. It is. I submit that it's with individuals (individuals who have concentrated in their work-field the maximum of general energies and elements) that the really significant developments begin. It's the individual who has taken the time and the pains to develop his/her life and thought who has in the long run, on the long view, in the last analysis, the most to offer society in general.²⁴

The explicitly 'individual' character of White's writing and thinking—its 'personal' character as I have put it here—undoubtedly goes against the grain of most contemporary writing and thinking. It clearly irritates some who see it as a source of pretension—as egoistic and even narcissistic.²⁵ But this is to misunderstand the character of White's work, and perhaps also of the style of thinking that it exemplifies. White's work is founded in the same insistence on the individual voice that is evident in Nietzsche (an insistence that, in Nietzsche, leads to an apparent emphasis on the individual 'genius' as taking precedence over the wider society)—the same individual voice that is evident in so many of the thinkers on whom White himself

draws (and is especially present in the surrealists to whom White stands in an especially close relation). This emphasis on the individual voice may be said to follow directly from White's poetic stance (is not the poet always present in the poem?), but it is not a function of that stance alone. It is directly tied to the character of thinking as indeed arising out of its own placedness—its own singular being in the world—and as a response to it. In White's words, "thought is always connected to sensed space, a lived existence".²⁶ What is at issue in White's thinking is thus White's own existence, White's own life, and it is no surprise to find that life so powerfully and explicitly addressed in White's work: "It's a strange life, this life of mine, full of ups and downs, distance and silence, refusing to separate, for the sake of some facile unity, the near and the far, the sublime and the grotesque, the self and the not-self, the human and the non-human".²⁷

III. The centrality of White's presence in his work is not mitigated by White's occasional tendency to refer to himself in the third person (as, for instance, "our Scottish-born intellectual nomad"²⁸), even though it may serve to placate some of those English readers who find White's personal voice discomfiting. If anything, such oblique self-reference ought to be seen as reinforcing, in a certain sense 'doubling', White's presence—White appearing as if he were the main character in an ongoing narrative, and at the same time, as its narrator. That there is a personal narrative here seems clear enough, regardless of whether it is given in the first or the third person. Indeed, one might view thinking as itself a kind of narration, just as narration is a kind of thinking (and certainly, of *knowing*—'narrative' having its origin in the same root as 'knowledge'). Yet it is not just any narrative that appears in White's writing—the narrative he recounts, the thinking he sets before us, is a narrative that can only be White's own, even though it is a narrative that speaks to more than White's own personal situation, that speaks to and of the world.

White himself has little to say about narrative as such—it may even be thought that he would be a little wary of giving too much attention to the notion (perhaps suspicious, like Plato, of the story—*mythos* in Greek—as a promoter of falsehood²⁹). Yet White's own writing is full of narratives—both his own as well as the narratives of those whom he invokes as travellers on the same path; narratives that are grounded in the places about which White writes, tracing out their contours and direction, following the passages that run in and through them, exploring their clearings and their shadows, and looking always to the

larger world to which they open.

The very idea of narrative carries an important connection to place. Places are given shape and identity through the narratives that belong to them, although since narratives grow around places like weeds in an untended garden, so one must take care to attend to the differences between narratives, and to the possibility that some have merely a superficial connection to the places, and so also the lives, with which they are associated. The narratives that matter cannot be mere inventions or fancies, but must rather be integral to and constitutive of that to which they also belong—in much the same way as a certain geology, ecology, or topography are integral to and constitutive of a locality or region. The narratives that belong to a place or—a life—are thus part of its very fabric and structure, and coming to know and understand that place is thus a matter of differentiating between the narratives that belong to it, that are written into its tracks and contours, from those that are impositions upon it. Although less focused on place as a key concept,³⁰ the sense of narrative at issue here is exemplified in the hermeneuticist Paul Ricoeur's idea of narrative as a fundamental mode—perhaps *the* fundamental mode—of understanding, and in Ricoeur's focus on narrative as central to the structure of human identity³¹

There is, of course, a common tendency—expressed to some extent in Louis Mink's famous claim that stories are not lived, but told³²—to suppose that narratives are always subjective constructs produced by a storyteller. But this is already to adopt a very particular view of the nature of narrative—one that treats narrative as always secondary to what it is about, and as exhausted by its role as essentially a mode of *representation*. What is at issue here, however, is precisely a concept of narrative that is *not* merely representational—even though it may be given *as* a representation—but is rather *ontological* (something especially clear in Ricoeur's account). On this rather different conception, narrative is exemplified not merely by the structure of *our recounting*, but by a structure and form that belongs *to that to which the narrative belongs*—which is why the narrative does indeed *belong* rather than being merely *imposed*.

Narration is the means by which place and the self are shaped *and* understood—it is because places and selves are constituted in and through narratives that they can be understood in that same way. It is also the case that such narration never involves place or the self taken separately, but always and only as they are brought together—as they belong originally together. Self-narration is thus always a narration of place, as place-narration is

also always a narration of self—both individually and collectively. This does not mean that places are ‘subjectively’ constituted any more than they can be said to be constituted ‘objectively’, instead places and selves appear together in intimate relation, each implicating the other, but neither reducible to the other.³³ White’s work exemplifies the sort of narrative inter-articulation of place and self that is evident here—both in terms of the entanglement of his own writing with the places to which that writing belongs, and in terms of the engagement with place that his writing explores. Such inter-articulation has the consequence that neither self nor place can be understood as possessed of some self-same identity that is independent of the other, and this means that the narration of self and of place must remain always incomplete, always indeterminate, always *in question*.³⁴ Self and place are thus essentially open and dynamic structures—each both shaping and shaped by the other; each given over to a constant interplay that always implicates other selves and other places; each taken up in that larger event that is the happening of world.

The mutual shaping of self and place as that occurs in narrative reflects the role of narrative in the shaping of identity as such. *Narrative* is a fundamental mode of *connection*—again something especially evident in Ricoeur—and especially of that form of connection that enables both differentiation and unity. Of unity itself, White comments that “[it] is not something given, to be taken for granted, it has to be composed”,³⁵ and this I take to indicate the character of unity as always something to be worked out, and not merely this, but as also always *complex*—unity is thus never the unity of simple homogeneity or numerical singularity (even though the latter conception is all too often the one that tends to be assumed). Places exemplify the sort of complex and dynamic unity that is at issue here, a unity that I have elsewhere tried to elucidate using the example of old-fashioned topographical surveying in which the unity of a certain domain or region is given through the interconnection between the locations that lie within it (interconnections established through triangulation and traverse). The identity of each location is thus dependent on its interconnection within the larger unity of the region as the identity of the region is dependent on its articulation through the multiplicity of locations.³⁶ In White’s case, the identity and unity of the places that figure in his writings, from Gourgounel to Glasgow, from the St Lawrence River to the Atlantic Coast, have the same character as being worked out through the drawing of multiple connections—connections that are made evident through the connections of those places to White himself, to the lives of those he

encounters, and through the connections that are made within and between those places.

IV. To connect is also to move—to move between and among. If narrative is a connecting, then it is also a moving, and so most basic form of narrative is the narrative of movement, especially the narrative of the passage through, across, and between. It is thus that the earliest stories are so often stories *of journeying*—whether of gods, heroes, or other travellers—and the traveller’s tale would itself seem to be the original precursor to the modern novel. Of his own work, or of a certain vision of that work, White writes that it is “a practice, an activity...which consists in moving about in place (space and time) and trying to say what one is aware of around oneself...”³⁷ Such movement is evident in the style of White’s writing—in its dynamic, active, mobile character—as well as in White’s use of the journey (notably, but not exclusively, as evident in his travel writings) as a key element in his work. The narrative element in White’s work can be discerned in this very emphasis on movement. Yet movement always presupposes free space, *room* (*Raum* in the German)—such space being precisely space *for movement*—space that itself belongs to and arises out of the openness of place. As movement is also, first and foremost, change in or of place, so place is invoked by the very idea of movement. The connection between place and narrative is thus mirrored by the connection between place and movement. The connection is a close one: Movement requires place as its essential precondition; place, in its turn, is articulated and accessed, at the most basic level, through movement.

There is a common tendency to think of place and places as essentially unmoving—an idea perhaps given clearest expression in the thinking associated with the ‘method of loci’ that is part of the art of memory (the *ars memorativa*).³⁸ There memory, which otherwise seems prone to uncertainty and loss, is apparently given fixity precisely through the association of memory with place: what is to be remembered is identified with a particular location, or object within that location, within a larger system of locations—the system usually taking the form of an imagined building (a palace or cathedral) that holds many locations within a single plan. Yet in spite of the way the method of loci is often understood, places themselves are characterised more by their dynamic rather than their static character. That this is so is evident even within the method of loci, in which it is precisely the interconnection between locations, accessed only by means of movement between them, that is the key to the method as the basis for

the art of memory. Thus, the system of locations is an interconnected system that is activated only through the practitioner's engagement within that system—which is to say through movement between those locations (whether real or imagined).

It is, indeed, only through movement, or the capacity for movement, that place is known, and by means of which any engagement with place is possible (it is also the means by which place itself appears *as place*). This is not only evident from the way in which the topographical surveyor depends on triangulation and traverse across a landscape as the means by which the landscape is mapped, but at a more basic level, through the way in which orientation depends on being able to move oneself within and in relation to that place. We find ourselves in place not by simply *remaining* in one place, but by *engaging with* that place, by connecting the place *to ourselves*, which means in the first instance, to our bodies, and by connecting that place *to other places*.

Such engagement and connection is fundamentally based in movement and the capacity for movement. Of course, movement itself requires orientation (that is, if it is not to be *mere* movement—uncoordinated and undirected), but this does not detract from the role of movement, and the capacity for movement, in making possible orientation, and so as basic to any form of genuine placedness. The general connection between movement and orientation that is evident here carries over into the character of thinking. Kant famously makes a connection between bodily and spatial orientation, and orientation in thinking.³⁹ Undoubtedly there is a connection here, and it is tied, at least in part, to thinking as itself requiring a certain space and time that belongs to it—something that Kant also takes up in the first *Critique*, through the discussion of the role of space in representation, and in the third *Critique*, through the notion of 'publicness'.⁴⁰

The connection between thinking and spatiality is evident in the character of narrative. It is also an important element in the solitariness of thinking. In such solitariness there is an essential apartness, which is of necessity also a *spatial* apartness, that appears as an essential element in the character of thinking. The role of spatiality in thinking is also evident in the way in which thinking is tied to the experience of a certain sort of openness—an openness that appears in terms of the experience of both 'interiority' as well as 'exteriority' (which can in turn be tied back to the experience of solitariness). The way thinking opens up an 'inner' space of the self that contrast with an 'outer' space of the wider world is an essential element in the possibility of thought. Although this contrast has

often been misconstrued in ways that have given rise to many problematic tendencies within the history of philosophy, it cannot be abandoned or ignored. Only because thinking does indeed open up in this way, only because it does entail a certain sense of apartness and separation, can it engage reflectively with itself and with its objects. Heidegger writes that 'In the poetry of the poet, and in the thinking of the thinker, there is always so much world- space to spare that each and every thing—a tree, a mountain, a house, the call of a bird—completely loses its indifference and familiarity.'⁴¹ The freeing-up of things to which Heidegger draws attention is a more radical version of the same opening—the same setting apart, in relation to self and to thing, that is also a form of bringing close—that characterises all thinking, and that is part of the character of thinking as not only an unfolding, a temporalizing, but, *as an opening*, also a *spatializing* (and as it is both so it is also genuinely *topological*—space and time standing in an essential relation to place, and neither being reducible to exclusively *physical* concepts⁴²). In the work of a thinker such as White—or, indeed, Heidegger—such spatializing itself becomes part of the very focus for thinking. Thinking becomes both an enactment and an exploration of the very space and place in which it arises and to which it gives rise. "How to inaugurate and develop a new thinking-in-the-territory (implicated in it, not imposed upon it)?" asks White, and he answers: "Maybe thought can be like a landscape—with fields and running waters (fluid concepts). A landscape-mindscape. That's maybe what we could map our way towards"⁴³—towards what looks very close to a genuine 'topology' of thinking as well as a 'thinking' topology.

The connection of thinking to spatiality and to movement takes on a particular character in Nietzsche's thinking—not only through his own explicit thematization of certain places and landscapes, but in his connecting of thinking and writing to bodily movement, especially to walking ("Give no credence to any thought that was not born outdoors while one moved about freely"⁴⁴), and in his seemingly unsettled lifestyle following his resignation of his university post from Basel. The very epigrammatic style of Nietzsche's thought also epitomises its active and dynamic character. White's biography may exhibit a more settled mode of life than Nietzsche's, and his work is expressed in the poem and essay rather than the epigram, and yet it is, as should already be clear, no less active or dynamic. "Live thought", White writes, "is erratic and erotic in its nature, full of tentative explanations and existential energy, and the essay-form proceeds by a series of intellectual sensations and logical leaps".⁴⁵ This emphasis on activity and movement, and

so also on spatiality, as vital characteristics of thought feeds directly into White's characterisation of his thinking, using a notion that Gilles Deleuze also uses specifically in relation to Nietzsche,⁴⁶ as 'nomadic'. The nomadic is a key concept in White's thinking drawing together several important elements: the use of multiple authors and sources; the engagement across traditions and cultures; the active and mobile character of thought; the very openness of world. It is also, of course, a concept that immediately implicates notions of place and the topological, since the nomad is precisely one who is defined by their relation to place, and by the character of that relation.

Although the nomadism to be found in White can indeed be compared to a similar nomadic quality in Nietzsche, it is nevertheless quite distinct from the idea of 'nomad thinking' that appears in Deleuze's work—and remains so in spite of Deleuze's own invocation of Nietzsche in this regard. Writing of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Baudrillard, White comments: "concerned with flight from constrictions, stifling enclosures, and with a line of flight anxious only to flee further and further, beyond all emplacement, into a dimensionless abstract, they are like men who leave a motel to hop onto a jet."⁴⁷ Part of what is at issue here is Deleuze and Guattari's seeming inattention to—one might even say their refusal of—any sense of the proper role to be accorded to the idea of *the bounded* in the thinking of place or of space, and so also, one might add, any real sense of place or of *the open*. Instead the focus is on the move beyond any notion of boundedness (even of horizon) into a space, if it be that, of seemingly endless transmission, transformation and flow.⁴⁸ Moreover, although often cited as theorists of space and place, the nomadism that one finds in Deleuze and Guattari actually has little to do with any notion of the spatial or the topographic except in a metaphorical or figurative sense⁴⁹—spatial and topographic ideas and images are deployed, but neither space nor place, nor world either, is a primary focus of inquiry. The focus of Deleuze and Guattari is almost entirely *political* (that is, it pays little or no attention to ideas and images beyond their political *effects*), and the 'nomadic' becomes, in Deleuze's writings, little more than a trope designed to epitomise a particular form of political resistance and refusal.

In spite of having been an examiner of White's doctoral thesis, Deleuze seems relatively insensitive to the substantive differences between his own position and that of White. When, in collaboration with Félix Guattari, Deleuze briefly discusses White's use of the language of the nomadic in *A Thousand Plateaux*, it is not to identify any differences

in relation to nomadism itself, but seems instead aimed at advancing a purely political critique of what might otherwise be thought of as White's Celticism and eclecticism—specifically his combining of elements from both Western and Eastern traditions. Deleuze and Guattari talk of how, in White's work, "this strange composite, the marriage of the Celt and the Orient, inspires a properly nomad thought that sweeps up English literature and constitutes American literature", then adding:

We immediately see the dangers, the profound ambiguities accompanying in this enterprise, as if each effort and each creation faced a possible infamy. For what can be done to prevent the theme of a race from turning into a racism, a dominant and all-encompassing fascism, or into a sect and a folklore, microfascisms? And what can be done to prevent the oriental pole from becoming a phantasy that reactivates all the fascisms in a different way, and also all the folklores, yoga, Zen, and karate? It is certainly not enough to travel to escape phantasy, and it is certainly not by invoking a past, real or mythical, that one avoids racism.⁵⁰

One might note that neither is it enough to ask rhetorical questions to engage critically, and it is certainly not by merely invoking a danger that one shows a position to be vulnerable to it. The criticism that Deleuze and Guattari advance against White in this passage is so general and so disconnected from White's own work as to be almost irrelevant. White makes no use of the language of race at all—his references to the 'Celtic' cannot be read in racial terms without considerable additional evidence and argument (which is conspicuously absent), and there is nothing to support the idea that his references to Eastern thought are indicative of some sort of Orientalism—even less can one see how a commitment to fascism might be taken to be suggested by White's writings. Nevertheless, what Deleuze and Guattari's response to White exemplifies is a tendency that is not restricted to Deleuze and Guattari alone, but that seems to come all too easily, and all too frequently, in response to any attempt to take up the placed character of thinking.

The way White draws upon ideas of the 'Celtic'—as well as of the Northern and the Atlantic—bears comparison with Nietzsche's opposition of the 'Southern' with the 'Northern', in Nietzsche's case meaning, primarily, the 'Prussian', or Albert Camus' use of the idea of the 'Mediterranean' as contrasted with the 'European'.⁵¹ Here thinking is directly tied to a place or a region—in Nietzsche and Camus' case, in a way that is also polemical and

oppositional. Although seldom directed in the same way at Nietzsche (perhaps surprisingly), thinkers who connect thinking to a place or region in this way are often the target for exactly the sort of critique that Deleuze and Guattari direct at White. This is especially so in the case of Camus, whose work has often been attacked for its supposedly implicit colonialist and racist biases, and whose emphasis on a Mediterranean sensibility (also present in the work of his close friend René Char) is frequently seen as exclusionary and parochial.⁵²

Yet although it might be argued that there are complications in Camus' case (arising largely from his own Algerian background), it is by no means obvious that the connecting of a certain character or quality of thinking to a place or a region, whether in White, Nietzsche, Camus, or others, is indeed such as generally to warrant accusations of parochialism, implicit racism or fascism. In the case of Nietzsche and Camus, their appeal to notions of place and region is itself advanced, often quite explicitly, as a counter to certain forms of nationalist and racist sentiment. It can also be seen as part of an attempt to disrupt the usual ordering of things and to reorient thinking towards a different landscape—to shift the focus of attention from the centre and towards the margins. For Nietzsche, this means shifting attention from North to South, from the 'German' to the 'European', for Camus, from the 'European' to the 'Mediterranean' and the Southern—for White it is a shift to the coast, to the far North (the 'Hyperborean'), to the Atlantic, to the 'Celtic fringe' of Europe.⁵³

Situated at another edge, in Tasmania, at the edge of the extreme South (the 'Hyperaustrean' perhaps), this shift to the margin is especially salient—and significant. The emphasis on the margin, the edge, the border is characteristic of precisely that mode of thinking that turns explicitly toward place. Such thinking is a thinking of, and typically at, the edge, since it is there, and not at the centre, that place most readily appears—indeed, the Greek *topos* is itself tied notions of surface and limit, and so this focus on the edge can be understood as already present in the very idea of place as such.⁵⁴ White locates himself at the borders, not only through his location in Brittany, or in his focus on Scotland, but also through his intellectual location at the margins of contemporary intellectual culture, fitting into no 'dominant paradigm' and, like Nietzsche, aiming to unsettle existing trends and traditions: "Drifting, drifting ... that's the way it looks on the edges of our civilization. A drifting, a searching, beyond all the known grounds, for an *other* ground... an other ground: a space of being, an area of the mind; and the way(s) to it".⁵⁵ It is just this marginal space

that is at issue in White's invocation of the place "where Hegel meets the Chinese gulls"—a place that is indeed marginal, as are all meeting points; a place that is uncertain and ambiguous; a place that is genuinely open.

One of the great complications in any discussion of this matter is, of course, Heidegger himself. Heidegger connects his thinking with a place and region in a quite explicit fashion—not only does Heidegger himself talk of the rootedness of his thinking in the Alemannic-Swabian countryside, but he also privileges the German and Greek languages as languages for thinking. Moreover, in Heidegger's case, the charge that such place-oriented thinking is indeed tied to nationalism, as well as to racism and fascism, is frequently taken to be directly substantiated by Heidegger's personal involvement with Nazism, as well as by the Nazi's own apparent invocation of notions of place and belonging to place. The emphasis on the 'apparent' is important, however, as the Nazi's use of such notions was never more than superficial—their commitment to both a biologicistic view of the human and a totalitarian politics being deeply antagonistic to any approach that would give priority to place and the human connection to place.⁵⁶ In Heidegger's case, there is a clear rejection of such biologism, and there is also good reason to take his engagement with place as itself part of what moves him away from Nazism rather than closer to it. The increasing explication and elaboration of topographic notions in his thinking is a feature of his thinking in the period after 1933-34, rather than before, reaching its clearest focus in his writings after the war, in the 'fifties and 'sixties.⁵⁷

Moreover, the concept of place that emerges in Heidegger's thinking, especially his late thinking, is not the idea of some homogenous and determinate 'ground' that underlies individual or collective identity nor is the relation to place a matter of simple rootedness in a single unchanging locale. Instead, place is that which is both questionable and the very ground of questionability—it is that which encompasses unity as well as difference, limit as well as openness, movement as well as rest. Thus the Fourfold that appears in Heidegger's later writings is an essentially relational structure that resists reduction to any single one of the elements that make it up, and that, through the gathering of elements also allows the differentiation of those elements to be apparent. The Fourfold is itself a dynamic structure—Heidegger talks of it as a 'dance', a 'roundelay'—it is the very opening of world as that occurs, necessarily, through the opening of place. Although White himself sometimes presents Heidegger as given over to residence rather than journeying, the Fourfold should

not be understood as implying any purely sedentary mode of existence. Already, in his lectures on Hölderlin's *Der Ister*, Heidegger talked of residence and journey as belonging essentially together—so the river is both locality (*Ortschaft*) and journeying (*Wanderung*).⁵⁸ If we think of the river as itself that which has the capacity to gather, and so as the locus for the happening the Fourfold, then the river makes evident the character of the Fourfold as that which enables residence, as that encompasses journeying, and journey, as that encompasses residence. The much-misunderstood notion of 'dwelling' (*Wohnen*) is thus not a matter of remaining rooted in a single spot, but rather implies an active mode of engagement in the world that recognises its own finitude—its own placedness. White's own emphasis on both residence and journeying—one of the points on which his work is clearly differentiated from that of writers such as Deleuze and Guattari—is thus one of the points on which he is actually, in spite of his comments to the contrary, brought close to Heidegger.

This emphasis on the importance of attending to both journey and residence has an important precedent in Kant, and especially in Kant's conception of himself (along with Hume) as a 'geographer of reason. Kant is the one who introduces the idea of the 'nomadic' into philosophy, although he understands it rather differently from White, and, although negatively disposed toward it, in a manner closer to Deleuze and Guattari. Thus, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant contrasts those who would aim to rebuild the house of metaphysics on a single plan with those "nomads who abhor all permanent cultivation of the soil."⁵⁹ Kant rejects the grandiose plans of traditional metaphysics (in the *Critique* he concludes that we have only the materials to build a modest residence—*Wohnhaus*—that is just sufficient for our needs and no more⁶⁰), and yet he also argues that philosophical nomadism (which he associates with extreme forms of skepticism and empiricism) is inadequate in that it provides only a "resting-place [*Ruheplatz*]", but "not a dwelling-place for permanent residence [*Wohnplatz*]"⁶¹ Kant acknowledges a certain capacity for movement as essential to the mapping of reason that he aims to undertake (the bounds of reason can only be marked out through engaging with the territory in which reason is situated), but also objects to what he takes to be the nomadic refusal of residence—a refusal that is, for Kant, in large part a refusal to recognize our own prior belonging to the world. The critique of traditional metaphysics, as well as nomadism, arises, in part, out of a recognition of this prior belonging, and of the manner in which it serves to ground knowledge and

understanding within their proper limits.⁶²

V. The placed character of White's thought, and its own thematization of that placedness, is itself tied to a feature that also belongs essentially to the poetic: its rootedness in the situated and concrete. Even the most abstract of poetry has its origins in sensory experience – and almost all poetry begins in a close attentiveness to the ordinary details of the world. It is in those details, and not apart from them, that any real transcendence—understood more as an opening into than a going beyond—is to be found. At the end of *Letters from Gourgounel*, White writes, “And I blessed the name of poetry, and up there in that wood, knew the glory of the poet, the real poet, who writes and speaks from the heart of nature, his greater home, and sends its living streams through the world”.⁶³ The experience that lies behind these words is an experience of nature, not merely as that which is distinct from the ‘human’, but also as the sheer and constant presencing of being. That experience is one that comes to White, not in any abstracted realm of the mind (if there could truly be such) nor in some anonymous and emptied location apart from the world, but “high up there on the slope of the valley, among the chestnuts and the whins... near thick clumps of pink *serpolet*”.⁶⁴ We find the world by entering into it, and it is place that is the entry into world—where, one might say, the world has its beginning—and where perhaps the poetic has its origin also, so the poetic is always a speaking and working ‘out’ of place.

The poetic vision that is at issue here clearly has close affinities with surrealism—with its refusal of separation and its re-embrace of the world. Such a connection is an obvious one to make given White's own early influences and interests. Yet it not a vision confined to surrealism alone—Bashō's poetry, for instance, also important for White, is just as much tied to a vision of the essential intimacy of self and world, and to the concrete experience of that intimacy. Moreover, even the emphasis on this vision as *poetic* cannot be taken to imply that it belongs only to poetry. The *poetics* of place and of the world that is surely invoked here concerns the intimacy of the relation of language and place, and of word with world, and so relates to an understanding of language that sees it as inseparably tied to the opening of world. This too is something powerfully present in Heidegger's thought as well as White's. For this reason, one might argue that Heidegger's own apparent linguistic chauvinism—the prioritization of German and Greek—is less to do with any form of nationalistic blindness, than a reflection of Heidegger's own inability to think other than

in those languages in which he is already 'at home'. One might say that the only language in which we can genuinely think—or in which we can poetize (which is perhaps not far from being the same thing)—is indeed our own. If Heidegger did not put it in just these terms himself, it is perhaps a result of his inability to distinguish his own thought from thinking as such—a philosophical egotism to which he was undoubtedly prone—rather than of any simple nationalistic sentiment. Yet every thinker is surely tied to their home language as is every poet to their native tongue. White may be thought to present an intriguing case, in this regard, working as he does across both English and French—although his poetry, the real essence of his thinking, is, for the most part, in English and not in French. It is thus that White is rightly regarded as a poet of the English language, rather than the French.

It is not uncommon, of course, to find language being cited, not as that which gives us entry to the world, but rather as that which obstructs or prevents such access. Language is, in Nietzsche's phrase, a 'prison-house', and as such surely something to be escaped from or struggled against—so language is that which must be overcome, surpassed, or somehow got beyond. Notwithstanding what is at play in this idea in Nietzsche (and what he may have intended by it), there is something deeply problematic about such a view. It is a view that essentially separates language from the world—since as a prison language presumably holds us apart from things—and in so doing, it empties language of meaning and of the possibility of truth ("Being not without language [Sein nicht ohne Sprache]", writes Heidegger, but also "language not without being [Sprache nicht ohne Sein]"⁶⁵) Understood as a prison house, language becomes a mere play of elements devoid of significance, while the world is rendered inaccessible to and hidden from us—a mystery that can properly not even be grasped as a mystery.

Just as we enter the world only through the places in which we reside and in which we act, so too is that entry is one that takes place in and through language. It is in our speaking that the world is opened to us—which is why poetry looms so large here. The significance of poetry does not lie in any capacity somehow to go beyond language—as if poetry was capable of breaking through the very language on which it depends—but rather because poetry speaks to the very essence of language and world as they belong together. Heidegger famously says, in the 'Letter on Humanism', that 'language is the house of being'.⁶⁶ This remark resounds and is repeated throughout the 'Letter'. There is nothing to indicate that this is a remark intended 'metaphorically, but instead it points towards a

more originary sense of 'house' (and of 'home') that is given in language and its relation to being. Language is that which shelters being, which allows being to come into its own, and which is also that in which the human properly dwells and in which it finds its essence. As language is the house of being, then so it is a house that takes as many forms as there are languages—and there is indeed no language that stands above and apart from this multiplicity. Language is thus always given over, as is being, to such multiplicity, at the same time as it also carries within it an essential unity.

The character of language as the 'house' of being points towards an essential spatiality, or better dimensionality, that belongs to language and to being. As the house of being, language provides space for being—it gives it *room*. The connection at issue here, in which space and place are both implicated, is one already presaged in the discussion of the relation between spatiality and *thinking*. The space that thinking requires and that it opens up is a space that is given only in relation to language. It is not only thinking that is implicated here, however, but *being*, and being itself appears as a certain fundamental mode of dimensionality. Thus Heidegger comments that "everything spatial and all time-space occur essentially in the dimensionality that being itself is".⁶⁷ It is this dimensionality that appears, in White's terms, as the *openness* of world—and in the *opening* of world as that occurs in and out of *place*. Such opening is also the opening, the *happening*, of being. It is an opening in which the word, understood as *logos* and not merely as *verbum*, plays an essential role. It is, moreover, through the word of poetry—whether the poetry of the essay or the poem—that this relation between word and world comes most clearly into view.

¹ *Coast to Coast: Interviews and Conversations 1985-1995* (Glasgow: Open World, 1996), p.116

² Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1989), p.165.

³ 'Kentigern on Atlantic Quay', in *On Scottish Ground* (Edinburg: Polygon, 1998), p.200

⁴ 'The White Bag of Books', in *The Wanderer and his Charts: exploring the fields of vagrant thought and vagabond beauty* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 2010), p.173.

⁵⁵ See Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

- ⁶ *Coast to Coast: Interviews and Conversations 1985-1995* (Glasgow: Open World, 1996), p.122.
- ⁷ See my *Heidegger's Topology* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), and also *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2012).
- ⁸ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A760/B 788; see also Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel, 'Kant's Geography of Reason', in Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta (eds), *Kant's Geography* (New York: SUNY Press, 2011), pp.195-214.
- ⁹ Heidegger, 'Seminar in Le Thor 1069', in *Four Seminars*, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell and François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), p.47—see also Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006).
- ¹⁰ See Heidegger, Heidegger, "Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?," in *Heidegger: The Man and The Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), pp. 27-30—see also White's own short poem "'Black Forest—Heidegger at Home'," in *Open World. The Collected Poems 1960-2000* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 2003), p.92.
- ¹¹ See Jeff Malpas, 'We Hyperboreans: Notes Towards a Nietzschean Topography', in Julian Young (ed.), *Nietzsche: Individual and Community* (New York: Cambridge University Press, in press, 2014).
- ¹² *Letters from Gourgounel* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966).
- ¹³ 'The Complex Field', in *The Wanderer and his Charts*, p.147.
- ¹⁴ Most notably so in 'An Atlantic studio', *House of Tides: Letters from Brittany and other lands of the west* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 2000), pp.43-50.
- ¹⁵ It is a particular focus in *House of Tides: Letters from Brittany and other lands of the west*.
- ¹⁶ 'Along the Atlantic Coast', *The Wanderer and His Charts*, p.122.
- ¹⁷ So Hannah Arendt seems to suggest—see *The Life of the Mind*, (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), Vol 1, pp.197-216. Arendt's position is complicated, however, and, in the final analysis, perhaps not so far removed from the position described here. See Malpas, 'The Place of Thinking: Finitude, Time, and *Topos*', forthcoming, *Philosophy Today*.
- ¹⁸ See Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

- ¹⁹ “La poésie est la solitude sans distance parmi l’affairement de tous” —Char, *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1983), p.742.
- ²⁰ See Malpas, *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- ²¹ See Malpas, *Rethinking Dwelling: Heidegger and the Question of Place*, with a foreword by Ross Jenner. (Auckland: enigma:he aupiki—*Interstices* | matariki editions, 2013).
- ²² See Malpas, ‘Putting Space in Place: Relational Geography and Philosophical Topography’, *Planning and Environment D: Space and Society*, 30 (2012), pp.226-242.
- ²³ *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), §6.
- ²⁴ ‘The White Bag of Books’, in *The Wanderer and his Charts*, p.178. White has himself acknowledged the charge of egoism: “Ego-centered? Yes, of course, on what else would you want to focus? One has to focus on the ego, concentrate on it, and move across it to enter the open field. Without this, one becomes caught up in all sorts of camouflaged egoism”, White, *Les Limbes incandescent* (Paris, Denoël, 1976), p. 114.
- ²⁵ The most extreme version of this reaction undoubtedly being James Kelman, ‘There is a first-order radical thinker of European standing such that he exists: or, tantalising twinkles’, in *And the Judges Said...: Essays* (Edinburgh: Polygon, 2002), 187-193. Ironically, Kelman’s parodic critique seems expressive of a form of intellectual self-certainty that is no less problematic than any pretention that could possibly be found in White.
- ²⁶ *The Wanderer and his Charts* p.viii.
- ²⁷ ‘Letter from the Pyrenees’, *The Wanderer and His Charts*, p.41.
- ²⁸ ‘On Scottish Ground’, pp. 120–1)),
- ²⁹ See Plato, *The Republic*, 2.377.
- ³⁰ Although see his comments in *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
- ³¹ See Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols., trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 1985, 1988).
- ³² Louis Mink, *Historical Understanding* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p.60
- ³³ The nature of this inter-relation is something explored in more detail in Malpas, *Place and Experience*, as well as in *Heidegger’s Topology*, where the issue is examined specifically in relation to Heidegger’s concept of the Fourfold in which mortals, divinities, earth, and sky stand in an essential and inextricable relation to one another. In *Place and Experience*, an

important distinction is also made between place as a fundamental ontological structure (that which grounds all and any appearing including the appearing of specific selves and places) and individual places—see *Place and Experience*, pp.xx-xx.

³⁴ See Malpas, *Rethinking Dwelling*.

³⁵ 'Along the Atlantic Coast', *The Wanderer and his Charts*, p.123.

³⁶ See Malpas, *Place and Experience*.

³⁷ 'The Complex Field', *The Wanderer and his Charts*', 144—White adds: "But what is this place, and what is that 'self'?"

³⁸ For more on this topic see Frances Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966)—see also the discussion of this in Malpas, 'The Remembrance of Place', in Azucena Cruz-Pierre and Don Landes (eds), *The Voice of Place: Essays and Interviews Exploring the Work of Edward S. Casey* (London: Continuum, 2013), pp.xx-xx.

³⁹ Kant, "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" trans. H. B. Nisbet, in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge,

⁴⁰ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*.

⁴¹ Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p.28.

⁴² See Malpas, 'Putting Space in Place: Relational Geography and Philosophical Topography', pp.xx-xx.

⁴³ 'Meditation in Winter', in *The Wanderer and his Charts*, p.63. Notice the emphasis here on thinking that is "implicated in" and not "imposed upon"—a similar point to that at issue in the discussion of narrative above.

⁴⁴ *Ecce Homo* in *The Genealogy of Morals/Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1989), pp.239-40.

⁴⁵ *The Wanderer and his Charts*, p. vii

⁴⁶ See Gilles Deleuze, 'Nomad Thought,' in David B. Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation* (Cambridge Mass. & London: The MIT Press, 1985), pp. 142-9.

⁴⁷ 'Elements of a New Cartography', *The Wanderer and His Charts*, pp.164-5.

⁴⁸ This flight into 'a dimensionless abstract' seems to have become characteristic of much contemporary theory—see Malpas, 'Putting Space in Place: Relational Geography and Philosophical Topography'.

- ⁴⁹ Although a feature of *A Thousand Plateaux*, this metaphoric deployment of the spatial and topographic is also evident in their treatment of Nietzsche—see Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London: Verso, 1994)—and is given particular emphasis in Stephan Günzel’s development of this theme in his *Geophilosophie: Nietzsches philosophische Geographie* (Berlin Akademie Verlag, 2001)—see also Günzel, ‘Nietzsche’s Geophilosophie’, *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 25 (2003), pp.103-16.
- ⁵⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaux: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), p.379
- ⁵¹ See Camus, ‘The New Mediterranean Culture’ in Neil Foxlee, *Albert Camus’s ‘The New Mediterranean Culture’: A Text and Its Contexts* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010), pp.38-49 (annotated translation); see also Camus, ‘Helen’s Exile’ in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), pp.185-192.
- ⁵² See especially Conor Cruise O’Brien in ‘Camus, Algeria, and “The Fall”’, *New York Review of Books* (9 October 1969), pp.6, 8, 10-12.
- ⁵³ It is noteworthy that for all three, whatever other landscapes they invoke (the mountain and high plateau in Nietzsche, for instance), the coastal is especially important—Nietzsche extols the virtues of Genoa and Venice; the very idea of the Mediterranean in Camus is the idea of a region of coast and island; White, of course looks to the Atlantic coast. The coastal is essentially marginal, liminal, a point of departure as well as meeting.
- ⁵⁴ The idea of the edge has become an important focus in Ed Casey’s work—it is a topic explored in a number of his essays—see, for instance, ‘Border versus boundary at La Frontera’, *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 29 (2011), pp.384-398—while surface and limit loom large in my own work also.
- ⁵⁵ Preface to *Travels in the Drifting Dawn* (London: Penguin, 1990), p.7.
- ⁵⁶ See my discussion of some of the issues at stake here in *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*.
- ⁵⁷ See the brief discussion of this matter in Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology* pp.xx-xx. None of this means, however, that Heidegger was immune to all of the political prejudices and blindspots of his time or that he was not also prone to the intoxication that comes with power or the seeming promise of power—as is clear from his Notebooks from the 1930s (the so-called *Schwarze Hefte*), *Überlegungen II–VI* («Schwarze Hefte» 1931–1938),

Gesamtausgabe Vol 94, ed. Peter Trawny (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014).

⁵⁸ Heidegger, Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister", trans. William McNeill & Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996)—see esp. pp.27-33.

⁵⁹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, Aix

⁶⁰ See *Critique of Pure Reason*, B735.

⁶¹ *Critique of Pure Reason*, A761/B789

⁶² See Kant's comments at the end of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*,₂ Trans. E. F. Goerwitz (London: Swann Sonnenschein & Co, 1900, Thoemmes Press reprint, 1992), p.114.

⁶³ *Letters from Gourgounel*, p.141.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.139.

⁶⁵ *Überlegungen II–VI*, p.11.

⁶⁶ 'Letter on Humanism', trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.239-276.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.254. For more on the relation between being and language, and the role of place in this relation, see Malpas, 'The Beckoning of Language: Heidegger's Hermeneutic Transformation of Philosophy', unpublished.